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Abstract 
Developing effective strategic thinkers in an organization requires a dedication to early 
identification, selection, development, and practice, along with the conceptual understanding and 
measurement tools to make it happen.  In support of this, the current research focused on three 
objectives: 1) establishing theoretical support across multiple disciplines for the concept of a 
strategic thinking mindset, 2) developing the Strategic Thinking Mindset Test (STMT) using 
situational judgment test methodology for the U.S. Army, and 3) evaluating the results of a pilot 
test of the STMT for reliability and construct validity.  
The STMT focuses on three characteristics of a strategic mindset: Flexibility, Humility, 
and Inclusiveness.  These characteristics were derived from themes found common to strategic 
thinking literature across the disciplines of psychology, management, and military science. 
In all stages of this research, officers and non-commissioned officers of the U.S. Army 
served as participants.  The first three stages involve the development and keying of content for 
the STMT.  A sample of 125 participants provided scenarios in Stage 1.  In Stage 2, 75 
participants gave feedback on the scenarios and provided realistic response options.  In Stage 3, 
224 participants rated the response options according to expression of the characteristic and 
effectiveness.  In Stage 4, the pilot version of the STMT was administered to 229 participants, 
along with several other measures used to establish construct validity evidence. 
The results of the pilot test revealed that, although there is some evidence supporting the 
construct validity of the STMT as a three-factor test of flexibility, humility, and inclusiveness, 
the overall profile of evidence suggests that the construct(s) being measured are unclear.  Low 
inter-item correlations contribute to a low internal consistency in the measure, which further 
limits the STMT’s use as a predictor.  The pilot test revealed interesting results related to 
  
cognitive ability, specifically a negative relationship between the mindset and cognitive ability 
under best/worst response instructions, rather than a positive relationship or no relationship, as 
was the case under most/least likely response instructions.  Future research recommendations are 
discussed in the areas of SJT development, scoring, format, and the further refinement and 
measurement of the strategic thinking mindset. 
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Chapter 1 - Problem Statement 
Over the past several decades, organizations have evolved their structures and processes 
in response to increased complexity and environmental unpredictability (Huber, 2011).  
Common organizational structures in the past were highly bureaucratic, characterized by clear 
hierarchical levels and functional divisions.  In contrast, many organizations today are better 
characterized as being "adhocracies" (cf., Toffler, 1970), often under pressure to become 
increasingly agile and responsive to the environment, with many developing structures and 
processes that are more decentralized and flexible (Huber, 2004).   
In many industries, the current organizational context can be seen as a complex adaptive 
system (Cunha & Cunha, 2006), or a system that feature a large number of individual agents 
continuously interacting and adapting to each other in unique ways, producing system-wide 
effects that are largely unpredictable and constantly evolving (Anderson, 1999).  The 
environmental context of an organization is critical to determining how it can best go about 
conducting strategic planning.  Stieglitz, Knudsen, and Becker (2015) describe how the 
importance of strategic exploration and flexibility vary depending on the environment’s 
dynamism.  Environments characterized by persistent trends and few structural shifts require 
different strategic choices than those characterized by dynamic changes in the direction, 
magnitude, and frequency of relevant environmental forces.   
Such dynamic environments represent complex adaptive systems. To the extent that an 
organization exists within this type of environment, executing strategy to ensure organizational 
prosperity becomes an increasingly difficult task and requires a greater investment in developing 
competence in strategic thinking throughout the organization, particularly among its leaders.  As 
such, strategic thinking has become an imperative for modern businesses (Duhaime, Stimpert, & 
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Chesley, 2012) and a crucial research focus, not only because of the importance of strategic 
thinking to ensuring long-term organizational success, but also because there is evidence that 
leaders across industries lack highly developed strategic thinking skills (Bethel, Prupas, Ruby, & 
Smith, 2010; Bonn, 2001; Krepinevich & Watts, 2009). 
Research on strategic thinking has focused not only on the conceptualization of what 
strategic thinking entails (Graetz, 2002; Liedtka, 1998a), but also how it is developed (Bonn, 
2001, 2005; Goldman & Casey 2010; Eifler, 2012), and how strategic managers struggle with it 
(Moldoveanu, 2009).  Among the scholars in the area, there seems to be a consensus that time 
and certain experiences are needed to develop strategic thinking (Dragoni, Oh, Vankatwyk, & 
Tesluk, 2011; Goldman, 2008).  For example, Goldman (2008) described the importance of 
spearheading a growth initiative or doing strategic planning activities in order to develop 
strategic thinking.  This trend has also been noted by military scholars as a necessary evolution 
for the armed forces (Alberts & Hayes, 2003).  The Army Research Institute for the Behavioral 
and Social Sciences has recently conducted a line of research exploring the needs for better 
strategic thinking development in the U.S. Army (e.g., Wolters, Grome, & Hinds, 2013; Sackett, 
Karrasch, Weyhrauch, & Goldman, 2016).  Similar to the process described by Goldman, Army 
officers with high potential are often rotated through a variety of broadening experiences as they 
rise in rank, in part to gain the perspective and knowledge necessary to be effective at strategic 
levels of command (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2009).  
If certain experiences are necessary to develop strategic thinking, a practical problem 
quickly emerges in that it becomes essential for organizational decision makers to know how to 
assign such activities.  That is, in order to optimize the development of strategic thinkers for an 
organization, leaders must make informed decisions about who has potential for positions at 
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higher organizational levels so that they can be properly mentored and subsequently promoted to 
positions that will help them further develop and utilize their strategic thinking skills.   
There are a variety of constructs that could be used to predict one’s potential for strategic 
thinking.  For example, general and technical knowledge, intelligence, creativity, adaptability, 
and personality have been proposed as predictors of strategic cognitive readiness in the military 
(Grier, 2012).  A similar list from the management literature includes cognitive ability, 
personality, and work experience (Dragoni et al., 2011).  
The purpose of the current research is to contribute to this literature on the understanding 
and development of strategic thinking by conceptualizing a new construct with the potential to 
predict and forecast strategic thinking ability: the strategic thinking mindset. Furthermore, this 
research will aim to develop a measure of strategic thinking mindset for use in the military.   
Broadly speaking, the strategic thinking mindset reflects the tendency for an individual to 
approach problems in a manner that is consistent with the elements of strategic thinking, 
specifically in terms of flexibility, humility, and inclusiveness.  Whereas others have referenced 
a strategic thinking mindset (Pisapia, Reyes-Guerra, & Coukos-Semmel, 2005; Yorks & 
Nicolaides, 2012), their conceptualizations and operationalizations are limited.  Pisapia et al. 
(2005) developed a three-dimensional self-report measure of a strategic leader’s thinking 
mindset, focusing on systems-thinking, reflecting, and reframing.  However, more work is 
needed in measurement development in the area of strategic thinking mindset. 
 Developing a Situational Judgment Test of Strategic Thinking Mindset 
To become a successful strategic thinker, having a mindset for strategic thinking is 
crucial, in combination with cognitive ability and extensive knowledge.  The ability to assess that 
mindset has clear practical and theoretical benefits for academics and practitioners concerned 
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with strategic thinking as a competency.  This research seeks to access strategic thinking mindset 
more directly through a situational judgment test (SJT).   
One previous attempt has been made to measure a similar concept, but faces certain 
limitations that the current measure is designed to overcome.  The Pisapia et al. (2005) Strategic 
Thinking Questionnaire, which reflects the first author’s theory on strategic leadership (see also 
Pisapia, 2009), faces a limitation common among behavioral self-report measures.  Specifically, 
the measure results in high means and small variance, suggesting the presence of social 
desirability bias by respondents confirming their tendency to exhibit the behaviors described.  
For example, Pisapia et al. report a mean of 4.20 (out of 5) and a standard deviation of 0.72 for 
the item “Evaluate a situation using many different viewpoints.”  
Using an SJT format, respondents’ mindsets are measured by their choices regarding 
specified problem scenarios, in which their tendency to adopt a strategic mindset in response to 
those problems are inferred from the courses of action they endorse.  This approach provides 
superior validity by making it more difficult for respondents to perceive the desirable response 
and to tailor their responding accordingly.  Instead, the respondent’s mindset is accessed more 
directly through concrete scenarios, rather than abstract and generic self-assessments.  This 
approach should also provide higher face validity for its users.  While this is not a necessary 
condition for assessment, it is an important consideration in organizational applications, resulting 
in more positive reactions among test takers and greater investment in assessment-related 
feedback (Hausknecht, Day, & Thomas, 2004). 
Another practical advantage for using an SJT format to assess the strategic thinking 
mindset includes the opportunity to assess a wider candidate pool in searching for future strategic 
thinkers in an organization.  Compared to assessment centers or work simulations requiring 
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trained assessors and simulation environments, paper-and-pencil SJTs are simpler and cheaper to 
administer.  Therefore SJTs could be used to assess more personnel than would likely be feasible 
with assessment centers or simulation exercises.  Furthermore, assessing strategic thinking 
mindset apart from ability permits earlier identification of potential, prior to a point in that 
person’s career when he or she will have had the opportunity to demonstrate strategic thinking 
skills.  With earlier identification of potential, mentorship and development can occur for a 
longer period prior to placement in a strategic-level position. 
 There are also practical benefits of a strategic thinking mindset assessment that uses an 
SJT methodology.  From the test takers’ perspective, they can learn from the results of the SJT 
about the ways in which their thought processes deviate from what theory says about dealing 
with strategic problems, allowing them to seek out development on their own and raise their 
metacognitive awareness, a key element of strategic thinking. 
SJTs are typically produced using scenarios from a certain domain of work performance.   
The U.S. Army was available as a supporting organization available for this research and 
interested in the assessment of strategic thinking competencies.  To balance applicability to the 
Army and rooting scenarios in a specified work domain, the problem scenarios forming the basis 
of the item content were collected from Company-grade Army officers and designed to reflect 
that general work domain, independent of military occupational specialty (MOS).  This allows 
the developed instrument to be used widely throughout military organizations. 
This research makes three primary contributions.  First, this project contributes 
substantially to conceptual work in understanding strategic thinking, by integrating theories of 
strategic thought and identifying the non-cognitive aspects of strategic thinking, covering the 
disciplines of psychology, management, and military doctrine and theory.  Secondly, in 
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developing an instrument capable of assessing the strategic thinking mindset, this research makes 
a contribution to the selection, promotion, development, and mentoring of young officers in the 
military.  Given the extensive work required to produce SJT items and collect sufficient response 
data to assess item and scale functioning, this is an important contribution.  Finally, the 
conceptualization, development, and outcomes of this effort may serve as a guide to other 
researchers in their own efforts to construct similar tests of strategic thinking mindset in other 
jobs and industries.  
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Chapter 2 - Academic Background 
 The Meaning of Strategy 
The English word strategy is rooted in the Greek term strategos meaning “army leader.”  
Within this context, the U.S. military defines strategy as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for 
employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve 
theater, national, and/or multinational objectives” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013, p. 294).  
Despite its origins in war, however, the term is now frequently employed in other contexts.  For 
example, managerial scholars have defined strategy in terms of outmaneuvering competitors by 
“finding alternative ways of competing and providing customer value” (Abraham, 2005, p. 5).  In 
game theory, strategy is a mathematical concept, specified by a functional equation which 
determines an action given the sequence of previous actions (Pelc & Pelc, 2009).  In human 
cognitive development, strategies are “non-obligatory, goal-directed activities designed to 
enhance task performance that are potentially available to conscious awareness” (Schwenk, 
Bjorklund, & Schneider, 2009, p. 1034).  Regardless of the specific discipline defining the 
concept, it is clear that a constant theme underlying strategy concepts is the notion of a carefully 
developed plan meant to guide the actions of a party in seeking an objective. 
In Freedman’s (2013) work on summarizing the history of the study of strategy, he 
provides a broad definition of strategy as “the art of creating power” (2013, p. xii).  Power can be 
conceived of in many ways.  Freedman structures his history according to three domains in 
which strategy has evolved: military strategies of force, social-political revolutions operating 
“from below,” (p. 245) and business management strategies as viewed “from above” (p. 457).  
Freedman makes a substantial contribution to the field of strategy by describing how leaders and 
revolutionaries across history, up to the present, have sought a rational understanding of how to 
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be a successful strategist, despite the inescapable problem that problems of a strategic nature do 
not lend themselves to complete understanding and control by a single individual.  For 
Freedman, the “master strategist,” (p. 237) who is able to foresee the future and execute a 
planned strategic victory, is a myth.  The best a strategist can do is identify ways to improve the 
group’s position in relation to environmental objectives, step by step, rather than through a pre-
determined sequence of moves.  The idea of positioning is central to an important paper by 
Porter (1996).  Porter emphasized that operational effectiveness is necessary, but not sufficient, 
for strategic success.  One’s positioning in relation to others in the environment is crucial. 
For the current research, strategy (and thus strategic thinking) should be understood in the 
same context as Freedman (2013), with a broader scope than the private sector, competitive 
consumer market context of Porter (1996), or the national security context of Yarger (2008) and 
the U.S. Department of Defense.  The purpose of strategy is the positioning of an organization 
effectively in a highly complex, dynamically adaptive environment.  Put another way, “it is 
future oriented behavior concerned with [the] dynamic and complex relationship of the 
organization with its environment.  It is a continuous process…which should produce an 
improved future state for the organization” (Wheatley, Anthony, & Maddox, 1991; p. 52). 
 What is Strategic Thinking? 
Extensive scholarship within the military, private sector, and other academic disciplines 
has been conducted on strategy development, strategic planning, and a wide assortment of 
related concepts.  More recently, researchers have focused on strategic thinking at the 
organizational culture level (Goldman & Casey, 2010), the individual level (Liedtka, 1998a), and 
both (Bonn, 2001; 2005).  
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 As alluded to earlier, disciplines vary in their concept of strategy.  The same applies to 
strategic thinking, primarily discussed in military and organizational science.  Yet, the 
differences are largely outweighed by points of agreement.  Two broad schools of thought exist 
on how strategy is developed and what sort of thinking is required.  These schools mirror the 
general question of whether strategy is deliberate or emergent. 
The first school of thought, which suggests that strategy development and strategic 
thinking are highly analytical and focus on deliberate processes to frame the environment and 
determine the most effective strategy, can be described as the strategic planning school.  An 
example of strategic thinking viewed from this perspective is that of Porter (1987), who asserts 
that developing strategy should be a deliberate process of employing analytical techniques.  For 
example, he proposed a five forces framework for analyzing a system (e.g., an industry) and 
developing strategies during long-range planning.  Others in this school often advocate their own 
unique process approach to strategic thinking, such as the highly systematic six-step process of 
Zabriskie and Huellmantel (1991) or the similarly deliberate cognitive mapping approach of 
Eden (1990).  
 The strategic planning approach was updated by Mintzberg (1994a, 1994b), who 
described a new approach that replaces the focus on analysis with one of synthesis and allows for 
strategy to emerge over time through a process of learning.  This second school of thought, a 
new learning school approach, emphasized the artistry of strategy by introducing the distinction 
between strategic planning and strategic thinking.  According to Mintzberg, strategic planning 
tools are valuable in informing and implementing strategy, but can hinder strategic thinking if 
inflexible planning processes dominate strategy creation and limit creativity.  Thus, in essence, 
these two primary schools of thought differ on the point of strategy being deliberate or emergent. 
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Mintzberg and contemporary scholars now tend to advocate positions that combine both 
schools, wherein strategy is seen as being created deliberately through strategic planning, as well 
as through the continuous learning and adaptation of strategic thinking (Graetz, 2002; 
Heracleous, 1998).  This balanced view of strategy making emphasizes strategic planning and 
strategic thinking as “distinct, but interrelated and complementary processes” (Heracleous, 1998, 
p. 482). 
 Models of Strategic Thinking 
Currently, models of strategic thinking tend to align with the learning school, 
emphasizing learning and emergent strategy.  However, many models have expanded strategic 
thinking to include both the synthetic elements from the learning school and the deliberate, 
intentional elements of the planning school.  Below, I describe some of the notable individual 
models of strategic thinking, as identified from military and management scholars.  From these, 
the shared elements underlying strategic thinking become clear, which then inform the question 
of the strategic thinking mindset. 
The first model, one that is commonly cited within the management literature, is that 
proposed by Liedtka (1998a).  In this model, she described strategic thinking as (a) requiring a 
systems perspective, (b) thinking in time, (c) intelligently opportunistic, (d) hypothesis-driven, 
and (e) being intent-focused.  To contrast this with a military perspective, Yarger (2008) 
proposed a similar five-component model of thinking competencies, including (a) systems 
thinking, (b) thinking in time, (c) creative thinking, (d) critical thinking, and (e) ethical thinking.  
These two models clearly align in certain ways, e.g., the focus on systems and thinking in time.  
Yarger’s (2008) inclusion of ethical thinking and Liedtka’s (1998a) inclusion of intent-focus, 
however, are unique aspects.  Yarger’s creative thinking can be mapped onto both Liedtka’s 
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intelligent opportunism and hypothesis-driven elements.  The hypothesis-driven concept also 
aligns with Yarger’s critical thinking.  To map each model of strategic thinking onto all others in 
this way is beyond the scope of what is needed.  However, it is clear the different models need 
not be seen as competing, but complementary and supplementary of each other.   
Going further, in defining strategic thinking as a core competency for organizations, 
Bonn (2001) noted that strategic thinking exists at the individual and collective level.  Focusing 
on the individual, the essence of her model includes (a) holistic understanding, (b) creativity, and 
(c) vision for the future.  Bonn’s work (2001; 2005) has been widely cited, along with Liedtka 
(1998a; 1998b).  Heracleous (1998) is commonly cited in distinguishing strategic thinking and 
strategic planning, comparing strategic thinking to double-loop learning (Argyris, 1992).  
Double-loop learning involves the questioning of rules and assumptions governing decision 
making, as opposed to single-loop learning wherein critical thinking can take place, but does not 
question the broader framework by which options for a decision are determined.  Heracleous also 
discussed synthetic, divergent, and creative thought processes underlying strategic thinking. 
More recently, Duhaime, Stimpert, and Chesley (2012) devoted an entire textbook to 
understanding the importance of strategic thinking in modern business.  They described three key 
themes of effective business leaders engaged in strategic thinking: (a) “effective leaders are 
experts … [who] link disparate strands of information and … consider a broad array of scenarios 
and outcomes” (p. 69), (b) “effective leaders must be able to think dynamically … and be able to 
anticipate the future” (p. 70), and (c) “managers (and their firms and businesses) must be good 
learners” (p. 70). 
In contrast to the models depicted thus far, which focus on characteristics describing the 
type of thinking, others scholars have focused on certain thinking activities that form the basis of 
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strategic thinking.  Casey and Goldman (2010), for example, identified four continuous and 
iterative activities that encompass strategic thinking: (a) scanning, (b) questioning, (c) 
conceptualizing, and (d) testing.  Casey and Goldman also noted that their model is based on a 
definition of strategic thinking as (a) conceptual, (b) systems-oriented, (c) directional, and (d) 
opportunistic.   
Graetz (2002) also attempted to distinguish strategic thinking from strategic planning, 
proposing five attributes for strategic thinking: (a) synthetic, (b) divergent, (c) creative, (d) 
intuitive, and (e) innovative.  These are contrasted with five attributes of strategic planning: (a) 
logical, (b) systematic, (c) conventional, (d) prescriptive, and (e) convergent.  Graetz emphasized 
that both deliberate (planning) and emergent (thinking) approaches to strategy making must 
coexist, despite the differing attributes.  Likewise, a framework from the U.S. Army’s War 
College, as described by Waters (2011), advocates a balanced approach in which strategy 
making is an art and science.  Waters’ framework includes a diverse model of elements and 
activities, including (a) critical thinking, (b) thinking in time, (c) synthesis, (d) systems thinking, 
(e) creative thinking, and (f) futuring.  The Waters framework also acknowledges the role of both 
divergent and convergent thinking, environmental scanning, judgment of risk and reward, and 
having a strategic thinking foundation (including self-awareness of one’s biases and assumptions 
and openness to discourse and reflection).   
Yet another model from the military domain includes four elements: (a) systems thinking, 
(b) visioning, (c) scanning the environment, and (d) scenario planning (McCauley, 2012).  This 
model combines characteristics and types of thinking, as with Liedtka (1998a) and Yarger 
(2008), respectively, but also thinking activities, similar to Casey and Goldman (2010).  While 
not explicitly discussing strategic thinking, Salmoni, Hart, McPherson, and Winn (2010) 
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summarize the cognitive characteristics needed of military strategic leaders in the future, 
including (a) emphasis on how to think rather than what to think (i.e.,  metacognition), (b) 
flexibility and openness to many disciplines, and (c) tolerance of iterative problem solving and 
lacking perfect solutions the first time.  Finally, Yorks and Nicolaides (2012) developed a 
conceptual model for how to develop mindsets for strategic insight.  They define strategic insight 
as resulting from (a) engaging with diverse perspectives, (b) assessing trends in divergent 
domains, (c) making assumptions explicit, and d) challenging those assumptions.   
Some models of strategic thinking are embedded in measurement approaches.  The 
Leader’s Strategic Mindset assessment (Pisapia et al., 2005) was developed around three 
dimensions: (a) systems thinking, (b) reframing, and (c) reflecting.  In another study, focused on 
the antecedents of strategic thinking competency, strategic thinking was operationalized as (a) 
articulating a vision, (b) demonstrating sound business judgment, and (c) attending to global 
business issues.  These criteria were assessed through an assessment center (Dragoni et al., 
2011).  Finally, a recent report by Grier (2012) discussed what constructs should be considered 
in assessing military cognitive readiness at operational and strategic levels of command: (a) 
general knowledge and abilities, (b) cognitive capabilities, (c) creativity, (d) adaptability, and (e) 
personality (including traits such as hardiness, self-control, and need for certainty). 
 Integrating Themes Among Strategic Thinking Models 
In integrating and synthesizing the aforementioned models into a broader understanding 
of strategic thinking, I identified nine themes underlying these models: (a) Systems and 
Synthesis, (b) Directionality, (c) Creativity, (d) Criticality, (e) Awareness of Time, (f) 
Adaptability and Opportunism, (g) Action Learning, (h) Breadth and Inclusion, and (i) Self-
awareness and Self-control.  The themes are presented below, in descending order of their 
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prevalence across the models.  This is not meant to imply, however, that any one theme has 
greater priority or importance than another.  These themes provide the basis for the current 
concept of strategic thinking mindset.  A summary of the relation of each model to the 
integrating themes is provided in Table 1. 
 Systems and Synthesis 
The most pervasive theme present in the theoretical models reviewed is that of systems 
and synthesis.  This theme refers to the process of gaining new awareness by combining parts to 
perceive a whole with unique properties emerging from the combination of parts.  This theme is 
present in 10 of the 14 models summarized and includes elements such as systems orientation 
(Casey & Goldman, 2010), synthetic (Heracleous, 1998), holistic understanding (Bonn, 2001), 
and attending to global issues (Dragoni et al., 2011).  
The ideas of both systems thinking and synthetic thinking emphasize the seeking of a 
broader understanding of how a collection of parts interact with each other and their environment 
to produce a collective effect or pattern.  For most organizations, the primary system of interest 
would be the organization itself, made up of all its agents (e.g., employees).  However, systems 
thinking also requires the consideration of other systems in the environment, particularly those 
that subsume the organization and exist within it.  Furthermore, the characteristics of an 
environment play a role in systems thinking.  Synthesis is a similar concept to systems thinking, 
but tends to focus more on the combination of processes and concepts, rather than the systems 
perspective which tends to emphasize the interaction and combination of tangible entities. 
 Creativity 
The second integrating theme, creativity, is readily apparent in eight of the models.  The 
creativity theme subsumes concepts such as innovative (Graetz, 2002), reframing (Pisapia et al., 
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2005), and conceptual (Casey & Goldman, 2010).  For Casey and Goldman, conceptual refers to 
theorizing new abstract ideas, which are then tested in the strategic environment.  The references 
to creativity throughout the models are grounded in the creation of something new, whether it is 
a new process, technique, idea, or narrative of a problem.  Creativity and synthesis are closely 
related concepts, therefore these themes overlap to some degree.  Synthesis is placed alongside 
systems as its own theme, rather than under this theme, due to its added emphasis on the joining 
together of existing system or organizational elements for added value.  The creativity theme is 
meant to describe the generation of an idea from a less tangible source, such as subconscious 
processing or a connection made with something previously thought to be irrelevant to the 
organization. 
 Directionality 
Directionality, the third theme, consists of a dedicated focus on seeking a desired future 
condition for the organization.  Present in six of the models, this theme might also be described 
using terms such as intent-driven (Liedtka, 1998a) or vision for the future (Bonn, 2001).  
Directionality is an element clearly seen in almost every definition of strategy.  Military 
organizations often refer to this as seeking an end-state; organizations encapsulate it in a vision 
statement.  Whether the strategy-making is occurring in geo-politics, war, industry, games, or 
individual life, there is always a goal in mind, a point toward which thinking is oriented.  An 
aspect of strategic thinking would include determining what the point of direction is or should 
be, but also how best to get there. 
 Criticality 
Criticality is present in six of the models, including elements such as questioning (Casey 
& Goldman, 2010), challenging assumptions (Yorks & Nicolaides, 2012), and double-loop 
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learning (Heracleous, 1998).  This theme addresses the issue of being willing and able to 
challenge and question ideas or assumptions, as a means of affirming or disconfirming their 
validity.  For an argument or assumption to be critically evaluated does not necessarily require it 
to be fundamentally changed or abandoned.  Rather, criticality is about explicitly acknowledging 
and evaluating ideas on their merits. 
 Awareness of Time 
The next integrating theme is awareness of time, a concept that may be less intuitive, but 
no less important as an aspect of strategic thinking.  Included in six models, this theme 
incorporates elements such as thinking in time (Yarger, 2008), anticipating the future (Duhaime 
et al., 2012), futuring (Waters, 2011), and assessing trends (Yorks & Nicolaides, 2012).  
Awareness of time refers to the consideration of how an issue is situated in past events, present 
contexts, and anticipated or potential futures.  Having an awareness of time is highly important 
in dealing with complex adaptive systems, as the passing of time is inherently associated with 
changes in that system.  With changes in any system come the need to check and adapt one’s 
understanding and approach in dealing with problems in that system. 
 Adaptability and Opportunism 
Related closely to the previous theme, adaptability and opportunism refers to changing 
one’s approach or creating a new approach when key conditions in the environment change or 
are revealed to be different than was thought.  This theme is present in six of the models 
summarized, based in elements such as adaptability (Grier, 2012), thinking dynamically 
(Duhaime et al., 2012), and intelligent opportunism (Liedtka, 1998a).  The learning school of 
strategy, discussed at length by Mintzberg (1994a) and Senge (1990), is centered almost entirely 
on this point.  Complex adaptive systems are so ambiguous and dynamic that it is thought to be 
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impossible to fully understand them and predict what will happen with any kind of certainty.  
Therefore, strategy-making must include room for adapting to unforeseen problems or taking 
advantage of unexpected opportunities. 
 Breadth and Inclusion 
The next theme, breadth and inclusion, refers to an openness to and equitable 
consideration of many, diverse viewpoints.  Present in five of the models, this theme covers both 
the intentional inclusion of new viewpoints and disciplines (e.g., engaging with diverse 
perspectives, Yorks & Nicolaides, 2012) not obviously related to the problem, but also 
comprehensively searching the environment for knowledge of factors that may have some 
influence on a problem (e.g., environmental scanning, McCauley, 2012). 
 Self-Awareness and Self-Control 
The theme of self-awareness and self-control is present in four of the models.  This theme 
overlaps with that of criticality (particularly the aspect of self-criticism), but is more specifically 
about one’s willingness and ability to maintain self-awareness, not only of weaknesses, but also 
basic assumptions.  Good strategic thinkers understand how their thinking is limited and 
intentionally counteract those limitations.  This theme includes elements such as metacognition 
(Salmoni et al., 2010) and making assumptions explicit (Yorks & Nicolaides, 2012). 
 Action Learning 
The final theme, action learning, links closely to the adaptability and opportunism theme, 
as learning takes place as new information is incorporated, creating or changing one’s knowledge 
of a strategic situation. However, the action learning theme covers the extension of this idea seen 
in three of the models:  Liedtka’s (1998a) concept of hypothesis-driven, Duhaime et al.’s 
organizational learning, and Casey and Goldman’s (2010) concept of testing. These concepts 
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emphasize the role of generating strategies by continuously developing concepts about the 
environment, implementing them, studying their impact on the environment, and using the 
results to learn and improve the strategy. In short, action learning is about putting a plan or idea 
in action and evaluating the results in order to revise the plan or idea.  This is the essence of the 
scientific method, that of developing a hypothesis, testing it, and interpreting the results as 
evidence in favor of the hypothesis or as disconfirming the hypothesis.  In a sense, strategic 
thinkers must be applied scientists in their strategic environment. 
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Chapter 3 - The Strategic Thinking Mindset 
Few would argue that successful strategic thinking does not require a high level of 
cognitive ability.  For example, both fluid and crystallized intelligence, memory, pattern 
recognition, and rapid information processing are likely all important aspects of being able to 
understand a strategic environment well enough to develop and implement an effective strategy.  
However, it is also clear from the models and themes described above that cognitive ability alone 
is not sufficient for successful strategic thinking.  Other characteristics of thought are required 
which are not necessarily held by those with the greatest intelligence.  I refer to this as the 
strategic thinking mindset.   
The distinction between the ability related to a thinking competency (strategic thinking) 
and the mindset for the same competency is a subtle, but crucial one.  A recent conceptual piece 
by Yorks and Nicolaides (2012) conveys this distinction in a simple, multiplicative equation:  
Generative Strategic Insight = f(Competency x Capacity). 
In other words, the generation of strategic insights is a function of one’s combination of capacity 
for strategic insights and competency.  In this framework, competency refers to the ability 
component (e.g., reasoning, knowledge, processes, and other cognitive tools).  Capacity refers to 
a meaning-making mindset or epistemological viewpoint.  To state this more simply, effective 
strategy development requires both the ability and proper tools for strategic thinking (which most 
of the strategic thinking literature focuses on) and the proper mindset, the focus of the current 
research. 
Conceptually, this mindset would be distinct from cognitive ability.  Rather, holding a 
strategic mindset would reflect an epistemological viewpoint consistent with addressing 
problems under conditions of complexity and ambiguity.  This mindset, while still in the realm 
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of thinking, is distinct from the information processing involved in the execution of strategic 
thinking.  However, it would likely predict an individual’s chances of being an effective strategic 
thinker in the future, alongside other cognitive capabilities and personality traits that are less 
malleable. 
 The proposed distinction between ability and mindset calls to mind the extensive 
literature on emotional intelligence (EI; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004).  Many have extolled 
the virtues of this alternative view of intelligence (Goleman, 1995; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 
2000), while others have criticized the lack of substantive scholarly work supporting the 
existence of the concept as defined and its proposed relationship to job performance (Zeidner, 
Matthews, & Roberts, 2004).   
 Broadly speaking, there are two types of models discussed in the EI literature: ability 
models, based largely on the work of Mayer et al. (2000) and mixed models, represented by the 
work of Goleman (1995).  Ability models focus primarily on the cognitive processing of 
emotional information, oriented around four competencies: identification, understanding, usage, 
and self-regulation (Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer, 2000).  Conversely, mixed models are 
looser in structure and include a wider variety of competencies, such as motivation, 
temperament, and social skills.  Cherniss and Goleman (2001) cite four core competencies in 
their mixed model of EI: self-awareness, self-regulation/management, social awareness, and 
relationship management/social skills.  
The competencies associated with the mixed model of EI are closer to what I refer to as 
mindset, rather than the more strictly cognitive, information-processing perspective of the ability 
model.   However, there may be components in these models that are unrelated to strategic 
thinking.  As noted by Zeidner et al. (2004), the question of “whether placing all such 
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competencies under the EI banner confuses, rather than clarifies, the role of emotional 
competencies in the workplace would seem a contentious point” (pp. 378-379).  Zeidner et al. 
further argue that “dealing with distinct but possibly interrelated competencies may be more 
tractable for research and practical purposes” (p. 379).  Although understanding the emotional 
aspects of job performance is important, for the sake of clarity, the strategic thinking mindset is 
not conceptualized as a form or subset of EI.  Rather, it is a set of interrelated characteristics 
which form the foundation of an important work-related competency. 
 Characteristics of a Strategic Thinking Mindset 
Having gathered and synthesized the themes common to strategic thinking models, 
attention can now be turned to the mindset characteristics that underlie strategic thinking.  The 
process of identifying these characteristics was one of synthesis among the themes, extracting 
their shared foundations, as well as returning to the specific model elements that contribute to 
each theme and analyzing the content and definitions of each.  As detailed below, three mindset 
characteristics can be found underlying the common themes of strategic thinking: (a) flexibility, 
(b) inclusiveness, and (c) humility.  These characteristics are malleable, in the sense that they can 
be developed over time with the proper intent, but not transient, meaning they are not so 
superficial as mood or states of emotion, but, rather, are deeply ingrained in a person’s 
behavioral and cognitive habits.   
According to the existing literature, the ideal strategic thinker would have a mindset 
consistent with these characteristics, along with substantial cognitive ability, and the knowledge 
and skills developed through experience, education, and training in the field.  As discussed in the 
sections that follow, each of these characteristics could be taken beyond a certain threshold and 
begin to hinder performance, depending on the nature of the job (Le, Oh, Robbins, Ilies, & 
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Holland, 2011).  Finally, these are characteristics of a person’s thought, internal to an individual, 
rather than merely characteristics of that person’s actions.  In other words, the apparent 
expression of these traits in action, without truly thinking and feeling in these ways, would not 
constitute a strategic mindset.   
In the sections that follow, I provide descriptions of each of the three characteristics that 
comprise strategic mindset and how each characteristic forms the foundation of the various 
certain strategic thinking themes.  It is worthy to note that not all of the strategic thinking themes 
are accounted for by, or likely influenced by, a strategic mindset.  For example, as indicated in 
Figure 1, there is no obvious direct link between any of the strategic mindset characteristics and 
the strategic thinking themes of directionality (i.e., a focus on seeking a desired future condition 
for the organization) and awareness of time (i.e., the consideration of how an issue is situated in 
past, present, and future contexts).  Nevertheless, I do not argue that a strategic mindset is the 
only factor in determining the potential for strategic thinking.  Rather, I simply note that it is one 
way to determine potential, acknowledging that there are other antecedents that can reflect the 
capacity and/or competency for strategic insight. 
 Flexibility 
The first mindset characteristic is that of flexibility.  A mindset of flexibility is 
characterized by a willingness and proclivity to adjust one’s understanding, opinions, or 
approach when conditions change or new information is presented.  In essence, a flexible 
individual does not resist necessary or optimal change.  The psychological bias of escalating 
commitment (also referred to as sunk cost fallacy) refers to a tendency to continue with a course 
of action when that action is no longer rational (Sleesman, Conlon, McNamara, & Miles, 2012; 
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Staw, 1976).  Having a flexible mindset is crucial to the ability to avoid making errors of 
escalating commitment in the execution of strategy.  
The importance of a mindset favoring flexibility can be seen in three of the integrating 
themes: (a) adaptability and opportunism, (b) action learning, and (c) creativity.  Being willing 
and comfortable to deal with change, major or minor in nature, is crucial to being adaptive and 
taking advantage of opportunities.  Specific model elements of reframing (Pisapia et al., 2005), 
flexibility (Salmoni et al., 2010), and adaptability (Grier, 2012) clearly reference the ability to 
change or adjust when necessary.  Additionally, the elements of opportunism (Casey & 
Goldman, 2010) and intelligent opportunism (Liedtka, 1998a) emphasize the need to be actively 
looking for beneficial change.  This is a crucial distinction, as change can be forced upon a 
strategist, by force or circumstances.  Changing course in the face of an obvious need for change 
does not necessarily indicate flexibility, rather the truly flexible strategic thinker is opportunistic, 
always aware of where potential changes may prove beneficial. 
Flexibility also underlies action learning; an inflexible orientation might cause one to 
hesitate to look fairly at the results of an action, for fear that they might indicate changes are 
necessary.  The specific model elements contributing to the theme of action learning include 
testing (Casey & Goldman, 2010) and hypothesis-driven (Liedtka, 1998a).  As noted earlier, 
action learning is essentially a process of applying the scientific method.  Flexibility and 
openness to new concepts and new methods is critical to any scientist who wishes to remain 
current in his or her field.  The same applies to an iterative strategic thinker who must test 
strategies and fairly evaluate them constantly. 
Finally, the theme of creativity is directly referenced in several models of strategic 
thinking (Bonn, 2001; Graetz, 2002; Grier, 2012; Heracleous, 1998; Waters, 2011; Yarger, 
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2008).  The process of creation is inherently incompatible with inflexibility.  New ideas and 
associations cannot be formed without some degree of flexibility.  Moreover, the willingness to 
embrace the changes to one’s understanding and processes that comes from implementing 
creative ideas requires an even greater level of flexibility.   
As with any characteristic, there is a threshold beyond which flexibility is problematic.  
The execution of strategy requires long-term consistency, so long as the strategy is still the right 
approach.  The key is to think of this characteristic as flexibility, rather than breakability.  Put 
another way: bend, but don’t break from a long-term strategy, unless adhering to that strategy is 
only justified by escalated commitment.  Bending a strategy allows for adaptation and adjustment 
of a strategy and its implementation in the face of changing conditions, without abandoning the 
long-term effort and developing another strategy from scratch. 
 Inclusiveness 
The next mindset characteristic is inclusiveness, referring to the welcoming of 
information and opinion from a broad range of sources.  Sources here could refer to individuals, 
groups, disciplines, or other relevant constituents.  Inclusiveness is conceptually similar to the 
openness to experience element of the Five Factor Model of personality (Costa & McCrae, 
1992).  A mindset favoring exclusion would result in one being hesitant to consider new or 
unusual sources of information or fearful of having too many voices involved in a discussion.  
Conversely, maintaining an inclusive mindset allows one to value the holistic understanding that 
can come from examining an issue from many directions.  As with flexibility, inclusiveness 
could lead to a point of diminishing returns, at which point information overload might lead to a 
feeling of analysis paralysis (Sugerman, Scullard, & Wilhelm, 2011).  However, an inclusive 
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mindset values the potential benefit of a broad perspective, while relying on other processes and 
judgment to eliminate or ignore information that does not contribute to understanding. 
Inclusiveness primarily underlies the themes of (a) breadth and inclusion and (b) systems 
and synthesis.  Specific model elements generating the theme of breadth and inclusion include 
engaging with diverse perspectives (Yorks & Nicolaides, 2012), assessing trends in divergent 
domains (Yorks & Nicolaides, 2012), openness to discourse (Waters, 2011), scanning (Casey & 
Goldman, 2010; McCauley, 2012; Waters, 2011), and openness to many disciplines (Salmoni et 
al., 2010).  Engaging in a broad and inclusive information search requires a welcoming of this 
kind of search.   
Inclusiveness is also critical to systems thinking and synthesis, which differs from 
traditional analytical processes in that system factors are gathered together for holistic 
understanding, rather than segmented into divisions handled separately.  Specific model elements 
for this theme are quite tightly clustered around the idea of systems thinking (Casey & Goldman, 
2010; Pisapia et al., 2005; Waters, 2011; Yarger, 2008;) and synthesis (Graetz, 2002; 
Heracleous, 1998; Waters, 2011).  Without an inclusive mindset, attempts to synthesize new 
understanding will clearly be hindered and likely result in nothing new, but rather “old wine in 
new bottles.” Likewise, one’s view of a problem’s context (i.e., the system) will be limited to the 
range of perspective and information already considered relevant. 
The need for selecting strategic thinkers with an inclusive and flexible mindset is 
supported not only by analysis of the existing models of strategic thinking, but also by a 
foundational theory underlying organizational behavior: the behavioral theory of the firm, as 
presented by Cyert and March (1963).  This theory introduced the concept of bounded rationality 
in the decision making of organizations.  Bounded rationality means that managers are faced 
26 
with information search and processing limits and will not always make decisions that maximize 
profit perfectly.  Instead, they will rely on closed search processes and decision-making 
heuristics or established rules that allow them to “satisfice” or reach an acceptable level of 
performance.  Strategic thinking requires going beyond heuristics and the habits of the past to 
create new strategies for accomplishing different objectives or new levels of performance. 
 Humility 
The final mindset characteristic is humility.  This characteristic refers, generally, to a 
comfort level with being wrong or having an incomplete understanding.  Furthermore, comfort 
with being wrong must be accompanied by the tendency to check oneself, examining issues as if 
one’s understanding is wrong in some way.  The importance of humility in leadership is an area 
in need of greater theory and research (Barling, Christie, & Hoption, 2011).  However, Morris, 
Brotheridge, and Urbanski (2005) laid out a strong review of the concept of humility and its role 
in leadership, defining humility as “a personal orientation founded on a willingness to see the 
self accurately and a propensity to put oneself in perspective” and emphasizing that humility 
“involves neither self-abasement nor overly positive self-regard” (p. 1331).  
Humility enables objectivity about the self, which is clearly necessary for many of the 
competencies associated with strategic thinking.  Specifically, humility is a necessary pre-
condition to the self-criticism and objectivity required for self-awareness/self-control and 
criticality.  The literature suggests that strategic thinkers must have/engage in self-awareness of 
biases and assumptions (Waters, 2011), self-control (Grier, 2012), meta-cognition (Salmoni et al. 
2010), questioning (Casey & Goldman, 2010), and reflecting (Pisapia et al., 2005).  Humility is a 
crucial component to these competencies, at least as they relate to criticality and awareness of 
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oneself and any group with which one identifies (e.g., specific functional area, organization, 
industry).  
Humility alone does not ensure objective self-awareness, self-control, or criticality, but it 
is a necessary pre-condition to accepting that one may be biased or clinging to faulty 
assumptions.  Without humility, any change in understanding or alternative viewpoint poses a 
threat to self-esteem, opening the door to defensiveness and bias in favor of maintaining old 
beliefs or assumptions.  Once open to and comfortable with the position of reasonable self-doubt, 
behaviors and positions can be examined and, with effort, improved. 
 Other Examples of Mindsets 
The separation of a mindset (or orientation) from its enactment, either behaviorally or 
cognitively, can be found in other scientific literature.  Lumpkin and Dess (1996) conceptualized 
a variable called entrepreneurial orientation, noting that it is distinct from entrepreneurship itself 
(that being the act of starting a new business or business venture) and has to do with individual 
characteristics that predict acting entrepreneurially.  In the field of motivation, plenty has been 
written on goal orientation (Payne, Youngcourt, & Beaubien, 2007).  In this literature, the act of 
setting effective goals is differentiated from one’s orientation toward what kinds of goals to set 
(e.g., learning vs. performance goals).  Dweck (2006) described a body of research on mindsets 
related to the self, specifically on the malleability of one’s talents and abilities.  She argued 
convincingly that much of success has to do with interpreting a challenge as an opportunity to 
develop, rather than a threat to reveal one’s limitations.  Finally, Story and Barbuto (2011) 
examined the concept of global mindset, describing it as a combination of cultural intelligence 
and global orientation. 
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Research on the strategic thinking mindset is in a very nascent stage and is in great need 
of further refinement, from a definitional, developmental, and measurement perspective.  There 
are some models of strategic thinking that reference the importance of a person’s mindset, 
independent of their thinking competencies.  A behavioral self-report measure of strategic 
thinking mindset was developed by Pisapia et al. (2005), around three dimensions: (a) systems 
thinking, (b) reframing, and (c) reflecting.  Likewise, Waters’ (2011) framework notes the 
importance of having a strategic thinking foundation (i.e., something beyond cognitive skills and 
intelligence), which he describes as having self-awareness of one’s own biases and assumptions, 
including the influence of one’s culture, being considerate of ethical and value-related issues, 
and having an openness to discourse and reflection.  Yorks and Nicolaides (2012) focus on 
differentiating the idea of a mindset for strategic thinking, apart from the ability, but do not 
discuss the exact nature of the mindset in much detail. 
Yorks and Nicolaides (2012) reference a useful theoretical framework to illustrate how a 
strategic thinking mindset might differ from other mindsets.  The framework comes from the 
theory of developmental action inquiry (Torbert, 2004).  The theory details a progression of 
“action logics” that guide how a leader generally thinks and acts at a series of stages of 
organizational maturity.  Each stage is represented by its own guiding principle.  The progression 
begins with an “opportunist” mindset which is guided by a principle of self-interest and winning 
as the only concern.  The penultimate stage is the “strategist” mindset, in which the focus is on 
linking valued theories and principles with action in dynamic systems.  
The Torbert (2004) theory presents these mindsets as developmental stages which are 
passed through over time as a manager matures.  Torbert’s framework was not developed as a 
theory on strategic thinking specifically or how it is best developed.  Rather, Torbert’s stages are 
29 
an attempt to depict how the mindset of a leader evolves over time, adopting new guiding 
principles.  Therefore, Torbert’s theory supports the current research by the notion that there are 
managerial mindsets that vary and can be developed over time. 
In the military domain, Yarger (2008) focused on the importance of understanding the 
differences between operational planning, national strategy, and national policy, noting that there 
are subtle, but important, distinctions and that “each also has a different mindset” (p. 8). 
However, his explanation of the strategic thinking mindset consisted of the five thinking 
competencies described earlier.  It is important to note the conceptual difference with what I 
refer to as strategic thinking mindset.  My view of strategic thinking mindset reflects a construct 
in line with the capacity element in Yorks and Nicolaides (2012), while Yarger’s work reflects 
more of the competency element. 
 Changing One’s Mindset 
Separating the concepts of strategic thinking skills/ability and strategic thinking mindset 
raises the question of the malleability of strategic thinking mindset, that is, whether the variable 
is more state-like (i.e., changing over time, transient) or trait-like (i.e., resistant to change, 
stable).  The concept of mindset here is more trait-like than state-like, but still malleable over 
time.  The general domain knowledge concept described by Lievens and Motowidlo (2016) as 
resulting from “fundamental socialization processes (parenting, schooling, etc.)” (p. 8) reflects 
how the mindset might also develop.  Lievens and Motowidlo also discuss the ways in which the 
implicit trait policies people hold, the degree to which people perceive traits to be effective in a 
social situation (see Motowidlo, Hooper, & Jackson, 2006), result in general domain knowledge 
when a job’s requirements align with those traits.  This is similar to the way in which the mindset 
might be considered a type of trait-based knowledge of the job of a strategic thinker. 
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Torbert’s (2004) developmental action inquiry theory describes the developmental and 
generally sequential stages a leader moves through as they mature.  A strategic mindset is 
something that could be similarly developed over time, as one matures and incorporates 
experiences into a certain worldview.  There are other examples of attributes that function 
between the extremes of state-like (transient) variables and trait-like (stable, unchanging) 
variables.  For example, research on psychological capital (self-efficacy, hope, optimism, and 
resilience) has demonstrated developmental capacity, while still being relatively stable over short 
periods of time (Luthans, 2002).  However, there may be individual differences in how early or 
naturally this mindset is adopted.  Established constructs such as the openness to experience 
component of the Five Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1992) or tolerance for ambiguity 
(Budner, 1962) may present a hindrance to strategic thinking for those who are low in these traits 
or, on the other hand, facilitate it for those who are exemplify these traits.   
A great deal of literature argues that strategic thinking skills must be developed through 
participation in the generation of strategy (Casey & Goldman, 2010; Mintzberg, 1994a).  This 
research draws on experiential learning theory (Kolb, 1984), which describes the importance of 
experiencing a process in order to learn it in the context of adult education.  While the thinking 
competencies for strategic thinking may not develop to maturity until one has a wealth of 
experience and subject matter knowledge, the mindset for strategic thinking may be present 
without the developed skills.  If this is the case, assessing a thinker’s mindset may be a key 
addition to assessments of cognitive ability and other individual difference variables in the 
prediction of future strategic thinking ability. 
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 Developing a Measure 
In order to supplement the literature on strategic thinking, in particular the relevant 
mindset, as well as to provide the Army with a more context-relevant assessment product, this 
research was designed to develop a Strategic Thinking Mindset Test (STMT) using a situational 
judgment test (SJT) format.  SJTs are characterized by a situation and response-choice format in 
which realistic situations from a designated job or work role are presented.  Respondents are 
instructed to select a response option that represents the best/worst (or most/least likely) way to 
address the situation. 
SJTs have grown in popularity among Industrial and Organizational Psychologists 
(Ployhart & MacKenzie, 2011), particularly in selection and assessment contexts, thanks to a few 
particular strengths of SJTs.  First, they tend to result in strong criterion-related validity for job 
performance (McDaniel, Hartman, Whetzel, & Grubb, 2007); although, the magnitude of this 
evidence is tied to the constructs measured.  Additionally, there is evidence that SJTs result in 
smaller subgroup differences than traditional cognitive predictors (Ployhart & Holz, 2008), 
resulting in reduced adverse impact.   
Additionally, SJTs typically demonstrate high face validity (Ployhart & Mackenzie, 
2011).  By incorporating situations relevant to the work of the respondent, rather than generic 
interpersonal situations, SJTs stand a better chance of appearing valid and relevant to 
respondents and other stakeholders, compared to non-work context or context-free assessments 
common in psychological research.  For example, a generic personality inventory might inquire 
about how one acts at social gatherings, an item which may raise concerns or appear to lack 
relevance to a respondent expecting to see items relevant to the workplace.  While from a purely 
measurement perspective face validity has no real value, in organizational contexts, pragmatic 
concerns such as acceptability are important.  The strategic thinking mindset assessment would, 
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ideally, be used to guide self-reflection, self-development, and mentorship among military 
officers.  However, without substantial face validity, as well as supportive construct validity 
evidence, the assessment would be less effective in this regard. 
 The first instruments designed to measure situational judgment appeared in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries (DuBois, 1970; Moss, 1931).  Research on SJT methods picked up after 
this form of testing was re-conceptualized as low-fidelity work simulation by Motowidlo, 
Dunnette, and Carter (1990).  At first, SJTs were developed around critical job tasks identified 
from a job analysis, rather than a specific construct.  Scientific investigations of the utility of job 
performance predictors revealed SJTs to be fairly strong predictors of performance (Schmidt & 
Hunter, 1998).  More attention has since been paid to the idea that SJTs reflect a method of 
testing constructs, rather than a construct itself (Arthur & Villado, 2008; Schmitt & Chan, 2006).  
Therefore, an SJT’s ability to predict performance or any other criterion depends on the construct 
it is designed to measure and that construct’s relationship with the criterion. 
Along that line, the use of SJTs has expanded into trait-based testing, with instruments 
being developed around a specific construct, other than the vaguely-defined situational judgment 
(Motowidlo, Hooper, & Jackson, 2006).  Ployhart and Mackenzie (2011) note that a consistent 
method for developing SJTs around a single homogenous construct without variance related to 
cognitive ability or personality has yet to be developed.  Therefore, SJTs typically correlate to 
some degree either with measures of cognitive ability or personality.  However, there is evidence 
that choices in SJT development have a predictable effect on whether SJT scores correlate more 
with cognitive ability or personality (McDaniel et al., 2007).  For example, response instructions 
(e.g., what would you do vs. what should you do) can cause an SJT to correlate more with 
personality and cognitive ability, respectively. 
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The SJT format enables the instrument to more directly assess the respondent’s mindset 
by presenting a situation designed to evoke elements of the mindset.  Relying on the critical 
incident technique to generate the scenarios ensures that the test benefits from a fidelity and 
experience of realism that would be difficult to replicate without the involvement of actual Army 
personnel.  Their input on the types of scenarios that evoke the characteristics, the language that 
would be used to describe those scenarios, and the realistic range of response options are all 
critical reasons to use a critical incident technique and an Army sample.  By presenting response 
alternatives reflecting levels of flexibility, inclusiveness, and humility within realistic Army 
officer responses, the SJT data provide information about a respondent that is more context-
bound than a behavioral self-report measure. 
 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The current research seeks to address two broad research questions.  First, given the need 
and potential benefit of an assessment of a young military officer’s mindset for strategic 
thinking, can an SJT be designed to assess this mindset through flexibility, inclusiveness, and 
humility characteristics? Secondly, will this test exhibit evidence of construct validity and 
measurement reliability? 
 The first research question relates to the structural characteristics of the instrument as it is 
developed.  The instrument was developed to measure three mindset characteristics underlying 
the strategic mindset.  As noted in the preceding literature review, these characteristics are 
slightly overlapping and will likely correlate with each other.  Two other structural models are 
also plausible, one in which the factors do not correlate and another in which there is only a 
single underlying factor.  In accordance with the reviewed literature on the underlying facets of 
strategic thinking, I hypothesize the following: 
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Hypothesis 1: An oblique, three-factor model will result in a better fit than competing 
orthogonal and single-factor models. 
 Construct-related validity is demonstrated by triangulating the STMT score for each 
mindset characteristic with measures of conceptually-related constructs (convergent validity) and 
conceptually unrelated constructs (discriminant validity).  Hypotheses 2a-c summarize the 
evidence regarding convergent validity: 
Hypothesis 2a: There will be an inverse relationship between strategic mindset flexibility 
and resistance to change.  
Hypothesis 2b: There will be a positive relationship between strategic mindset 
inclusiveness and work-related openness. 
Hypothesis 2c: There will be a positive relationship between strategic mindset humility 
and dispositional humility. 
It should be noted that, in the case of Hypothesis 2a, the evidence of convergence is 
demonstrated by an inverse (negative) relationship, due to the framing of the resistance to change 
variable.  Discriminant validity evidence will be gathered from the relationship between each 
mindset characteristic and a measure of cognitive ability.  Meta-analytic estimates of the 
relationship between SJT scores and scores from cognitive ability tests showed a mean 
correlation of .29 (corrected .32; McDaniel et al., 2007).  Conceptually, strategic thinking 
mindset should be less related to cognitive ability than a traditional SJT construct that is closer to 
true judgment or job knowledge.  Therefore, discriminant validity will be inferred from a small 
or non-significant relationship, given adequate measurement reliability (coefficient alpha).  
Given the problems associated with hypothesizing the null (Cortina & Folger, 1998), no formal 
hypotheses are associated with this test of validity.   
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 As demonstrated in other SJT research, the cognitive content of an SJT score can be 
influenced by the nature of the response instructions.  To explore this issue, data were gathered 
using both types of response instructions (most/least likely response and worst/best response).  In 
line with previous meta-analytic evidence regarding the impact of response instructions 
(McDaniel, Hartman, Whetzel, & Grubb, 2007), I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Instructions to pick the best/worst response will result in stronger SJT 
score relationships with cognitive ability than response instructions to pick their most/least likely 
response.  
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Chapter 4 - Method and Results 
 Choices in Situational Judgment Test Development 
There are a variety of alternatives available when developing an SJT, each of which 
affects the way the SJT functions and what constructs it is likely to measure.  There are five main 
issues to be dealt with in developing an SJT: (1) item stem content, (2) response option content, 
(3) response instructions, (4) response keying, and (5) scoring methods (McDaniel & Whetzel, 
2007; Weekley, Ployhart, & Holtz, 2006).  Discussion of each as it relates to the current research 
follows. 
 Item Stem Content 
The situation presented to the respondent, referred to as the item stem, is typically 
generated either by the researcher, based on theory, or by subject matter experts (SMEs) through 
the critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954).  A hybrid approach is used in this study, by 
collecting critical incidents related to a specific context, which were then used to develop items 
for each mindset characteristic.  
Stem complexity (e.g., detail, length, reading level) may also hinder or enhance criterion-
related validity (McDaniel, Morgeson, Finnegan, Campion, & Braverman, 2001; Reynolds, 
Sydell, Scott, & Winter, 2000) and subgroup differences (Sacco, Schmidt, & Rogg, 2000).  A 
strength of the critical incident approach used in this study, wherein the target population writes 
the initial incident description, is that the reading level for all scenarios begins at the level of the 
target population. 
Stem fidelity (i.e., the extent to which the focal task is truly recreated) is another issue.  
Multimedia-based SJTs have taken advantage of this to eliminate reading requirements, and 
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enhance validity and respondent reactions (Olson-Buchanan & Drasgow, 2006).  While 
multimedia SJTs have their advantages, development and implementation costs are high.   
Finally, stem content can vary from interpersonal, judgment-based situations to more 
factual, procedural knowledge formats.  This test is decidedly judgment-based, seeking to access 
the way the respondent deals with ambiguous situations, in regard to flexibility, inclusiveness, 
and humility.  The development of item stem content is discussed further in the Stage 1 section 
of this chapter. 
 Response Option Content and Instructions 
Paired with each item stem is a set of response options.  The same issues of source, 
complexity, and fidelity (discussed in regard to item stem) also apply to response options.  As 
with the item stem, the response options are construct-oriented, meaning each item focuses on 
either flexibility, inclusiveness, or humility.  Following the example of Ployhart and Ryan 
(2000), a behavioral continuum approach is employed, in which the response options reflect 
varying levels of the focal construct.  The development of response option content is discussed 
further in the Stage 2 section of this chapter. 
In regard to the instructions given for the SJT (i.e., framing of the question), there are 
typically two (or four) alternatives: which option is your most/least likely response and which 
option is the best/worst (or most/least effective) response.  SJTs based on likelihood instructions 
tend to correlate more with personality, while best/worst instructions tend to correlate more with 
cognitive ability (McDaniel et al, 2007).  Data using both approaches were collected in this 
research, to examine the question of how the response instructions influence the scale’s 
relationships with other variables.  The results of this examination are described in the Stage 4 
section of this chapter. 
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 Response Keying 
Once a set of items has been developed with stems and response options, a decision must 
be made about how to key each response in relation to the measured construct.  In other words, 
each response must be identified as correct/incorrect or as an expression of some particular level 
of the construct.  The keying scheme can be (a) empirically derived (e.g., based on each option’s 
correlation with a criterion), (b) based on subject matter expert (SME) judgment, (c) rationally 
derived from theory, or (d) based on a hybrid of these approaches (Bergman, 2006; McDaniel & 
Whetzel, 2007).  Empirical keying is ideal for situations with a clear performance criterion, 
which does not apply to this case.  Purely following theory without any expert input would lack 
fidelity to real-world response tendencies.  Therefore, a hybrid approach relying primarily on 
SME ratings, though informed by theory-based rationality, was used for this instrument.  The 
development of the response keying system is described in the Stage 3 section of this chapter. 
 Scoring 
Finally, there are options related to how the SJT will be scored overall, translating the 
key into an item score.  A forced-choice strategy involves a dichotomization of correct and 
incorrect responses, wherein a point is scored if a correct item response is endorsed.  An 
expansion on this scoring approach is to tie a negative score to incorrect response options.  As 
demonstrated by Motowidlo et al. (1990), the variance in a forced-choice item can be enhanced 
by scoring an item on a scale of -2 (best answer identified as worst and vice versa) to +2 (best 
and worst answers both correctly identified).  Rather than a forced-choice strategy, others have 
adopted a continuous scale approach (e.g., Mumford, Van Iddekinge, Morgeson, & Campion, 
2008), wherein respondents rate each response option on a scale of best/worst or most/least 
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likely.  The continuous rating method, however, complicates data analysis by shifting the level of 
analysis down, such that each stem becomes a testlet with items nested within it.   
For this instrument, scoring was done with a forced-choice approach similar to the 
example provided by Motowidlo et al. (1990) to simplify scoring and reduce test length and 
respondent fatigue.  The scoring system is described further in the Stage 4 section of this chapter. 
 Overview of Method 
As described above, the development and testing of the STMT items occurred in four 
main stages: Stage 1 - Critical Incidents, Stage 2 - Feedback and Response Options, Stage 3 – 
Response Option Scoring, and Stage 4 – Pilot Testing and Construct Validation.  In Stage 1, 
critical incidents were gathered and selected for relevance to the content area of the instrument 
(i.e., complex, ambiguous problem scenarios at the Army Company-grade officer level).  In 
Stage 2, Army personnel served as subject matter experts (SMEs) providing feedback on the 
quality of the scenarios (e.g., fidelity, detail, complexity, and ambiguity), determining which of 
the mindset characteristics (flexibility, humility, or inclusiveness) were most relevant for each 
scenario, and generating a range of possible response options.  In Stage 3, a new sample of SMEs 
rated a set of candidate response options for each scenario on effectiveness and level of mindset 
expression.  Finally, in Stage 4, two final groups of Army personnel completed the instrument 
and a set of additional measures for construct validity evidence. 
 U.S. Army Research Participant Recruitment Procedures 
Before describing each stage of the development process, it is important to clarify the 
process by which participants are recruited in the U.S. Army.  Participants for research by 
approved agencies of the Department of Defense (DoD) are recruited by filing an Army 
Research Support Request (RSR).  Requests are sent to individual schools and/or commands 
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within U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and U.S. Army Forces 
Command (FORSCOM).  Each RSR is evaluated by the garrison commander and his or her staff 
to determine whether it will be supported.  Tasking orders are then sent out to individual units or 
course groups according to the type of personnel requested, the priority level of the request (as 
submitted by each requesting agency), and the personnel resources available to support the 
request.  
Researchers are then given the opportunity to explain the research to the requested 
personnel, including specifics about the general objectives, procedures, risks/benefits of 
participation, and their rights as research participants.  At this point, all participants are clearly 
informed that they have fulfilled their tasking and are free to voluntarily participate or not.  If 
anyone in a participant’s chain of command is present in the research session, that individual is 
asked to leave or move to a different testing space in order to prevent any coercive influence they 
might have on the participation of their subordinate.  This is a rare occurrence as participant 
groups are typically peers of the same rank and from a variety of individual units.  The 
recruitment procedure and steps for ensuring voluntary participation apply across all stages of 
this research and for all participants.  In the vast majority of sessions across all research stages, 
the author administered the procedures.  However, in a few cases, sessions were scheduled 
concurrently, in which case a co-researcher (PhD Research Psychologist with ARI) conducted 
the session.  The co-researcher was fully trained in human-subjects research and identified on all 
IRB documentation. 
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 Stage 1: Critical Incidents 
 Stage 1 Method 
 Sample 
A sample of 125 Soldiers participated in this stage, from eight U.S. Army installations 
across the country.  The sample consisted of 104 males and 21 females, very closely matching 
the gender breakdown across the Active Army (17% female, Maxfield, 2015).  The vast majority 
were Army Captains (85.6%), and represented a wide range of Army functional branches, with 
no more than 18% of the sample coming from a single branch.  A large majority (82.4%) had 
deployment experience.  The most recent deployment was predominately to Afghanistan (45.6%) 
or Iraq (29.6%).  Additional detail on the make-up of the sample including the branch 
representation is provided in Table 2. 
 Materials and Procedure 
Participants received three documents: a demographic questionnaire, instructions packet, 
and a worksheet.  The demographics sheet was completed and returned independently.  The 
instructions packet, provided in Appendix A – Stage 1 Materials as Instructions for Reporting 
Critical Incidents provided detailed explanations, tips, and examples for writing the critical 
incident(s).  The participants were briefed on the content of this packet and were given time to 
review it while they thought of their incident(s).  Participants were free to ask clarifying 
questions throughout the session. 
 The participants used the worksheet, provided in Appendix A as Incident 1 and Incident 
2, to write their critical incident(s).  Space was provided for two incidents, in case an individual 
had multiple to provide.  In most cases, only one was provided.  Participants reported their 
incidents in three sections: Situation, Problem-Solving Approach, and Outcome.  Participants 
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were instructed to speak in third-person narrative using false names of people and specific places 
(e.g., a particular base) and only broad time frames, if necessary. 
In addition to writing the incident, participants were asked to provide two additional 
pieces of information, the type of thinking required by the incident, using Yarger’s (2008) 
model, and a rating of the degree to which the problem had been effectively addressed (1 = Very 
Ineffective/Detrimental to 5 = Highly Effective/Successful).  This was done to provide further 
contextual information on how the participant viewed the incident and whether/how to use each 
incident as a scenario. 
 Stage 1 Results 
Although the initial data collection target was 60, upon review during data collection, it 
was determined that a larger target would be necessary to gather a sufficient number of usable 
incidents.  Upon initial review, incidents needed to describe a clearly-stated ambiguous problem, 
with a decision-making context for a single Company-grade officer.  A total of 144 critical 
incidents were collected, at which point 59 were deemed initially usable, constituting a sufficient 
sample to proceed.  
The incident descriptions were converted into open-ended scenarios by removing the 
Problem-Solving Approach and Outcome sections, leaving only the Situation section, which 
formed the basis of the scenario.  Occasionally, content from the Approach and Outcome 
sections was brought into the scenario, either because it provided more information about the 
situation than the problem-solving approach or because it served to extend the complexity or 
ambiguity of the situation.  The author also edited the scenarios as needed for grammar, spelling, 
clarity, and removal of any potentially identifying information that was not censored by the 
original writer of the incident. 
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The author and an additional PhD research psychologist reviewed each of the 59 
scenarios more carefully for usability.  An ideal incident had the following characteristics: a 
clearly stated problem depicted with contextual detail, ambiguity with regard to the correct way 
to address the problem, opportunity for a Company-grade officer to make choices varying in 
flexibility, inclusiveness, and/or humility.  After this extensive incident and scenario review 
process, 32 scenarios were identified for further development as items in the scale. 
 Stage 2: Feedback and Response Options 
 Stage 2 Method 
 Sample 
A total sample of 75 Soldiers with Company-grade deployment experience were 
surveyed as subject matter experts (SMEs) in this stage, from four participating installations.   
The status of the Soldiers as an “expert” sample refers to their familiarity and knowledge of 
realistic and feasible options that a Soldier might have in a given scenario.  The sample consisted 
of 69 males, 5 females (with one non-respondent), predominately Captains (74.7%), representing 
a range of Army functional areas, although a large proportion came from the infantry branch 
(41.3%).  Additional detail on the make-up of the sample is provided in Table 3.   
It should be noted that not all participants reviewed each of the scenarios.  A significant 
amount of time was required, per scenario, to read and consider the scenario and provide 
feedback and response options.  A unique set of scenarios was provided to participants in each 
data collection session.  Due to varying participation rates, and the relative need (or lack thereof) 
for additional response options on certain scenarios, the number of participants for each scenario 
ranged from 17 to 25. 
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 Materials and Procedure 
SMEs were again given three documents: a brief demographic questionnaire, a construct 
definition handout, and the scenario review and feedback packet.  The demographics sheet was 
completed and returned independently.  The SMEs then reviewed and listened to the researcher 
explain the nature of the research and the meaning of the three mindset characteristics.  SMEs 
were instructed to familiarize themselves with the definitions of flexibility, humility, and 
inclusiveness as indicated on the definitions sheet, provided in Appendix B – Stage 2 Materials 
as Definitions.  The researcher reviewed the content of the definitions sheet with participants and 
elaborated on the meaning and derivation of each characteristic.  SMEs were free to ask 
clarifying questions throughout the session. 
 Finally, participants reviewed their assigned scenarios in the Scenario Review and 
Feedback Packet, provided in Appendix B.  Each packet consisted of approximately 10 scenarios 
for review.  The exact number, group, and ordering of the scenarios changed for each session, to 
avoid order effects as well as to ensure sufficient feedback was gathered for each scenario.  
The researcher explained to the participants the need for their contextual familiarity with 
military procedures and problem solving to evaluate the scenarios.  They were instructed to write 
whatever feedback occurred to them, with particular emphasis on the degree to which the 
scenario reflected a sufficiently ambiguous and complex problem scenario, the realism of any 
details provided (e.g., a newly-promoted Captain being placed in a certain type of position), and 
the need for any additional clarifying details (although in some cases, the lack of such details is 
the root of the scenario’s ambiguity).  
 Participants were also asked to consider each of the three mindset characteristics and 
select the one that was the most relevant to the scenario, thereby voting for it as the appropriate 
mindset characteristic to assess with that scenario.  After providing the scenario feedback, 
45 
participants then provided up to ten feasible response options, with instructions to vary their 
options by the mindset characteristics (i.e., providing a highly flexible response, a highly 
inflexible response, and a neutrally flexible response).  It was emphasized that they need not 
restrain themselves to responses that would fully address the problem or that they would even 
consider to be good responses.  Rather, they were instructed to describe as many feasible 
responses as they could (i.e., responses that someone in the Army might realistically make).  
Finally, they were instructed that their responses might and ought to include cognitive responses, 
or ways in which the person depicted in the scenario might think about the scenario, as well as 
act.  
The initial data collection session for this stage was conducted in a small group 
discussion format.  After reviewing the scenarios, the researcher facilitated a group discussion 
among all participants about each scenario for the final 15 minutes of the session.  This approach 
was abandoned for the remaining data collections.  The primary reason was the need by many 
participants to use the available time to get through all the scenarios.  Furthermore, the group 
discussions tended to result in very little new insight through cross-talk. 
 Stage 2 Results 
The first step in analyzing the data for this stage was to tally the mindset characteristic 
votes for each scenario.  In several cases, respondents selected two characteristics for a scenario.  
In this case, both were counted as a vote.  The winning characteristic was documented and, in 
cases where there was a tie or close vote, a back-up characteristic was also noted.  Initially, the 
voting process resulted in 17 scenarios assigned to flexibility, 5 scenarios assigned to humility, 
and 9 scenarios assigned to inclusiveness.  One of the 32 scenarios, having to do with the threat 
of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on a convoy route, was eliminated due to feedback that it 
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was not only insufficiently ambiguous, but also in consideration of the stress-inducing potential 
of such an item. 
 The goal of this process was to have an even number of scenarios (approximately 10) 
assigned to each of the three mindset characteristics.  Therefore, the process of assigning the 
characteristic for each scenario proceeded iteratively.  First, all scenarios with a tied (or nearly 
tied) vote that included flexibility were assigned to the other characteristic.  Likewise, the 10 
scenarios that were most convincingly voted for flexibility retained that assignment.  The 
remainder were assigned according to the number of votes between the two remaining 
characteristics.  When necessary, scenarios were altered in order to heighten the potential for 
varying inclusiveness or humility in responses.  In one particular case, although the vote was 
narrowly in favor of flexibility, the scenario was assigned to inclusiveness, based on the quality 
of the response options available for that scenario.  Therefore, the culmination of this process 
was 10 scenarios for flexibility, 10 for humility, and 11 for inclusiveness.  
 The next step was to review, edit, and assign the response options for each scenario.  The 
generation of these response options relied heavily on the content provided by the SMEs in Stage 
2, particularly when it was indicated that a response option was meant to reflect a high or low 
level of a certain characteristic.  There were many responses options provided by the participants 
from Stage 2.  The number ranged from 24 to 74, with an average of 40.  Although they were not 
all appropriate or usable for various reasons (e.g., options that were illegal, immoral, clearly 
against policy, beyond an individual’s realistic control, or otherwise obviously bad responses), 
the range of responses provided a clear sense of the types of responses Army personnel would 
find realistic.  Unsurprisingly, many of the response options were similar, giving a further sense 
of what “common sense” among Army officers might dictate. 
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 In selecting and producing a quality set of response options for rating in Stage 3, several 
factors were considered.  The first consideration was whether a response option clearly indicated 
a high or low level of the characteristic assigned to that scenario, without being explicit (e.g., 
“remain flexible when talking with the host national”).  A second consideration was whether the 
response option stood a reasonable, but not certain, chance of resolving the problem.  A third 
consideration was whether the option was a realistic/feasible way for someone to respond.  A 
final consideration was whether the response option matched the level of specificity of other 
options for that scenario, regarding scope of action and time.  All these factors were considered 
in selecting response options for each scenario.  The author also used the provided response 
options as a base from which to judge the appropriateness of newly written or heavily-revised 
responses that would fill in the necessary number and type of responses needed for Stage 3.  On 
average, no more than one option per scenario needed to be newly composed or heavily revised 
by the author.  In certain cases, scenario details were tweaked to allow for a wider range of 
possible responses. 
 For each scenario, six (in a few cases, seven) response options were selected or written, 
two positive indicators, written to form a clear expression of the characteristic, two neutral 
indicators that are not inconsistent with the positive indicator, and two negative indicators that 
demonstrate a lack of the characteristic.  The neutral and negative indicator primarily rely on 
their juxtaposition with the positive indicator.  A different approach to the negative indicator 
might have been to select response options that are more transparently indicative of an opposing 
characteristic (e.g., flexibility vs. rigidity, inclusiveness vs. isolation or exclusion, and humility 
vs. arrogance or condescension).  This approach, however, tends to produce rather transparently 
ineffective or undesirable responses to the scenario.  Although they might be endorsed by some 
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(e.g., those who would proudly reject the value of flexibility, inclusiveness, or humility), these 
response options would most likely exacerbate the restriction of range in the item score 
distribution. 
This process occurred through multiple iterations of revision between the author and 
other PhD Research Psychologists employed by the Army who brought insight into Army 
leadership doctrine, training, and practice.  This marked the end of Stage 2, with a collection of 
31 scenarios, each accompanied now by a set of six response options to be evaluated for 
effectiveness and level of the assigned characteristic in Stage 3. 
 Stage 3: Response Option Scoring 
 Stage 3 Method 
 Sample 
A total sample of 224 Army personnel (primarily 1LTs and CPTs, some enlisted Non-
Commissioned Officers, see Table 4) with deployment experience were sampled as SMEs for 
this stage).  As with the previous stage, the SMEs status as expert is in relation to their 
understanding of Army Soldier behavior and problem-solving in context.  As with Stage 2, each 
participant evaluated a subset of the total scenario pool, in this case about half.  Individual 
scenario rating samples ranged in size from 68-90 (M = 83.8).  On an individual scenario basis, 
two exclusion criteria were applied: a) a correlation > .95 between ratings of effectiveness and 
the mindset characteristic (< 1% of ratings removed), and b) zero variance in ratings of the 
mindset characteristic (3.3% of ratings removed).  Extremely high correlations between 
effectiveness and mindset indicate that the participant did not differentiate between the elements 
they were being asked to rate.  Similarly, a participant that did not vary their ratings of 
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flexibility, for example, for all response options to a scenario contributed no value to the 
differentiation of the responses.  
Also, a group of four research psychologists (three PhD-level, one Master’s-level) 
familiar with Army leadership doctrine and critical incident methodology evaluated the scenarios 
to supplement the Army SME ratings with an alternative perspective. 
 Materials and Procedure 
Participants were provided with a similar set of materials as in Stage 2.  The 
demographics questionnaire and definitions sheet were identical to those provided in Appendix 
B.  Participants also received a rating packet consisting of approximately 15 scenarios, each of 
which was followed by the list of response options twice, see Appendix C: Scenario and 
Response Rating Packet.  The first time through the response options, participants used a 5-point 
Likert-type scale to indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed that a response option would 
be an effective way to address the problem (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree).  
Afterward, the participants rated each response option a second time, using the same scale, this 
time indicating how strongly they agreed or disagreed that the response would reflect a mindset 
of humility/inclusiveness/flexibility, as noted for that scenario.  
Participants were briefed on the nature and objectives of the project in a fashion similar 
to Stage 2.  Additional emphasis was placed on their understanding the difference between rating 
the effectiveness of a response option (i.e., how well would it address the problem scenario 
presented?) and how much it reflected the mindset characteristic (i.e., regardless of whether it is 
a good response, is it a flexible/humble/inclusive response?).  Notably, the expertise of the SME 
sample is considerably stronger in regard to the likely effectiveness of a response option as 
compared to the level of characteristic shown.  Therefore, considerable time was spent in the 
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briefing of the research about the meaning of flexibility, humility, and inclusiveness in this 
study.  
Similar to Stage 2, the order of presentation in the scenario packet varied.  For Stage 3, 
the order was carefully counter-balanced to avoid the order effects related to survey fatigue or 
contamination from a previous scenario.  Four different scenario orderings were used: an initial 
order (1-15), a reversal of the initial order (15-1), a half-switch (8-15, 1-7), and a reversed half-
switch (7-1, 15-8). 
 Stage 3 Results 
Each scenario and its accompanying response options were reviewed with a goal to 
identify the best scenarios (6-8 for each characteristic) to use in pilot testing.  Recall that the 
result of Stage 2 was a set of six response options for each scenario, two of which were written to 
represent a positive expression of the mindset characteristic, two representing a negative 
expression, and two representing a neutral expression.  
For a scenario to become a pilot-test item, it needed a set of four response options with 
similar effectiveness ratings, one option to be positively keyed, one option to be negatively 
keyed, and two to be unkeyed, neutral options.  This required a careful examination of the ratings 
for each response option (186 in total), as well as an evaluation of the scenarios with the best set 
of options.  The primary criteria for evaluating a response option was the mean characteristic 
expression ratings given by the SMEs and the psychologists.  Additionally, the standard 
deviation of the expression ratings was considered, with smaller deviations indicating greater 
rater agreement.  Given the overall positive skew to the characteristic ratings (M = 3.52, SD = 
1.3; 5-point scale), a rule of thumb was adopted for evaluating whether each option matched its 
intended level of characteristic expression.  For positive expression options, a mean 
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characteristic rating greater than 4.25 was a good match.  Likewise, for negative expression 
options, a mean characteristic rating below 2.5 was a good match.  For neutral options, mean 
characteristic ratings between 3.25 and 3.75 were considered good matches.  For each scenario, 
the set of options had to be considered as well.  Scenarios with a larger range between the mean 
ratings for the positive and negative expression options were favored.  Likewise, scenarios with 
options scoring fairly equally on effectiveness were favored.  Discrepancies between the ratings 
from Army SMEs and the psychologists were examined to further explore the level of agreement 
about how each option expressed the characteristic.  
The process of selecting the best four response options for each scenario, and in turn 
selecting the best scenarios for each characteristic, proceeded according to these criteria.  When 
multiple options could work for a particular keying, preference was given to the one with a 
smaller standard deviation and less discrepancy between the SME and psychologist samples.  In 
cases where ratings for an intended keyed option did not support the intention, but a neutral 
response option aligned better, it was substituted.  Ultimately, six scenarios were chosen as items 
to measure inclusiveness, eight scenarios as items to measure flexibility, and seven scenarios as 
items to measure humility.  In Tables 5-7, the data for each response scenario and its response 
options are presented, along with which scenarios and options were selected and how the options 
were keyed. 
 Stage 4: Pilot Testing and Construct Validation 
 Stage 4 Method 
 Sample 
A total of 229 Army personnel participated in this stage (26 additional participants were 
removed from the sample due to unscoreable SJT responses).  The total sample was split into 
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two groups.  Each group completed the pilot test of the STMT.  In addition, Group 1 (n = 123, 
84% male) completed measures for testing Hypotheses 2a-c, while Group 2 (n = 106) completed 
measures for testing Hypothesis 3 and gathering additional construct validity evidence.  Group 2 
was further subdivided into sub-samples based on response instructions for the STMT: a 
most/least likely response sub-sample (n = 54, 81% male) and a best/worst response sub-sample 
(n = 52, 83% male).  Additional demographic information on each group is provided in Table 8. 
 Materials and Procedure 
Participants completed the same demographics sheet used in previous stages.  All 
participants in both groups completed the pilot-test version of the STMT.  In Group 1, all 
participants were instructed to respond to each scenario by identifying the two options they, 
personally, would be most and least likely to choose, from the options presented.  Approximately 
one half of the Group 2 participants also responded according to these instructions.  The 
remaining Group 2 participants were instructed to respond by identifying the two options that 
they believed were the best and worst options presented.  The STMT has an eleventh grade 
reading level, as indicated by the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level statistic (11.2), and a Flesch 
Reading Ease statistic of 50.3 (roughly equivalent to 10th to 12th grade).  Although high, this 
reading level is appropriate considering the subject matter of the test and the education level of 
the test-taking population (in 2014, 90.6% of active duty officers had a high school diploma or 
higher; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family 
Policy; 2014). 
In addition, participants completed five other measures.  The additional measures were 
always completed after the STMT, to prioritize the completion of that test and avoid priming 
effects.  In order to test Hypothesis 2a, that the flexibility subscale of the STMT would be 
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inversely related to resistance to change, participants in Group 1 completed the Resistance to 
Change Scale (RCS; Oreg, 2003).  The RCS is an 18-item self-report measure with items rated 
using a six-point Likert-type agreement scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 6 = Strongly Agree).  For 
example, “Once I’ve made plans, I’m not likely to change them.” The RCS is scored by 
calculating the mean item rating, after any reverse-scored items are recoded.  The observed 
coefficient alpha for the RCS in the current sample was .87.  The development of the RCS was 
published in the Journal of Applied Psychology, which details the convergent and divergent 
validity evidence with measures of variables such as risk aversion, locus of control, dogmatism, 
tolerance for ambiguity, generalized self-efficacy, self-esteem, and five factor personality. 
Concurrent and predictive validity evidence in regard to actual behavior is also included. 
To test Hypothesis 2b, that the inclusiveness subscale of the STMT would be positively 
related to work-related openness, participants in Group 1 completed the Work-Related Openness 
Scale (WROS; Socin, 2008).  The WROS is a 30-item self-report measure with items rated using 
a six-point Likert-type agreement scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 6 = Strongly Agree).  The scale 
contains five facets: Fantasy, Feelings, Actions, Ideas, and Values, each of which are measured 
with six items.  For example, “I often think of a wide range of possible ways to complete a work-
task” is an Ideas item.  The WROS is scored by calculating the mean item rating, after any 
reverse-scored items are recoded.  The observed coefficient alpha for the WROS in the current 
sample was .89.  The WROS was developed as a doctoral dissertation with criterion-related and 
convergent validity evidence supporting its validity using existing measures of openness in the 
five factor model and job performance in an applied sample.  
To test Hypothesis 2c, that the humility subscale of the STMT would be positively 
related to dispositional humility, participants in Group 1 completed the Dispositional Humility 
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Scale (DHS; Landrum, 2011).  The DHS is a 17-item self-report measure with items rated using 
a six-point Likert-type agreement scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 6 = Strongly Agree), all 
beginning with the item stem “In general, I like people who….” For example, “In general I like 
people who… are willing to take others’ advice and suggestions when given.” The DHS is 
scored by calculating the mean item rating, after any reverse-scored items are recoded.  The 
observed coefficient alpha for the DHS in the current sample was .97.  The development of the 
DHS is published in the journal Psychological Reports, with several pieces of convergent 
validity supporting the scale, such as measures of private and public self-consciousness, 
narcissism, need for achievement, and self-esteem.  
To test Hypothesis 3, that best/worst instructions would result in a stronger relationship 
between SJT scores and cognitive ability than most/least likely instructions, participants in 
Group 2 completed the 16-item ICAR Sample Test from the International Cognitive Ability 
Resource (ICAR) group1 (Condon & Revelle, 2014).  The test measures general cognitive ability 
with four multiple-choice item types (four items each): Letter and Number Series, Matrix 
Reasoning, Three-Dimensional Rotation, and Verbal Reasoning.  
A Letter and Number Series item presents a sequence of five letters and/or numbers with 
an underlying sequential logic.  Respondents must correctly identify the next letter or number in 
the logical sequence from among six options.  Similarly, a Matrix Reasoning item presents a 3x3 
grid of shapes with an underlying logic, but one missing cell in the grid.  Respondents must 
correctly identify the missing shape in the grid from among six options.  A Three-Dimensional 
                                                 
1 ICAR test items are available as part of the public domain, with some restrictions on use to ensure legitimate 
scientific purposes. A summary of the current project and how the items would be used was submitted to the group. 
Access and use of the items was approved. 
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Rotation item presents an image of a six-sided cube.  Three of the sides are shown and feature a 
distinct symbol.  Respondents must consider each of six cubes and correctly identify the one 
cube that is a possible physical rotation of the given cube.  A Verbal Reasoning item presents a 
word problem, the answer to which is one of four options presented.  To illustrate, one item 
presents a series of statements about the relative heights of three boys.  The respondent must then 
consider four statements about the boys’ heights and correctly identify which of the four is true.   
The scale is scored as a percentage of the items answered correctly.  The observed alpha for the 
test was .83 overall (.82 in the likelihood response instruction group, .84 in the best/worst 
response instruction group). 
Finally, participants in Group 2 completed the Strategic Thinking Questionnaire (STQ; 
Pisapia et al., 2005).  The STQ is a 25-item self-report measure with items rated using a five-
point frequency scale (1 = Almost Never to 5 = Almost Always) in regard to how one thinks and 
acts in the context of facing a difficult problem or dilemma.  There are three separate 
components to the scale, measuring Reframing (nine items), Systems Thinking (seven items), and 
Reflection (nine items).  A sample item for Reframing is “I rethink the situation from another 
point of view.” A sample item for Systems Thinking is “I define the entire problem before 
breaking it down into parts.” A sample item for Reflection is “I consciously look for similarities 
between my past experiences and the current problem.”  The STQ is scored separately by 
component, calculating the mean item rating, after any reverse-scored items are recoded.  The 
observed coefficient alphas for each component in the current sample were: Reframing (.68), 
Systems Thinking (.71), and Reflection (.70). 
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 Stage 4 Results 
Item scoring was initially done with the approach used by Motowidlo et al. (1990) 
whereby the options chosen for most and least likely (or best/worst) result in integer scores 
between -2 and 2.  The system is simple: positive and negative keyed options each give a 
positive or negative score of 1 or -1, respectively, depending on whether they are endorsed (most 
likely/best) or rejected (least likely/worst).  Neutral options give a score of 0.  Each item score is 
thus a combination of the score for endorsement and rejection. 
This approach, however, has two flaws.  First, a random chance distribution of scores for 
items scored this way would be bimodal, as there are eight combinations that can result in a score 
of 1 or -1, two that result in a score of 0, and one combination each resulting in a score of -2 or 2.  
Upon review of the score distributions for the pilot SJT items, this flaw became evident, 
negatively affecting the tenability of any assumption of normality.  A second flaw of this scoring 
system is the equal weight given to the options that are endorsed and rejected.  Although there is 
meaning in the option that is rejected, the endorsed option is arguably more meaningful.  In other 
words, what a person chooses to do (or says they would do) indicates more than what they 
choose not to do.   
To my knowledge, no previous SJT development has chosen to weight the endorsed 
option over the rejected option, although there is clearly a wide variety of approaches taken.  So, 
there is no known precedent for this approach.  However, it is quite common for SJT developers 
to employ similar variations.  A variant on the endorsement approach was adopted by Porterfield 
(2001), wherein three best options are rank-ordered and give 3, 2, or 1 point(s), while the 
remaining options give no points. 
Bergman et al. (2006) compared validity results for several different methods of keying 
the same SJT (a leadership skills test).  However, this analysis focused on the keying side of item 
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scoring (e.g., expert-based, theory-driven, or empirical), rather than the scoring system (all 
resulted in scoring outcomes of -1, 0, or 1).  For the reasons noted above, I believe it is both 
theoretically justified and serves practical measurement purposes to adopt a unique approach 
which weights the endorsed option over the rejected one.  
Specifically, the new scoring system gives an extra point of weight to the endorsed 
option.  This extra point results in scores that range from -3 to 3.  The random chance 
distribution of item scores is now more even (see Figure 2), with two response combinations 
each scored as -2, -1, 0, 1, or 2, and one combination each scored as -3 or 3.  In Table 9, the 
descriptive statistics for each item under each scoring system are provided (under most/least 
likely conditions).  The alternative scoring system slightly reduced issues of negative skew (M1 = 
-.48 to M2 = -.45, N = 128) and kurtosis (M1 = -.3 to M2 = -.07, N = 128).  However, Shapiro-
Wilk tests of normality still reject the null hypothesis of normality for each item, with test 
statistics ranging from .60 to .94 (df = 126). 
Standard practice in test construction is to report estimates of measurement reliability.    
Coefficient alpha is a standard metric for estimating reliability, treating each item as an 
individual test administration of its own and comparing their consistency to estimate the 
reliability of the test.  This approach requires an assumption of tau-equivalence, which some 
have argued is not a realistic condition in most test construction cases (Sijtsma, 2009).  
Furthermore, alpha has always been known to be a lower-bound estimate of a test’s reliability, 
one which may grossly underestimate actual reliability (Sijtsma, 2009).  Alternative reliability 
estimates, such as λ2 (Guttman, 1945), exist which offer better lower bound estimates, although 
reliability is still underestimated and constrained by the difficulty of estimating reliability from a 
single test.  In regard to SJTs in particular, internal consistency reliability is considered an 
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inappropriate index for reliability.  As described by Whetzel and McDaniel (2009), SJT items are 
typically construct heterogeneous, which interferes with factor loadings and the assessment of 
scale reliability through homogeneity.  Whetzel and McDaniel suggest test-retest reliability or 
parallel forms approaches instead. The nature of the current sample precluded a test-retest 
format, and establishing parallel forms was infeasible as well.  Therefore, internal consistency 
estimates are provided, with a clear expectation that they underestimate the reliability of the test, 
due to the nature of these metrics and the construct heterogeneity of SJT items. 
Coefficient alpha and λ2 reliability estimates for the STMT items were all quite low. 
When all pilot test items were included, alpha and λ2 were very low: inclusiveness (α = .14, λ2 = 
.21), flexibility (α = .08, λ2 = .15), humility (α = .03, λ2 = .13), and overall (α = .3, λ2 = .35).Four 
items for each characteristic were selected to remain in the item set, on the basis of item-total 
correlation, item-scale correlation, and normality (skew/kurtosis).  The refined item set shows 
improved reliability estimates across the board: inclusiveness (α = .33, λ2 = .34), flexibility (α = 
.29, λ2 = .31), humility items (α = .25, λ2 = .3), and overall (α = .4, λ2 = .43).  The average item 
distribution characteristics improved for skewness (-.27, SE = .21) and kurtosis (-.43, SE = .43).   
Hypothesis 1 addressed the factor structure of the STMT items.  Specifically, an oblique 
three-factor model was expected to fit the data better than an orthogonal model.  Although the 
assumption of univariate and multivariate normality is questionable in this case, the models were 
tested using maximum likelihood estimation.  Alternative estimation methods that do not assume 
normality require much larger sample sizes (e.g., asymptotically distribution free estimation, 
bootstrap estimation).  
Using the 128 cases from Group 1 of Stage 4, both three-factor models, oblique and 
orthogonal, resulted in unidentified models.  When the additional 54 cases from Group 2 were 
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included (originally intended as a hold-out sample) in the analysis, the oblique model was 
successfully identified and the fit estimated.  The orthogonal model, however, produced 
inadmissible results.2 This is likely due to a large negative error variance estimate for one item (-
10.4).  A one-factor model was also tested, for comparison against the hypothesized three-factor 
oblique model. 
There are many indices and tests of model fit available.  Absolute model fit is often tested 
with a chi-square test (χ2; indicates bad fit if significant, Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006) alongside 
the ratio of χ2 to its degrees of freedom (CMIN/df; threshold < 2, Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006).   
Hu and Bentler (1999) recommend also examining a combination of a relative fit index, such as 
the comparative fit index (CFI) which functions well for small sample sizes (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2006), and a non-centrality parameter, such as the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA; threshold < .07; Steiger, 2007).  
The oblique model demonstrated marginal to good fit, given the caveat that violations of 
normality likely cause the fit to be overestimated.  The chi-square test for the oblique was not 
significant, χ2 (51) = 55.28, p > .05, and the CMIN/df was acceptable (1.084).  The CFI indicated 
marginally poor fit (.88).  The RMSEA indicated excellent fit (0.022; 90% CI [< 0.001, .054]).  
As shown in Figure 3, however, the standardized factor loadings for the three-factor model are 
inconsistent, quite low in multiple cases.  Two items in particular (P16 under flexibility and P10 
under humility) load so weakly on their factors (.04 and -.16, respectively) that the model would 
be clearly improved by removing those items.   
                                                 
2 A three-factor orthogonal model would likely be unsupported regardless, as there is a significant correlation 
between inclusiveness and humility subscale scores, as seen in Tables 11 and 14. 
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After removing items 16, 10, and an additional inclusiveness item (P6 under 
inclusiveness) to maintain an equal number of items per subscale, the models were estimated 
again.  The orthogonal model was once again inadmissible due to a negative error variance.  The 
three-factor oblique model showed improved fit, χ2 (24) = 25.032, p > .05, CMIN/df = 1.043, 
CFI = .967, RMSEA = .015, 90% CI [< 0.001, 0.063] (see Figure 4).  The one-factor model also 
showed strong fit, χ2 (27) = 29.035, p > .05, CMIN/df = 1.075, CFI = .935, RMSEA = .02, 90% 
CI [< 0.001, .063] (see Figure 5).  In this circumstance, where both models indicate good fit, it is 
appropriate to consider model parsimony.  Although there are no well-established thresholds for 
the parsimony-adjusted CFI (PCFI; scaled 0-1; Bentler, 1990), it may be used to compare how 
well the fit of the two competing models maximizes parsimony.  Unsurprisingly, the one-factor 
model (PCFI = .701) performs better than the three-factor oblique model (PCFI = 0.645), albeit 
slightly.   
As noted above, there are important caveats to the interpretability and reliability of these 
fit assessments.  The sample size is somewhat low (N = 182, 12 observed variables, ~15 subjects 
per variable) but within the recommended range (10-20 per variable).  The non-normality of the 
data present a significant challenge to the accuracy of the fit estimation.  Attempts to transform 
the item score distributions using square root and log 10 transformations, as recommended by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2006) for negatively skewed data, resulted in slightly more skewed item 
distributions.  Low inter-item correlations and factor loadings further suggested a problem with 
the model, and indicated that that very good fit indicated by the fit indices were likely 
substantially overestimating the fit of both models.  As shown in Table 10, the inter-item 
correlations were mostly below .2 and, in several cases, negative.  
61 
Hypothesis 1 focused on the relative superiority of an oblique model compared to an 
orthogonal model.  Due to the inadmissible nature of the results for the orthogonal model, this 
comparison cannot be fully completed.  In place of that comparison, the three-factor and one-
factor models were compared.  In regard to the relative fit of those models, with the refined item 
set, the data fit both models fairly equally, with most indices slightly favoring the hypothesized 
three-factor oblique model, while parsimony-adjustments suggest the favorability of the one-
factor model.  Both these models, allow for the conceptual overlap of flexibility, humility, and 
inclusiveness components of the mindset, the difference being the extent to which the 
components can be shown to exist distinctly.  Overall, there is insufficient compelling evidence 
to support that the hypothesized three-factor model better represents the data than a model 
encompassing one overall mindset factor.  Therefore, these results suggest Hypothesis 1 is not 
supported. 
For the remaining analyses, scale scores, alphas, and intercorrelations will use the 9-item 
form of the STMT derived from the CFA.  Removing those items lowered alpha for flexibility (α 
= .26, down from .29) and inclusiveness (α = .26, down from from .33), but raised it for humility 
(α = .42, up from .25), and overall mindset (α = .45, up from .4). 
Hypothesis 2 covered the expected relationships between the STMT subscales and the 
alternative measures of similar constructs to establish construct validity.  Specifically, 
Hypothesis 2a predicted a negative relationship between strategic mindset flexibility and 
resistance to change.   
 The observed correlation between the three-item flexibility score and resistance to 
change was significant (r = -.27, p < .01).  Hypothesis 2b predicted a positive relationship 
between strategic mindset inclusiveness and work-related openness.  The observed correlation 
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between the three-item inclusiveness score and work-related openness was significant (r = .18, p 
< .05).  Hypothesis 2c predicted a positive relationship between strategic mindset humility with 
dispositional humility.  The observed correlation between the three-item humility score and 
dispositional humility was significant (r = .34, p < .01).  See Table 11 for the full bivariate 
correlation matrix.  
To place these relationships in context, the relationships between each characteristic and 
the other construct validity measures should be explored.  Inclusiveness did not correlate 
significantly with either resistance to change (r = -.06) or dispositional humility (r = .07).  
Flexibility did not correlate significantly with work-related openness (r = .04) or dispositional 
humility (r = .16).  Humility did not correlate with either work-related openness (r = .11) or 
resistance to change (r = -.05).  To summarize, each subscale of the STMT correlated 
significantly with its corresponding self-report measure, but did not correlate significantly with 
the others.  This evidence cumulatively supports Hypotheses 2a-c, with the caveat that 
measurement validity requires reliability, the estimates of which are low for the STMT. 
In Group 2, an additional measure was included to explore the relationship between 
strategic mindset scores as measured by the STMT and scores on the Pisapia et al. (2005) STQ. 
Under the likelihood response instruction condition, inclusiveness correlated positively with 
STQ reflection (r = .30, p < .05), as did the overall mindset score (r = .32, p < .05). All other 
such correlations were non-significant.  See Table 14 for the full bivariate correlation matrix, 
under each response instruction condition. 
Hypothesis 3 concerned the relationship between STMT scores and cognitive ability 
when the item response instructions were changed.  Specifically, the relationship with cognitive 
ability was predicted to be stronger when instructions were to choose the best and worst 
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response, compared to instructions to choose one’s most and least likely response.  Descriptive 
statistics for each item under both instruction conditions are provided in Table 12.  The observed 
correlation between the overall STMT score and cognitive ability was nonsignificant in the 
likelihood condition, r = -.12, ns, but significantly negative in the best/worst condition, r = -.29, 
p < .05).  See Tables 13 and 14 for further item-level and scale-level detail.  Although the 
specific prediction made in Hypothesis 3 was technically supported by the significant 
relationship in the best/worst condition, the direction of that relationship was not in line with 
what was anticipated.  However, the intended construct-level relationship between strategic 
mindset as measured with likelihood instructions and cognitive ability (i.e., a lack thereof) is 
bolstered by this evidence. 
Exploratory analyses were conducted for the demographic variables in Stage 4.  For 
analyses that include only the STMT scores, the Group 1 sample was combined with the subset 
of Group 2 respondents who completed the STMT with the same likelihood response instructions 
as Group 1.  There was no effect of sex on scores for inclusiveness (F(1,180) = 0.816, ns), 
flexibility (F(1,180) = 0.982, ns), humility (F(1,180) = 0.975, ns), or total mindset (F(1,180) = 
2.099, ns) as measured by the STMT.  Likewise, there was no effect of sex on work-related 
openness (F(1,126) = 0.013, ns), resistance to change (F(1,126) = 0.069, ns), dispositional 
humility (F(1,126) = 0.031, ns), reframing (F(1,103) = 0.037, ns), systems thinking (F(1,103) = 
0.410, ns), reflection (F(1,103) = 0.039, ns), or cognitive ability scores (F(1,103) = 1.938, ns).  It 
should be noted that, although the sample’s balance of males and females is consistent with the 
Army-wide population (cf., Maxfield, 2015), there is a large imbalance in the sample for this 
demographic variable. 
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There was no effect of rank on scores for inclusiveness (F(4,177) = 0.37, ns), flexibility 
(F(4,177) = 1.58, ns), humility (F(4,177) = 1.760, ns), or total mindset (F(4,177) = 2.019, ns). 
There was a significant effect of rank on work-related openness (F(4,123) = 2.735, p = .032), but 
no effect of rank on resistance to change (F(4,123), 1.041, ns) dispositional humility (F(4,123) = 
0.576, ns), reframing (F(2,102) = 1.262, ns), systems thinking (F(2,102) = 1.172, ns), reflection 
(F(2,102) = 2.128, ns), or cognitive ability scores (F(2,102) = 1.165, ns).  Post-hoc examination 
of the rank effect on work-related openness, using Tukey’s HSD test, reveals that 2nd Lieutenants 
(M = 3.66, SD = 1.07) scored significantly lower on work-related openness than Captains (M = 
4.33, SD = 0.55). 
There was no effect of functional branch on scores for inclusiveness (F(16,165) = 1.131, 
ns), flexibility (F(16,165) = 0.582, ns), humility (F(16,165) = 0.814, ns), or total mindset 
(F(16,165) = 0.54, ns).  Likewise, there was no effect of functional branch on work-related 
openness (F(14,113) = 1.593, ns), resistance to change (F(14,113) = 0.407, ns), dispositional 
humility (F(14,113) = 0.924, ns), reframing (F(13,91) = 1.224, ns), systems thinking (F(13,91) = 
1.651, ns), reflection (F(13,91) = 1.319, ns), or cognitive ability scores (F(13,91) = 1.178, ns).   
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Chapter 5 - Discussion 
Gaining new understanding about the improvement of organizational strategy through the 
development of effective strategic thinkers is a goal shared by many academic scholars, human 
resource professionals, and organizational leaders.  It has only been fairly recently that the so-
called black box of the boardroom, the often empirically inaccessible environment in which 
high-level strategizing happens in large organizations, has started to open to scholars and 
researchers (Arnardottir, Fischer, & Martin, 2015).  Much remains to be known about the 
individual and interpersonal dynamics of strategic thinking and strategizing. The current research 
sought to contribute to this understanding by conceptualizing a new construct: the strategic 
thinking mindset.  In conjunction with cognitive ability and the domain-specific knowledge best 
gained with time, experience, and education, such a mindset reflects the unique perspective that 
makes a person well-suited to the complex and ambiguous thinking challenges required for 
successful strategy-making.  
 The overarching goal of creating a test that measures the strategic thinking mindset was 
to help identify strengths related to strategic thinking in organizational members that have yet to 
be set on a path to strategic level leadership.  This research study aimed to not only develop a 
theoretical understanding of the strategic thinking mindset as a construct, but also to measure 
that construct with a situational judgment test format conducive to identification and 
development in a way that is specific to an organization’s work domain. 
To that end, the current research was structured in four stages.  The first three stages of 
data collection and analysis reflect the development of the STMT items.  The standard form of a 
situational judgment test item consists of an item stem (a scenario of some kind), item options 
(ways in which one could respond in the scenario), and a scoring key (how each response option 
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relates to the item score, if chosen).  The fourth stage consisted of the evaluation of the STMT’s 
psychometric qualities. 
In Stage 1, participants from a wide range of functional areas in the Army provided 
critical incidents from their experiences in which they or a close associate were confronted with 
a difficult problem that had no clear right answer.  These critical incidents were carefully 
reviewed, culled, and edited into a set of scenarios that elicit a demonstration (or rejection) of 
humility, flexibility, or inclusiveness by a functionally generic audience of Army participants at 
a certain level of rank. 
In Stage 2, a new group of participants read the scenarios and provided feedback on their 
realism and general applicability across the Army, as written.  Participants also indicated the 
most relevant characteristic for the scenario and provided a range of response options, with 
emphasis on varying the focal characteristic within a range of reasonably realistic and effective 
approaches to responding to the problem depicted in the scenario.  Scenario feedback was 
incorporated, as needed, to improve the scenarios.  The votes for each scenario as relevant to 
flexibility, humility, or inclusiveness were tallied and used to assign each scenario a 
characteristic.  The many response options provided for each scenario were reviewed and 
compiled into a set of candidate response options that represented different levels of the focal 
characteristic. 
In Stage 3, another new group of Army participants considered the options for each 
scenario and rated them individually on the level of flexibility, humility, or inclusiveness shown 
and the likely effectiveness of the option.  A small group of research psychologists also rated the 
scenarios and options in the same way.  This data was carefully compiled and analyzed in an 
attempt to select the most appropriate options for each scenario and identify the scenarios with 
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the best group of response options to represent a range of flexible, humble, or inclusive 
responses, with generally equivalent effectiveness.  
Finally, in Stage 4, the remaining scenarios and response options were presented to a 
final group of Army participants as pilot test items, alongside measures of other constructs for 
accumulating validity evidence. For a subset of participants, the instructions for how to respond 
were altered from a focus on one’s most and least likely response to which would be the best and 
worst response. 
In summary, existing scholarship on the characteristics of strategic thinking was 
summarized and synthesized by an analysis of the themes that underlie the breadth of the 
construct across several disciplines.  Once the theoretical model of the strategic mindset was 
identified, four stages of progressive item development and refinement produced a 9-item 
situational judgment test, the STMT, for use by the U.S. Army with three sub-scales that show 
some evidence of construct validity, in line with the theoretical model.   
The results demonstrated that the STMT suffers notably due to deviations from normality 
as well as low inter-item correlations and construct homogeneity. This is not particularly 
surprising given the issues of construct heterogeneity inherent to the SJT format (see Whetzel & 
McDaniel, 2009).  Although some evidence emerged supporting the theoretical model 
underlying the STMT’s structure, the lack of an adequate indicator of the test’s reliability and the 
questionable factor structure of the test may limit the test’s usability as a predictor or criterion.  
If the STMT were to be employed in research or selection, a better estimate of the reliability of 
the test, such as a test-retest form, would be needed before the test could be trusted for this 
purpose. Any criterion-related correlations would need to be substantially attenuated for any 
unreliability in the test.  The single test administration nature of the current research posed a 
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difficult challenge to determining the test’s true reliability.  The construct heterogeneity of SJTs 
contributes to a lack of internal consistency of SJTs (Whetzel & McDaniel, 2009).  Many other 
SJT developments have encountered similar issues.   Schmitt and Chan (1997) describe the 
common occurrence of relatively low alphas, low inter-item correlations, and factor analytic 
results that account for a small portion of total variance in SJT development research.  Porterfield 
(2001) developed an SJT for security officers, finding it to be an effective predictor of job 
performance, but suffering from a disappointing alpha (.31).  Chan and Schmitt (1997) 
developed an SJT for generic skilled blue collar work with a final alpha of .55.  There are, 
however, examples of SJTs that succeed in (or come close to) meeting the standard thresholds of 
alpha reliability (e.g., Ascalon, 2004, .69; Born, Van der Maessen, & Van der Zee 2001, .91).  It 
has been suggested that an increased focus on measuring specific constructs, rather than the 
entire scope of a job may lead to better alphas (Ascalon, 2004).  Born et al. (2001) developed a 
construct-focused SJT for social intelligence and achieved a very high alpha; however, Young’s 
(2004) SJT focused on emotional intelligence suffered from an extremely low alpha (.17).  
Likewise, an SJT developed by Smith (2011) focused on entrepreneurial orientation produced an 
alpha of .32.  Furthermore, coefficient alpha, as the standard metric for internal consistency 
reliability, has been criticized as a (potentially gross) underestimate of true reliability (Sijtsma, 
2009).   
Schmitt (1996) notes that a measure may have other strengths than high internal 
consistency reliability around a clear homogeneous construct, such as content coverage of a 
domain, that may support the test’s use.  The STMT’s reliability is of greater concern when the 
purpose of the test is to analyze the score. Yet, one of the great strengths of an SJT is its content 
fidelity (Weekley & Ployhart, 2006).  The use of the STMT as a starting point for self-awareness 
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training and group discussion about intellectual flexibility, humility, and inclusiveness is not 
substantially hindered by the unknown reliability and factor structure of the test.  So, while the 
results of this study are disappointing in regard to the psychometric strength of the scale 
developed, this outcome is not inconsistent with the issues that have hindered many previous SJT 
developments. 
There is some evidence that the measure taps into the constructs of flexibility, humility, 
and inclusiveness as intended.  Relating to Hypothesis 1, the CFA provided some evidence 
supporting three factors, favoring the three-factor oblique model over the one-factor model in a 
pure fit sense.  Ultimately, identifying paths for the three factors in the structural model did not 
add enough value to the model to overcome the cost of decreased parsimony.  However, the 
results still supported the presence of those factors, albeit with fairly strong covariances between 
the factors and somewhat low factor loadings.  Furthermore, the low inter-item correlations 
suggest that a factor analysis may not even be appropriate for the data obtained.  
In support of Hypotheses 2a-c, each three-item subscale in the final test correlated as 
expected with its corresponding self-report measure, but did not correlate significantly with the 
others.  The implications of this are that, while there may be significant construct overlap and 
statistical noise in each subscale’s strength as a predictor and construct measurement, there is at 
least some signal that is uniquely tied to the intended construct.   
That said, there is a reason why reliability, inter-item and item-total correlations, and 
factor structure are a concern in measurement, particularly when a test is designed to measure 
specific constructs, rather than broadly defined “judgment” in a job.  In the current research, the 
STMT was designed to measure the construct of strategic thinking mindset as indicated by the 
constructs of flexibility, inclusiveness, and humility. There remain important concerns about the 
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overall evidence supporting the construct validity of the STMT in this regard.  The low inter-
item correlations suggest that each item reflects a heterogeneous set of constructs, even within 
the subscales.  There is also evidence of significant overlap between the inclusiveness and 
humility subscales in particular, suggesting a need for some refinement to the theory underlying 
those two characteristics.   
The lack of a relationship with cognitive ability, in the likelihood conditions, is 
noteworthy.  It not only reinforces that the constructs being measured by the STMT are distinct 
from a general intelligence factor, as intended, but also reinforces the need to appreciate and 
understand the aspects of strategic thinking that require something other than a powerful 
intellect.  The negative correlation with cognitive ability under best/worst instructions is difficult 
to interpret.  To the extent that the relationship is not a spurious one, a possible interpretation is 
that people (perhaps Army officers in particular) with the strong reasoning skills required to 
score highly on a cognitive ability test have a tendency to be overconfident, especially when they 
are confronted with the notion that there is a clear best response.  Such a condition may prompt 
more analytical thinking processes, rather than humanistic ones.  More generally, highly 
intelligent people might have a tendency, either innate or learned, to devalue certain ways of 
approaching problems.  They may be less likely to seek to integrate the viewpoints of others 
(inclusiveness), acknowledge their limits or biases (humility), and/or attend to clues that a 
change in approach or assumptions may be needed (flexibility).  More research on this 
possibility is warranted.  
The general lack of relationship between the STMT and the Pisapia et al. (2005) measure, 
the STQ, aligns with the different approach to conceptualizing the mindset in each measure.  The 
approach taken by the STQ focuses more on three “cognitive processes” (p. 44): systems 
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thinking, reflection, and reframing.  According to Pisapia et al., these processes facilitate the 
creation of the strategic mindset.  These are certainly important elements of strategic thinking, as 
indicated by the inclusion of the Pisapia et al. model in the integrating themes analysis 
summarized in Table 1.  The STMT focuses on the mindset characteristics that form a necessary 
foundation for the kinds of thinking processes measured in the STQ.  Additionally, it should be 
noted that the methodological differences of the STMT and STQ as measures affect what exactly 
is being measured.  While the STQ relies on the respondent’s self-assessment of general 
tendencies, the STMT puts the respondent in a position to apply those tendencies in a series of 
situational judgments.  The significant relationships found between inclusiveness and the total 
mindset score with reflection may suggest an avenue for further research.  For example, it may 
be that inclusiveness plays a role in supporting the processes represented by the theme of self-
awareness and self-control.   
 Strengths 
Although the overall profile of results for the scale developed in this research are 
disappointing, there are still important strengths in the areas of conceptual development, method 
selection and item development, and research design.  The conceptualization of the strategic 
thinking mindset may still need further refinement, but the process by which the mindset was 
conceptualized was sound, rooted in a diverse review and synthesis of existing scholarship from 
the disciplines of psychology, management, military art, and history.  There is far too much 
empirical, conceptual, and philosophical literature about strategy to provide a fully 
comprehensive review of what we know or think we know about it.  The scope for this research 
was to examine how different disciplines ascribe specific characteristics to individual strategic 
thinking.  In some cases, this included explicitly designed scientific models of strategic thinking, 
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while in other cases, the substance of strategic thinking is described in a more philosophical way, 
or embedded in an approach to measurement.  I believe this is a strength of this research, in that 
it avoids what can become a self-reinforcing cycle of overly-narrowing a concept by relying too 
heavily on one contextual lens.  The notion of a strategy is unquestionably broad and 
fundamental to individuals and organizations of all types, be they small or big, private or public, 
military or civilian, athletic or artistic.  There is a cost to the broader understanding of how to 
think about a complex problem environment and create effective strategies within it if 
researchers and scholars fail to maintain a sufficiently wide lens.   
This research intentionally sought to integrate the common themes of all who think and 
write about what strategic thinking is and looks like, and then to take a step further in using that 
synthesized understanding to derive a new concept.  For all that we might already understand 
about what strategic thinking is and who does it well, we know much less about how to identify 
those who have a talent for it and give them the right developmental experiences, such as 
planning and decision-making opportunities, broadening experiences, and education.  The 
mindset for strategic thinking, how to approach complex problem environments in the right way, 
is an important tool, alongside intelligence and a base of relevant knowledge, for individuals to 
contribute to effective strategic thinking and strategy-making. 
The choice of situational judgment testing as a method for assessing the strategic thinking 
mindset was thoughtfully rooted in the strengths of this format.  First and foremost, the SJT 
format is a relatively inexpensive method that retains some content fidelity as a small-scale 
simulation, rather than relying on a test-taker’s self-awareness and honesty.  Face validity to test-
takers, reduced adverse impact, and potential material for group-discussion and self-development 
also weighed in favor of this method.  The item development process was carefully planned and 
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performed in line with the best practice guidance of SJT experts and practitioners, notably 
McDaniel and Whetzel (2007).  Each element of the STMT (item stem content, item response 
content, scoring key) was developed in its own stage, allowing for each stage of development to 
contribute to improving the products of the previous stages.  
At each stage, the STMT was developed with a unique and relevant sample of 
participants with expertise in the job environment at hand.  Employing a more generic student 
sample may have facilitated easier data collection and larger samples, which may have facilitated 
greater flexibility for maximizing the psychometrics.  However, the utility of the STMT, in the 
end, would have suffered significantly from the lack of perspective on the real-life patterns of 
thought and decision-making in the population for whom the test was intended.  
Best practices in research methods were followed throughout.  Item-order effects were 
carefully counterbalanced.  Efforts were made to prevent survey fatigue.  Diverse and 
representative participants were sampled. The assumptions underlying the evidence for statistical 
and construct validity were evaluated, considered, and the results accurately reported. 
A final strength of this research is the careful consideration of, and adherence to, ethical 
standards for human subjects research.  The use of a military sample required special attention to 
including all relevant forms of institutional review.  All stages of the research were reviewed and 
approved by the institutional review board governing U.S. Army human subjects research.  The 
Kansas State University review board was also involved in the review process, through a 
memorandum of understanding established between the university and Army review boards.   
The Army process for obtaining access to participants also ensures that Army units allowing 
their personnel to participate are given the opportunity to consider the goals and anticipated 
benefits of the research in order to prioritize and selectively support individual research projects.   
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Intellectual property rights were respected throughout.  The appropriate permissions were 
obtained for use of the ICAR Sample Test (Condon & Revelle, 2014) and the Strategic Thinking 
Questionnaire (Pisapia et al., 2005).   
  Limitations 
 The primary limitation of this research relate the lack of a solid understanding of what 
the STMT is truly measuring at a construct level.  The reliability problems are inherently related, 
in that they rely on the internal consistency model of estimating reliability, which treats each 
item as a mini-test and therefore the degree to which the items intercorrelate with each other 
determines the estimate of how reliable the test is.  As noted above, and according the 
recommendation of Whetzel and McDaniel (2009) this approach to estimating the reliability of 
an SJT is suboptimal compared to other approaches, such as test-retest reliability.  
As noted above, SJTs commonly present muddled results in regard to identifying the 
constructs measured.  The current test was no different.  There are also limitations related to 
sample size.  The 54 cases in Group 2 of the Stage 4 pilot test were meant to be a hold-out 
sample to replicate test the results of the CFA.  However, they were instead incorporated into the 
main CFA to boost its power and overcome model identification problems.  Sample size is also 
related to the violations of the general linear model.  Many of the analyses reported here require 
an assumption of univariate, and in the case of structural equation modelling, multivariate 
normality.  Although there are techniques which can overcome violations of normality, they 
generally require very large sample sizes.  Steps were taken to address the normality of the item 
distributions, and the implications of those violations are acknowledged throughout.  An option 
would be to seek out more participants until a sufficient sample for these robust analyses is 
obtained.  However, extensive effort and resources were put into obtaining the current minimally 
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viable sample size.  The costs of obtaining what would be a much larger sample would have been 
unrealistic and untenable.   
The nature of the Army sample should be considered a strength of this research overall.   
However, there are limitations aside from the restrictions on sample size and restraints on the 
opportunity to estimate reliability through test-retest correlations.  Although the samples 
obtained certainly have expertise derived from first-hand knowledge of decision-making in the 
job, there is no real expertise in the sample regarding the constructs of flexibility, humility, and 
inclusiveness.  Although the author’s involvement at all points, and the research psychologist 
sample in Stage 3, serve to balance this concern, the participants may have been limited in their 
ability to sufficiently conceptualize the relevance of a scenario to the mindset characteristics, or 
to generate a wide enough range of realistic flexible, humble, and inclusive response options.  
In addition to the psychometric weaknesses of the developed test, there are limitations to 
the strength of the strategic thinking mindset at a conceptual level.  As noted throughout the 
introduction, there is a likely a curvilinear relationship between each of the strategic thinking 
mindset characteristics and success in strategic thinking.  In other words, there is reason to 
believe that, beyond a certain threshold, these characteristics may become a hindrance to 
strategic thinking.  This research does not allow for an investigation of that phenomenon; 
however, it bears mentioning here as the application of these characteristics in problem-solving 
requires a judgment about where that threshold may be.  Some respondents may value 
inclusiveness highly, but feel that in the scenario presented, to embrace an inclusive approach to 
the problem would be more problematic than helpful.  
A related point regarding the interpretation of one’s mindset from SJT responses is that 
one’s natural tendencies may be suppressed by the wishes of an authority figure or the norms of 
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a culture.  This is of particular relevance in the military, which has a clearly defined chain of 
command, powerful cultural and climate norms, and constant peer competition for promotion.  A 
respondent may be naturally inclined to endorse an inclusive response to a given scenario, but 
also feel that such a response would be perceived badly by peers or authority figures.  For 
example, an inclusive response may be seen as an abdication of one’s own decision-making 
responsibility, perhaps with the intent of sharing the risks associated with failure.   
In this case, it would be more accurate to say that the STMT is measuring the degree to 
which the unit climate a respondent comes from is receptive to flexibility, humility, and 
inclusiveness.  Future research could effectively explore this phenomenon by comparing the 
results of Soldiers within and between units.  This also points back to the measure’s strength as a 
source of group discussion and self-development.  If a unit leader wishes to get a sense of how 
their command climate does or does not support flexibility, inclusiveness, and humility, the test 
could be used as a group diagnostic and source of material for discussion. 
 Future Research 
As noted above, future research for the STMT in particular should focus on the question 
of whether it tends to measure an innate trait or a more transient perception of the characteristics, 
perhaps brought on by climate and/or leadership, using a between- and within-unit design.  
Although there were no significant effects of branch on scores, a more directed effort to obtain a 
sufficient sample from each of the major branches may reveal something about the areas in the 
Army that tend to produce (or attract) individuals with a strategic thinking mindset, and might, 
therefore, be under- or over-represented in promotion to strategic-level leadership positions.  If 
the mindset is more transient and influenced by unit, this would suggest that the mindset could 
be developed through education or facilitated by improvements to unit climates.  This is a critical 
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area of future research on the mindset as it stands to define whether, and through what time and 
resources, any Soldier can be trained to think this way, or if organizations are better off 
facilitating the promotion of Soldiers who already think about problems in this way.  As for what 
the current study can show about the transience of the mindset, there was no significant effect of 
any demographic variable on STMT scores, suggesting that the Army is not already indirectly 
selecting for and promoting this mindset into the higher ranks or key branches.   
Related to the issue of transience is the question of how one’s mindset relates to one’s 
actions.  The SJT format uses decisions about actions to indicate tendencies about a test-taker’s 
mindset.  Therefore, it is conceptually possible that a person who does not have a mindset 
favoring those characteristics would still make decisions and act in a way that suggests they do.  
This might happen, for example, if the Army’s evaluation and promotion processes begin to 
explicitly evaluate and reward these characteristics.  Future research could explore this 
possibility, perhaps through an experimental design that involves priming a group of participants 
that the Army highly values those characteristics.  In some ways, it may not matter whether an 
officer is being inclusive, humble, or flexible in their actions, but not in their thinking; for 
example, the subordinates they oversee may witness it the same and be developed to appreciate 
the role of these characteristics in problem-solving.  However, when it comes to the individual 
officer’s ability make good decisions, if they only go through the motions of inclusiveness, for 
example, without truly incorporating the perspectives provided, their thinking will still suffer 
from a narrow lens.     
The STMT should be tested in an environment in which test-retest reliability can be 
estimated, as well as other methods for evaluating the validity of the test, such as criterion-
related validity.  A research design might utilize course performance at various Army schools, 
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such as the Captain’s Career Course or the Command and General Staff College.  Depending on 
the nature of the course, this may be a useful performance criterion for the test.  Conversely, the 
STMT could be used to evaluate training interventions related to flexibility, humility, or 
inclusiveness.   
The relationship of the STMT with cognitive ability could also be explored more fully. 
Although the results supported the independence of the strategic mindset and cognitive ability, a 
qualitative and quantitative approach could be designed to explore how people high and low in 
cognitive ability tend to think about and value the importance of flexibility, humility, and 
inclusiveness.  The STMT’s relationship with personality and other individual difference 
variables should also be explored.  Although one element of the five-factor model was 
incorporated in this research (the WROS focuses on the openness to experience factor), there 
may be significant overlap with one or more of the other four factors.  Need for cognitive 
structure may be revealing of why certain individuals struggle to embrace a mindset of 
flexibility, for example. All such analyses would likely help to clarify the constructs being 
measured in the STMT.   
Finally, further research could be done to clarify whether the mindset is truly unrelated to 
aspects of problem-solving and strategic thinking that it is expected to be unrelated to.  It 
remains to be seen if domain-relevant knowledge affects the mindset.  It may be that more 
domain-relevant knowledge decreases the ability of the mindset to influence decision-making, as 
more focus may be paid to the particular facts of the situation.  If this were the case, it may be 
preferable to measure the mindset when officers are still recruits and have yet to gather any 
knowledge or experience at the Company grade.  However, a recruit may be inclined to score 
highly on flexibility, humility, and inclusiveness when presented with scenarios that they know 
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are beyond their training, education, and experience.  When the scenarios match the level of the 
test-takers, however, higher mindset scores may be more indicative of how they would actually 
think and behave.  Finally, as noted in Figure 1, there are two themes that were not tied to a 
mindset characteristic, directionality and awareness of time.  Future research should seek to 
develop measures of those processes and assess whether the mindset characteristics relate in a 
meaningful way. 
Other approaches to measuring the strategic thinking mindset should also be explored.  
Some SJTs are developed using multi-media formats, depicting the scenario through audio-visual 
means, for example.  This presents a substantial resource challenge, however, a multi-media 
version of the assessment might allow for an investigation of how interpersonal biases (racial, 
ethnic, gender, etc.) or stereotypes affect scores on the STMT.  For example, someone biased 
against female officers in a combat environment may be much less likely to be inclusive than if a 
male officer is presented in the same role.   
A self-report measure similar to the STQ might be developed, based on the specific 
concepts of flexibility, humility, and inclusiveness in problem-solving as modeled in this 
research.  This would allow for a better comparison of the way in which people assess their own 
tendencies and how they apply them in scenario-based judgments.  The issue of social 
desirability in responding is certainly relevant here. No explicit measure of socially desirable 
responding was included in this research, however, future studies should examine this issue, both 
for the SJT and especially if a self-report version of the STMT is developed.  The STMT should 
be considerably more resistant to socially desirable responding, as the constructs being measured 
in each item are more obscured and embedded than, for example, in the Pisapia et al. (2005) 
STQ.  That said, future research could explore how honest or accurate participants’ responses to 
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the SJT are in relation to how they actually behave in problem-solving.  An observational study 
could be designed in which participants take the SJT and participate in one or more group 
problem-solving exercises.  
A qualitative approach might also prove valuable.  The growing field of computational 
linguistics and natural language processing might open up new options for assessing a person’s 
cognitions in their written or oral communication.  Critical self-reflection essays, lessons-learned 
reports, or after-action review transcripts may contain sufficient content to assess the mindset.  
Similarly, such an approach could be used to further refine the strategic mindset concept itself by 
obtaining written or oral reflections on decision-making by individuals in strategic positions and 
mining the ways and frequency with which they refer to moments of flexibility, inclusiveness, 
and humility in their thought process.  
Future research in the area of SJT development in general should continue the work of 
Bergman et al. (2006), focused on keying and scoring methods.  Further refining the 
circumstances in which each of the many options is most desirable and defining the ways in 
which choices in keying and scoring impact the data will help future researchers better anticipate 
and account for the data-related problems so commonly faced by SJTs.  Specific research in this 
line might focus on alternate methods of keying and scoring the STMT in particular, altering the 
nature of the hybrid keying system employed, to explore the effect of those changes on 
relationships with variables in the current or future studies.  One example might be to weight 
each item in the total scale score according to its discrepancy between the positive and negative 
keyed options as scored in Stage 3.  This would give greater weight to scores of items that 
feature a clearer delineation of the characteristic among the options.   
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Further research could also explore the nature of the relationship between SJTs as a 
method, the constructs they measure, and cognitive ability.  Although there seems to be 
consistent evidence that instructions to respond with a best/worst dichotomy vs. a most/least 
likely dichotomy influence the degree of relationship with cognitive ability (McDaniel, Hartman, 
Whetzel, & Grubb, 2007), there is likely more to be understood as to why this occurs.  
Particularly given the negative relationship with cognitive ability found in the current study, the 
construct being measured by an SJT may play a role in determining whether high cognitive 
ability is likely to increase or decrease test scores. 
Finally, future SJT research should seek to expand the SJT into the computer adaptive 
realm.  In what a test-taker might experience as a choose-your-own-adventure test, each response 
option to an initial scenario would have its own item characteristics based on an item response 
theory analysis.  As with any computer adaptive test, the test-taker’s response would drive the 
next test item presented.  Instead of an entirely separate item presented next, the next item could 
be a new scenario depicting the same character confronted with the consequences of the initial 
choice, and with a set of response options that have item characteristic curves that will help 
refine the estimate of the test-taker’s true ability level.   
There are obvious practical challenges to developing the content for such a test.  
However, this approach would be a natural fit for the assessment of strategic thinking, as it 
would allow a test-taker to experience the evolution of a problem and how their choices can 
shape the environment.  An even loftier goal might be to develop a system that allows for free 
responding to each scenario, rather than a multiple choice format.  If an adequate algorithm 
could be derived through computational linguistics to evaluate the response in relation to a bank 
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of existing coded responses, the item could be scored the same as any other SJT, but without 
providing the range of possible answers for the respondent.   
 Implications 
Despite the disappointing evidence in regard to the utility of the scale developed, there are useful 
implications that can be derived from this research.  The primary implication, for the theory of 
strategic thinking, is the ability to put to use the integrating themes described in Chapter 2.  As 
shown in Table 1, the various models/descriptions of strategic thinking published in articles and 
books from various disciplines cover much of the same content domain.  Furthermore, many of 
the same terms are often used.  However, each of them leaves out at least a few of the important 
concepts described in the other models, and in some cases, slightly different terms are used to 
describe the same general idea.  Although each scholar has the right to their own unique 
understanding and preferred terminology, this can create problems for the practical application of 
this scholarship to the development of strategy and strategic thinking.  The nine themes provide a 
description of the shared space that theorists in fundamentally different environments have 
described when identifying what strategic thinking is and what it requires.  Although the 
environments of strategizing for private-sector competitive position in industrial markets and 
grand military strategy for the use of the elements of national power differ widely in what their 
strategies consist of and look like, the art and science of strategic thinking are largely the same.  
Practitioners and theorists interested in developing, identifying, coaching, or evaluating strategic 
thinkers can use these themes to ensure they are operating with all the valuable insights brought 
by scholars in various disciplines.  
In addition, the strategic thinking mindset conceptualized and pursued in this scale development 
project has similar implications.  Further research must be done to refine the understanding of 
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what the mindset consists of and how it is best measured and applied in problem-solving.  
However, the more general description of the mindset, distinct from intelligence and knowledge, 
provides an avenue for organizational solutions related to producing better strategic thinkers in 
organizations.  Ensuring that organizational climates are maintained that support the growth of 
the mindset and do not suppress or eliminate it is an important implication of this concept.  
Likewise, organizations would benefit from providing opportunities to apply the mindset in 
practice, particularly among those with exceptional intelligence and high levels of the mindset 
characteristics who have yet to be put in the position to engage with strategic level problem-
solving. 
 Conclusion 
The current research was designed to accomplish three main objectives: 1) to build a 
theoretically sound concept of a strategic thinking mindset that is rooted in the understanding of 
strategic thinking in multiple disciplines, 2) to develop a test of the mindset for U.S. Army 
officers using situational judgment testing, and 3) to evaluate the psychometric and construct 
validity evidence of the test.  
Although the objective to create and evaluate such a test was accomplished, the implicit 
objective that the test successfully demonstrate psychometric utility and validity is much more 
ambitious and presented an elevated risk of failure.  Strategic thinking is a highly subjective 
phenomonen that is challenging to define (see Chapter 2) and to operationalize in psychological 
measurement.  Furthermore, the SJT format was chosen to assess the strategic thinking mindset 
for its potential as a middle ground solution between a high-fidelity simulation exercise 
technique and a behavioral self-report technique reliant on the honest reflection and self-
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awareness of a test-taker.  However, the SJT format brings with it significant issues for 
constructing a reliable and valid scale of identifiable constructs.   
While the theoretical work in integrating theories of strategic thinking and 
conceptualizing the mindset construct represent useful contributions to theory and practice, the 
evidence supporting the psychometric quality of the STMT and its construct-related validity did 
not, in general, prove convincing.  Although there is some evidence suggesting that the STMT 
measures what it was designed to measure, it is questionable as to whether it measures it well 
(reliably, comprehensively, and accurately).  Additional research on the STMT, other methods of 
measuring the strategic mindset, and further clarification of the concept of a strategic mindset are 
needed.   
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Figure 1 Relation of mindset characteristics to integrating themes.  
Two of the identified themes are not linked to a mindset characteristic, these are shown with dashed lines. 
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Figure 3 Standardized Estimates of 12-Item Three-Factor Oblique Model 
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Figure 4 Standardized Estimates of 9-Item Three-Factor Oblique Model 
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Figure 5 Standardized Estimates of 9-Item One-Factor Model 
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Table 1 Relation of models to integrating themes 
  
Systems  
& 
Synthesis Creativity Directionality Criticality 
Awareness 
of Time 
Adaptability  
&  
Opportunism 
Breadth  
& 
Inclusion 
Self-
Awareness  
& 
 Self-
Control 
Action 
Learning 
Heracleous (1998) X X 
 
X 
     Liedtka (1998b) X 
 
X 
 
X X 
  
X 
Bonn (2001) X X X 
      Graetz (2002) X X 
       Pisapia et al. (2005) X X 
 
X 
 
X 
   Yarger (2008) X X 
 
X X 
    Casey & Goldman (2010) X X X X 
 
X 
  
X 
Salmoni et al. (2010) 
     
X X X 
 Dragoni et al. (2011) X 
 
X 
   
X 
  Waters (2011) X X X X X 
  
X 
 Duhaime et al. (2012) 
    
X X X 
 
X 
Grier (2012) 
 
X 
   
X 
 
X 
 McCauley (2012) X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
  Yorks & Nicolaides (2012)       X X   X X   
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Table 2 Stage 1 Sample Demographics 
Sex Male Female 
    n = 104 n = 21     
Branch Intelligence Engineer Armor Infantry 
 
n = 21 n = 15 n = 12 n = 12 
     
 
Field Artillery CBRN* Military Police Logistics 
 
n = 10 n = 8 n = 7 n = 7 
     
 
Aviation Air Defense Marines* Adjutant General 
 
n = 6 n = 4 n = 4 n = 3 
     
 
Medical 
Services 
Health 
Services Quartermaster Signal 
 
n = 3 n = 3 n = 3 n = 3 
     
 
Ordnance Public Affairs JAG* 
   n = 2 n = 1 n = 1   
Rank Major Captain 
First 
Lieutenant 
Gunnery 
Sergeant 
(Marine) 
 
n = 5 n = 107 n = 8 n = 1 
     
 
Staff Sergeant 
(Marine) 
Sergeant 
(Marine) Specialist 
   n = 1 n = 2 n = 1   
Avg. Time 
in Rank 
(months) Major Captain 
First 
Lieutenant 
Gunnery 
Sergeant 
(Marine) 
 53 27 13 48 
     
 
Staff Sergeant 
(Marine) 
Sergeant 
(Marine) Specialist 
   36 39 48   
Most Recent 
Deployment 
   
Never Deployed 
or None 
Indicated Afghanistan Iraq Other Nation 
  n = 57 n = 37 n = 9 n = 22 
Note. CBRN = Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear, JAG = Judge Advocate General   
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Table 3 Stage 2 Sample Demographics 
Sex Male Female     
 n = 69 n = 5   
Branch Infantry Armor Intelligence Field Artillery 
 
n = 31 n = 10 n = 7 n = 7 
     
 
Logistics Engineer 
Adjutant 
General CBRN 
 
n = 4 n = 3 n = 2 n = 1 
     
 
Aviation 
Military 
Police Signal JAG 
 
n = 2 n = 1 n = 1 n = 1 
     
 
Simulation 
Operations 
Public 
Affairs 
Army 
Medical 
Specialist 
Corps 
Army Nurse 
Corps 
 
n = 1 n = 1 n = 1 n = 1 
Rank 
Lieutenant 
Colonel Major Captain 
First 
Lieutenant 
  n = 1 n = 15 n = 56 n = 2 
Note. CBRN = Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear, JAG = Judge Advocate General 
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Table 4 Stage 3 Sample Demographics 
Sex Male Female     
 n = 203 n = 20   
Branch 
Field 
Artillery 
Air 
Defense 
Artillery Intelligence CBRN 
 
n = 48 n = 38 n = 46 n = 24 
     
 
Military 
Police Infantry Armor Engineer 
 
n = 20 n = 17 n = 5 n = 5 
     
 
Aviation Signal Cavalry Medical 
 
n = 4 n = 4 n = 3 n = 2 
     
 
EW Ordnance Quartermaster Transportation 
 
n = 2 n = 1 n = 1 n = 1 
     
 
Adjutant 
General 
    n = 1    
Rank Corporal Sergeant Staff Sergeant 
Sergeant First 
Class 
 
n = 1 n = 3 n = 44 n = 5 
     
 
Warrant 
Officer 
2nd 
Lieutenant 1st Lieutenant Captain 
 
n = 1 n = 4 n = 49 n = 114 
     
 
Major 
     n = 2       
Note. CBRN = Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear, EW = Electronic Warfare   
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Table 5 Response Option Keying Data – Flexibility Items 
      Flexibility Effectiveness     
   
SMEs Psychologists SMEs 
  S Options M SD M SD M SD Key Pilot # 
1 1 Negative 3.41 1.2 2.25 0.8 3.63 1.2 Negative P20 
 
2 Negative 4.46 0.8 4.00 1.2 4.60 0.6 
  
 
3 Neutral 3.32 1.2 4.00 0.0 3.36 1.2 
  
 
6 Neutral 3.21 1.3 2.50 1.1 3.49 1.1 Neutral 
 
 
4 Positive 2.88 1.4 3.50 1.7 3.22 1.3 Neutral 
   5 Positive 4.14 0.9 4.25 0.4 4.12 0.9 Positive   
2 1 Negative 3.59 1.2 3.00 0.7 3.53 1.1 
 
P8 
 
5 Negative 2.82 1.2 2.50 0.5 2.94 1.1 Negative 
 
 
2 Neutral 3.05 1.2 1.25 0.4 4.07 0.9 Neutral 
 
 
4 Neutral 3.85 1.1 4.50 0.5 3.49 1.2 Neutral 
 
 
3 Positive 4.30 0.7 4.50 0.5 3.93 1.0 Positive 
   6 Positive 4.40 0.9 5.00 0.0 4.48 0.7     
14 1 Negative 3.82 1.3 4.00 1.2 4.00 1.1 
 
P9 
 
4 Negative 2.70 1.2 2.00 0.7 3.23 1.3 Negative 
 
 
5 Neutral 3.02 1.1 3.25 0.8 2.91 1.2 Neutral 
 
 
3 Neutral 4.36 0.8 3.75 0.4 4.22 0.9 Positive 
 
 
2 Positive 3.85 1.2 3.75 0.4 3.74 1.1 
    6 Positive 3.56 1.3 4.00 0.7 3.01 1.2 Neutral   
10 1 Negative 3.51 1.2 3.75 0.4 3.20 1.4 
 
P2 
 
5 Negative 2.44 1.3 3.00 1.4 2.64 1.4 Negative 
 
 
3 Neutral 3.83 1.0 2.00 0.7 3.95 1.1 Neutral 
 
 
4 Neutral 3.58 1.2 2.25 0.8 3.57 1.1 Neutral 
 
 
2 Positive 3.96 0.9 4.25 0.4 3.85 1.0 Positive 
   6 Positive 3.86 1.2 3.75 0.8 3.48 1.3     
19 4 Negative 4.04 1.0 4.00 0.7 3.74 1.3 
 
P13 
 
2 Negative 2.48 1.0 2.75 0.4 3.21 1.0 Negative 
 
 
5 Neutral 2.93 1.1 3.25 0.8 3.06 1.2 Neutral 
 
 
6 Neutral 2.81 1.2 2.75 0.8 2.58 1.3 Neutral 
 
 
3 Positive 2.67 1.2 2.75 1.1 2.94 1.1 
    1 Positive 3.89 0.9 3.75 0.4 4.03 0.7 Positive   
23 3 Negative 2.29 1.1 1.75 0.8 2.98 1.2 
 
P16 
 
4 Negative 3.01 1.3 3.00 0.7 3.56 1.1 Neutral 
 
 
5 Neutral 2.10 1.1 1.50 0.5 2.53 1.2 Negative 
 
 
6 Neutral 4.16 0.9 4.25 0.4 4.06 1.0 
  
 
1 Positive 3.58 1.2 3.75 0.8 3.16 1.3 Neutral 
   2 Positive 4.18 0.8 4.25 0.4 4.24 0.9 Positive   
26 2 Negative 2.13 1.2 1.25 0.4 2.60 1.2 Negative P5 
 
6 Negative 3.14 1.2 2.50 0.5 3.02 1.2 
  
 
4 Neutral 3.69 1.0 3.00 1.0 3.97 0.9 Neutral 
 
 
5 Neutral 2.88 1.2 2.25 1.1 3.28 1.2 Neutral 
 
 
1 Positive 3.65 1.3 4.50 0.5 3.16 1.1 
    3 Positive 3.88 0.8 4.00 0.7 3.77 0.8 Positive   
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      Flexibility Effectiveness     
   
SMEs Psychologists SMEs 
  S Options M SD M SD M SD Key Pilot # 
29 1 Negative 2.66 1.3 2.25 1.1 3.93 1.0 Negative P21 
 
3 Negative 3.96 1.1 4.25 0.4 4.09 1.1 
  
 
2 Neutral 4.32 0.7 4.50 0.5 4.32 0.9 
  
 
6 Neutral 3.25 1.3 2.50 0.9 3.52 1.1 Neutral 
 
 
4 Positive 4.46 0.8 4.50 0.5 4.36 0.8 Positive 
   5 Positive 3.97 1.0 4.00 0.7 4.28 0.8 Neutral   
Note: Pilot # refers to the re-numbering of items for the Stage 4 pilot test. Empty cells under Key 
indicate response options that were not retained for that item  
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Table 6 Stage 3 Response Option Keying Data – Humility Items 
      Humility Effectiveness     
   
SMEs Psychologists SMEs 
  S Options M SD M SD M SD Key Pilot # 
3 1 Negative 2.08 1.3 2.00 1.2 2.12 1.2 Negative P7 
 
6 Negative 3.54 1.1 3.25 0.8 4.07 0.9 
  
 
3 Neutral 3.84 1.0 3.75 0.4 4.00 1.0 Neutral 
 
 
5 Neutral 3.39 1.2 3.25 1.1 4.10 0.9 Neutral 
 
 
4 Positive 4.37 0.9 4.25 0.8 4.39 0.8 Positive 
 
 
2 Positive 4.31 1.0 3.50 1.5 4.35 0.7 
    7 Positive 4.30 0.9 4.25 0.4 4.25 1.0     
13 2 Negative 3.33 1.3 2.75 1.8 3.73 1.1 Neutral P10 
 
5 Negative 3.20 1.1 2.25 0.4 3.92 1.2 Negative 
 
 
3 Neutral 3.59 1.1 3.00 0.7 4.00 1.1 
  
 
1 Neutral 3.73 1.1 2.75 0.8 3.61 1.2 Neutral 
 
 
4 Positive 4.42 0.9 5.00 0.0 4.10 1.0 Positive 
   6 Positive 3.56 1.2 5.00 0.0 2.48 1.2     
17 2 Negative 2.94 1.26 2.25 0.43 3.90 0.98 Neutral P3 
 
6 Negative 2.14 1.18 1.75 0.43 2.53 1.30 Negative 
 
 
3 Neutral 4.01 1.01 4.25 0.83 4.27 0.92 
  
 
5 Neutral 3.78 1.08 3.25 0.83 3.55 1.19 
  
 
4 Positive 3.65 1.08 4.75 0.43 3.07 1.32 Positive 
   1 Positive 3.77 1.11 3.00 0.71 4.55 0.72 Neutral   
21 2 Negative 2.91 1.2 3.00 1.0 2.78 1.3 Negative P12 
 
4 Negative 3.36 1.2 3.50 1.1 3.18 1.4 
  
 
3 Neutral 3.55 1.1 3.50 0.5 3.46 1.3 Neutral 
 
 
5 Neutral 3.49 1.2 3.75 1.1 2.75 1.4 Neutral 
 
 
1 Positive 4.08 1.0 3.75 1.1 4.13 1.1 Positive 
   6 Positive 3.75 1.2 4.50 0.5 3.66 1.2     
24 1 Negative 2.97 1.2 1.50 0.5 4.27 0.7 
 
P4 
 
3 Negative 2.61 1.1 2.00 0.0 3.11 1.1 Negative 
 
 
4 Neutral 3.43 1.1 3.50 0.5 3.89 1.0 Neutral 
 
 
6 Neutral 3.58 1.0 2.75 0.8 3.86 0.7 Neutral 
 
 
2 Positive 3.97 0.9 4.25 0.4 3.43 0.9 Positive 
   5 Positive 3.68 1.2 4.50 0.5 2.88 1.3     
30 1 Negative 3.53 1.3 2.50 0.9 4.34 0.8 Neutral P19 
 
2 Negative 2.53 1.2 2.50 0.5 3.15 1.3 Negative 
 
 
4 Neutral 3.43 1.1 2.75 0.8 4.07 0.9 Neutral 
 
 
5 Neutral 2.63 1.3 1.50 0.5 2.46 1.2 
  
 
3 Positive 3.77 1.1 3.50 0.9 3.54 1.1 Positive 
   6 Positive 3.78 1.1 3.25 1.3 4.21 0.9     
32 1 Negative 2.90 1.3 1.75 0.8 3.46 1.1 Negative P11 
 
5 Negative 2.93 1.2 2.00 1.0 3.73 1.0 
  
 
2 Neutral 3.17 1.2 2.25 1.1 3.61 1.2 Neutral 
 
 
4 Neutral 2.97 1.2 2.50 1.1 2.69 1.2 Neutral 
 
 
3 Positive 4.20 1.0 4.75 0.4 4.27 0.9 Positive 
   6 Positive 3.93 1.0 3.75 1.1 3.27 1.3     
Note: Pilot # refers to the re-numbering of items for the Stage 4 pilot test. Empty cells under Key 
indicate response options that were not retained for that item   
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Table 7 Response Option Keying Data – Inclusiveness Items 
      Inclusiveness Effectiveness     
   
SMEs Psychologists SMEs 
  S Options M SD M SD M SD Key Pilot # 
4 1 Negative 2.85 1.2 3.50 1.5 3.35 1.1 Negative P17 
 
5 Negative 3.42 1.2 3.00 1.0 3.60 1.1 
  
 
3 Neutral 3.07 1.2 2.75 1.1 3.25 1.2 Neutral 
 
 
6 Neutral 3.43 1.2 2.75 1.3 3.39 1.2 Neutral 
 
 
2 Positive 3.95 0.9 4.00 0.0 4.13 0.8 
    4 Positive 4.41 0.9 4.75 0.4 3.95 1.2 Positive   
6 1 Negative 1.79 1.1 1.00 0.0 2.31 1.3 Negative P1 
 
4 Negative 3.25 1.2 2.33 0.9 3.74 1.1 Neutral 
 
 
3 Neutral 3.87 1.1 3.50 0.5 4.09 1.0 
  
 
5 Neutral 3.98 1.0 3.50 0.9 3.94 1.0 
  
 
2 Positive 3.16 1.3 3.25 1.1 3.25 1.3 Neutral 
   6 Positive 3.97 1.0 3.50 1.1 3.97 1.1 Positive   
8 1 Negative 2.19 1.3 1.50 0.9 2.78 1.3 Negative P15 
 
4 Negative 2.99 1.1 2.25 0.8 3.78 1.0 
  
 
3 Neutral 3.66 1.1 3.25 0.8 3.53 1.3 Neutral 
 
 
5 Neutral 3.79 1.1 3.50 0.9 3.44 1.1 Neutral 
 
 
2 Positive 4.36 0.7 4.25 0.4 3.47 1.1 Positive 
   6 Positive 4.27 0.9 4.75 0.4 4.45 0.8     
9 2 Negative 2.24 1.2 1.25 0.4 2.98 1.0 Negative P18 
 
5 Negative 3.33 1.1 2.75 0.8 4.30 0.9 Neutral 
 
 
1 Neutral 3.69 1.2 3.00 1.2 3.59 1.2 Neutral 
 
 
6 Neutral 3.97 1.1 2.75 1.1 3.92 1.1 
  
 
3 Positive 4.59 0.6 4.75 0.4 4.22 1.0 Positive 
   4 Positive 4.57 0.7 4.00 0.7 4.60 0.7     
11 1 Negative 2.42 1.3 2.00 0.7 3.39 1.3 Negative P14 
 
3 Negative 4.07 1.0 3.75 0.4 4.00 1.2 
  
 
2 Neutral 3.40 1.2 2.25 0.8 3.83 1.1 Neutral 
 
 
4 Neutral 2.39 1.2 2.50 0.5 2.61 1.2 Neutral 
 
 
5 Positive 4.57 0.8 4.67 0.5 4.06 1.1 Positive 
   6 Positive 4.49 0.8 5.00 0.0 4.13 1.0     
15 4 Negative 2.83 1.1 2.75 1.1 2.96 1.1 Negative P6 
 
5 Negative 3.75 1.1 3.50 0.5 3.55 1.0 
  
 
2 Neutral 3.05 1.4 3.25 0.8 3.52 1.2 Neutral 
 
 
6 Neutral 3.02 1.3 2.50 1.1 2.85 1.2 Neutral 
 
 
1 Positive 4.55 0.8 5.00 0.0 4.40 0.7 Positive 
   3 Positive 4.47 0.8 4.50 0.9 4.32 0.8     
Note: Pilot # refers to the re-numbering of items for the Stage 4 pilot test. Empty cells under Key 
indicate response options that were not retained for that item   
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Table 8 Stage 4 Sample Demographics 
Sex Male Female     
Group 1 n = 108 n = 20 
  Group 2 n = 87 n = 19     
Branch Infantry Engineer Military Police CBRN 
Group 1 n = 16 n = 18 n = 13 n = 7 
Group 2 n = 22 n = 21 n = 19 n = 15 
     
 
Logistics Intelligence Transportation Armor 
Group 1 n = 20 n = 3 n = 13 n = 0 
Group 2 n = 1 n = 2 n = 0 n = 13 
     
 
Adjutant 
General Quartermaster 
Medical 
Services 
Field 
Artillery 
Group 1 n = 2 n = 4 n = 1 n = 1 
Group 2 n = 1 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 
     
 
Public 
Affairs Ordnance Cavalry Signal 
Group 1 n = 1 n = 8 n = 0 n = 8 
Group 2 n = 0 n = 1 n = 1 n = 2 
Rank 
Corporal/ 
Specialist 
Private First 
Class 2nd Lieutenant 
1st 
Lieutenant 
Group 1 n = 3 n = 2 n = 6 n = 26 
Group 2 n = 0 n = 0 n = 6 n = 62 
     
 
Captain 
   Group 1 n = 91 
   Group 2 n = 38       
Note. CBRN = Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear  
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Table 9 Stage 4 Group 1 Item-level Distribution Characteristics by Scoring Method 
  Original Unweighted Scoring   Alternative Weighted Scoring 
Item M SD Mdn Skew Kurtosis   M SD Mdn Skew Kurtosis 
I - P1 0.92 1.01 1 -1.29 1.44 
 
1.11 1.56 1 -0.83 0.68 
I - P6 0.89 0.91 1 -0.75 0.25 
 
1.47 1.44 2 -1.03 0.44 
I - P14 0.40 1.15 1 -0.23 -1.19 
 
0.49 1.82 1 -0.21 -1.19 
I - P15 0.63 1.07 1 -0.70 -0.34 
 
0.98 1.61 1 -0.65 -0.33 
I - P17 0.37 1.17 1 -0.33 -0.95 
 
0.66 1.91 1.5 -0.45 -1.16 
I - P18 0.35 1.10 1 -0.27 -0.85 
 
0.58 1.60 1 -0.21 -0.63 
F - P2 0.56 0.99 1 -0.54 -0.50 
 
0.80 1.44 1 -0.33 -0.30 
F - P5 0.74 1.20 1 -0.63 -0.91 
 
1.13 1.67 1 -0.45 -0.83 
F - P8 0.60 0.94 1 -0.38 -0.74 
 
0.81 1.40 1 -0.19 -0.50 
F - P9 0.51 1.16 1 -0.38 -0.99 
 
0.75 1.58 1 -0.14 -0.62 
F - P13 0.54 0.97 1 -0.48 -0.67 
 
0.91 1.71 2 -0.70 -0.84 
F - P16 0.67 1.02 1 -0.52 -0.48 
 
0.94 1.58 1 -0.45 -0.47 
F - P20 0.16 1.13 1 -0.01 -1.42 
 
0.26 1.86 1 -0.09 -1.52 
F - P21 0.58 1.05 1 -0.60 -0.39 
 
0.77 1.70 1 -0.55 -0.58 
H - P3 0.22 1.11 1 -0.10 -1.33 
 
0.30 1.39 1 0.16 -0.31 
H - P4 -0.30 1.15 -1 0.48 -0.91 
 
-0.33 1.57 -1 0.36 -0.23 
H - P7 1.59 0.71 2 -2.11 4.70 
 
2.45 1.05 3 -2.39 6.00 
H - P10 0.41 1.05 1 -0.42 -0.53 
 
0.39 1.50 1 -0.25 0.01 
H - P11 -0.39 0.94 -1 0.40 -0.60 
 
-0.74 1.53 -1 0.46 -0.78 
H - P12 0.92 0.84 1 -1.16 1.55 
 
1.60 1.28 2 -1.39 1.66 
H - P19 0.01 1.08 0 -0.02 -1.43   0.01 1.25 0 -0.01 0.07 
Note. Original scoring method ranged from -2 to +2, giving equal weight in scoring to endorsed 
and rejected options. The alternative scoring method ranged from -3 to +3, giving an extra point 
of weight in scoring the endorsed option.
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Table 10 Stage 4 Group 1 Item-level Correlation Matrix 
  Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
1 I - P1 
                         2 I - P6 -.02   
                       3 I - P14 .04 .12 
                       4 I - P15 .03 .07 .17   
                     5 I - P17 -.12 -.10 -.04 .11   
                    6 I - P18 .05 .17 .11 .02 -.15   
                   7 F - P2 .02 <.01 .10 .04 .07 -.01 
                   8 F - P5 .04 .02 -.03 .20* .09 -.08 -.02 
                  9 F - P8 -.04 .09 -.13 .11 -.12 .02 -.05 .08 
                 10 F - P9 -.13 .10 .05 <.01 .19* .08 -.05 -.09 -.13 
                11 F - P13 .04 -.03 .01 -.06 .05 -.10 -.03 -.12 -.03 .02 
               12 F - P16 .11 .06 .03 <-.01 .14 .17* .13 -.05 .03 -.04 .05   
             13 F - P20 .01 .04 .09 .05 .04 -.07 .03 <-.01 .20* -.04 -.03 .04   
            14 F - P21 -.03 -.12 .06 .06 .26** .06 <.01 .11 -.03 .07 -.08 .13 .13 
            15 H - P3 .03 -.02 .19* .10 -.06 .04 -.07 .07 -.09 -.13 -.02 -.08 .03 .10 
           16 H - P4 -.01 .13 .11 .13 <.01 .19* .01 .13 .03 .10 -.01 .03 -.03 .09 .13 
          17 H - P7 -.06 .06 .01 -.09 -.02 -.12 -.10 .01 .13 .22* .13 .06 -.10 -.03 -.09 -.08 
         18 H - P10 .03 -.02 -.04 -.06 .03 -.05 .01 .04 -.13 .06 .18* .04 -.07 -.12 -.09 -.01 .16 
        19 H - P11 -.07 -.02 .07 -0.18 -.15 -.08 .04 <-.01 -.16 -.04 .01 -.04 -.04 .01 -.10 .01 -.08 .09   
      20 H - P12 -.09 <-.01 .13 .02 .12 -.11 -.01 -.02 .02 -.01 .04 .05 .11 .09 .04 -.08 .06 -.09 -.09 
      21 H - P19 -.06 -.07 .17 .12 .05 -.16 -.08 .03 .10 .01 -.02 -.09 .15 .15 .20* .26** -.05 <.01 -.01 -.13   
    22 Inclus. .35** .42** .56** .53** .33** .43** .09 .10 -.04 .12 -.03 .19* .07 .13 .11 .21* -.09 -.04 -.16 .04 .20 (.14) 
   23 Flex. .01 .04 .07 .14 .26** .02 .31** .33** .33** .25** .28** .43** .49** .48** -.06 .13 .10 .04 -.07 .10 .10 .22* (.08) 
  24 Hum. -.07 .03 .23** .01 -.02 .03 .02 .10 -.07 .06 .11 -.02 .01 .10 .41** .51** .25** .42** .37** .23** .47** .10 .10 (.03) 
 25 Total .15 .25** .43** .36** .31** .25** .22* .28** .14 .23** .19* .33** .32** .39** .21* .40** .12 .19* .04 .18* .34** .68** .73** .55** (.29) 
Note: N = 128, inter-item and item-total correlations are marked. 
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Table 11 Stage 4 Group 1 Scale-level Correlation Matrix 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Work-Related Openness 4.26 0.58 (.89) 
      2 Resistance to Change 3.15 0.73 -.44** (.87) 
     3 Dispositional Humility 5.26 0.84 .20* -.26** (.97) 
    4 Inclusiveness 1.83 2.96 .18* -.06 .07 (.26) 
   5 Flexibility 1.84 3.16 .04 -.27** .16 .09 (.26)   
6 Humility -0.02 2.87 .11 -.05 .34** .31** .13 (.42)  
7 Total Mindset 3.88 6.17 .17 -.20* .27** .70** .61** .70** (.45) 
Note: Based on 9 item SJT version, N = 128, α in parentheses 
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Table 12 Stage 4 Group 2 Item-level Distribution Characteristics by Response Instructions 
  Most/Least Likely Response Instructions   Best/Worst Response Instructions 
Item M SD Mdn Skew Kurtosis   M SD Mdn Skew Kurtosis 
I - P1 1.69 1.16 1 -0.54 0.46 
 
1.04 1.45 1 -0.98 1.53 
I - P6 1.48 1.49 2 -1.53 2.10 
 
1.67 1.02 2 -1.12 2.02 
I - P14 0.22 1.68 0 0.06 -0.78 
 
-0.02 1.77 0 0.25 -1.02 
I - P15 0.85 1.74 1 -0.48 -0.88 
 
0.75 1.79 1 -0.67 -0.33 
I - P17 0.83 1.77 2 -0.70 -1.00 
 
0.37 2.07 2 -0.31 -1.66 
I - P18 0.89 1.38 1 0.03 -0.96 
 
1.10 1.43 1 -0.22 -0.90 
F - P2 1.13 1.53 1 -0.55 -0.23 
 
1.25 1.36 1 -0.62 0.93 
F - P5 1.20 1.63 1 -0.75 -0.11 
 
0.88 1.82 1 -0.11 -1.36 
F - P8 1.19 1.60 1 -0.94 0.79 
 
0.94 1.11 1 -1.05 2.88 
F - P9 0.59 1.42 1 0.15 -0.27 
 
0.40 1.24 1 -0.12 0.53 
F - P13 1.26 1.33 2 -0.65 -0.08 
 
0.44 1.89 1 -0.24 -1.42 
F - P16 0.89 1.66 1 -0.20 -1.07 
 
0.37 1.58 0 -0.11 -0.74 
F - P20 0.37 1.96 1 -0.22 -1.39 
 
0.08 1.87 0 -0.02 -1.63 
F - P21 0.69 1.72 1 -0.57 -0.51 
 
1.08 1.54 1 -0.50 -0.62 
H - P3 0.19 1.29 1 -0.30 0.03 
 
0.44 1.33 1 0.31 -0.43 
H - P4 -0.07 1.39 -1 0.54 -0.63 
 
-0.31 1.55 -1 0.47 0.08 
H - P7 2.41 0.98 3 -1.66 2.16 
 
2.65 0.74 3 -2.08 3.40 
H - P10 0.46 1.56 0 -0.11 -0.96 
 
0.75 1.63 1 -0.17 -0.97 
H - P11 -0.70 1.68 -1 0.53 -0.60 
 
-1.06 1.27 -2 0.64 -0.47 
H - P12 1.80 1.16 2 -0.88 -0.20 
 
1.58 1.27 2 -1.39 2.27 
H - P19 0.33 1.33 1 -0.25 0.24   -0.15 1.02 -1 0.79 -0.23 
Note: Likelihood N = 54, Best/Worst N = 52 
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Table 13 Stage 4 Group 2 Item-level Correlation Matrix 
  Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Likelihood Response Instructions         
1 I - P14 
            2 I - P15 .05             
3 I - P18 -.01 .21            
4 F - P8 -.12 .18 .06          
5 F - P20 .02 -.07 -.07 .12         
6 F - P21 .06 -.02 .17 .14 .17         
7 H - P3 .02 .17 .23 .28* .08 .32*       
8 H - P4 -.01 .03 .03 .13 -.14 -.07 -.04       
9 H - P19 .04 -.1 .03 .20 .10 .11 .18 -.19      
10 Inclus. .59** .70** .58** .06 -.06 .10 .22 .02 -.02    
11 Flex. -.01 .03 .07 .60** .71** .66** .33* -.05 .21 .04   
12 Hum. .03 .06 .17 .36** .02 .20 .65** .47** .58** .13 .28*  
13 Total .31* .41** .41** .53** .40** .53** .57** .16 .34* .60** .74** .62** 
  
            
Best/Worst Response Instructions 
        1 I - P14   
           2 I - P15 .18             
3 I - P18 .04 .42**           
4 F - P8 .09 .21 .13          
5 F - P20 .08 -.13 .09 -.06          
6 F - P21 .09 -.09 -.08 .01 -.15         
7 H - P3 .17 .16 -.02 .06 -.19 .11       
8 H - P4 .13 .10 < .01 -.09 -.04 -.15 -.07       
9 H - P19 .05 -.04 -.26 -.13 -.07 .05 .15 .11     
10 Inclus. .63** .79** .65** .21 .01 -.03 .16 .11 -.10    
11 Flex. .16 -.06 .07 .41** .64** .52** -.06 -.17 -.08 .08   
12 Hum. .20 .14 -.13 -.08 -.16 -.02 .58** .66** .58** .12 -.17  
13 Total .61** .58** .42** .31* 0.243 .23 .36** .31* .17 .79** .47** .48** 
Note: Limited to revised 9-item pool. Likelihood N = 54, Best/Worst N = 52. Item-item 
correlations and item-total correlations are outlined. Significant correlations are marked (*.05; 
**.01) 
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Table 14 Stage 4 Group 2 Scale-level Correlation Matrix 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Likelihood Response 
Instructions 
         1 Cognitive Ability 62.04% 22.84%         
2 Reframing 3.57 0.51 -.06 (.68)       
3 Systems Thinking 3.86 0.47 -.04 .07 (.71)      
4 Reflection 3.98 0.44 -.05 .51** .60** (.70)     
5 Inclusiveness 1.96 3.00 .01 .12 .30* .19 (.21)    
6 Flexibility 2.24 3.48 -.17 .18 .22 -.05 .04 (.33)   
7 Humility 0.44 2.26 -.06 -.08 .08 -.01 .13 .28* (-.07)  
8 Total Mindset 4.65 5.76 -.12 .14 .32* .06 .60** .74** .62** (.36) 
            Best/Worst Response Instructions 
        1 Cognitive Ability 64.66% 24.15% 
        2 Reframing 3.49 0.51 -.02 (.58)       3 Systems Thinking 3.82 0.56 -.11 .26 (.81)      4 Reflection 3.95 0.55 -.11 .42** .63** (.80)    
 5 Inclusiveness 1.83 3.45 -.18 < -.01 .11 .23 (.44)    6 Flexibility 2.10 2.45 -.12 -.03 -.01 .01 .08 (-.27)   7 Humility -0.19 2.38 -.23 .18 .15 .11 .12 -.17 (.12) 
 8 Total Mindset 3.90 4.99 -.29* 0.068 .15 .22 .79** .47** .48** (.19) 
Note: Based on 9-item SJT version. Likelihood N = 54, Best/Worst N = 52 
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Appendix A - Stage 1 Materials 
 Definitions 
 
Flexibility  
What it is: 
• A mindset characterized by a willingness and tendency to adjust one’s understanding, 
opinions, or approach when conditions change or new information is presented.   
What it is NOT: 
• Resisting necessary or optimal change.   
• Breaking from long-term strategy. “Bend, don’t break” from a long-term strategy.  
Bending a strategy allows for adaptation and adjustment of the strategy and its 
implementation in the face of changing conditions, without abandoning the long-term 
effort and developing another strategy from scratch. 
Why flexibility? 
• Flexibility underlies the following themes of strategic thinking models:  
o Adaptability and opportunism: being willing and comfortable to deal with change, 
major or minor in nature, is crucial to being adaptive and taking advantage of 
opportunities. 
o Action learning: being inflexible might cause one to hesitate to look fairly at the 
results of an action, for fear that they might indicate changes are necessary. 
o Creativity: new ideas and associations will inevitably cause changes to one’s 
understanding and processes in other areas, which requires a level of flexibility. 
 
Inclusiveness 
What it is: 
• A mindset characterized by the welcoming of information and opinion from a broad 
range of sources (e.g. individuals, groups, disciplines, or other relevant parties). 
• Maintaining an inclusive mindset allows one to value the holistic understanding that can 
come from examining an issue from many perspectives. 
What it is NOT: 
• Being hesitant to consider new or unusual sources of information. 
• Fearing having too many voices involved in a discussion. 
• Including everything; an inclusive mindset values the potential benefit of a broad 
perspective, while relying on other processes and judgment to filter information that does 
not contribute to understanding. 
Why inclusiveness? 
• Inclusiveness underlies the following themes of strategic thinking models:  
o Breadth and inclusion: engaging in a broad and inclusive information search requires 
first acknowledging and embracing the value of a broad information search.   
114 
o Systems thinking and synthesis: differs from traditional analytical processes in that 
system factors are gathered together for holistic understanding, rather than segmented 
into divisions which are handled separately.  Therefore, systems thinking requires an 
inclusive mindset: a willingness to consider the breadth of a system all together.   
Humility 
What it is: 
• A mindset characterized by comfort with admitting to being wrong or having an 
incomplete understanding of something.   
• Tendency to check oneself; examining issues as if one’s understanding is somehow 
wrong or incomplete. 
What it is NOT: 
• Reacting defensively to proposed changes or constructive feedback. 
• Having a bias in favor of maintaining old beliefs or assumptions. 
Why humility? 
• Humility underlies the following themes of strategic thinking models:  
o Self-awareness and self-control: To critically evaluate one’s own opinions and 
assumptions, a certain level of humility must be reached which allows for acceptance 
that one may be wrong. 
o Criticality: Once open to and comfortable with the position of reasonable self-doubt, 
behaviors and positions can be examined and, with effort, improved. 
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 Instructions for Reporting Critical Incidents 
What do you mean by critical incident? 
• A specific example of work, from your experience, representing some aspect of your job 
(in this case, a novel, complex problem 
• They are not descriptions of general types of problems you experienced. 
• There can be a short or extended time frame. Problems can be contained in a short 
period, or throughout a deployment. 
 
What kind of critical incident do you want? 
• Incidents of dealing with highly complex problems requiring a novel solution. In other 
words, unique problems that weren’t specifically covered during training and don’t have 
established solutions.  
• If you did not experience such a problem, try to think of one you closely observed a 
peer dealing with.  
 
What should I include? 
• The mindset of an officer during decision-making in complex, novel problem situations. 
So, the way you assessed the problem is as relevant as what you did to solve it. 
Describe actions taken and the process for understanding the problem and possible 
solutions.  
• Can be an example of good, poor, or mediocre performance. We want stories reflecting 
a range of performance. Complex, novel problems are rarely resolved perfectly; failures 
and successes are expected.  
• We are mostly concerned with the situations. Focus the forces acting on the situation 
and how each impacted you.  
• Courses of action that were considered, but not adopted, are welcome.  
 
 
How will these be used? 
• We will use the incidents you provide to build problem scenarios for officer 
development. Expert feedback and theory will help us develop various courses of 
action. These scenarios will help us compare and assess the way Officers respond to the 
types of scenarios presented.  
 
 
Strategic Thinking Competencies 
 
In addition to describing the behaviors you engaged in, you will be asked to indicate the types 
of thinking that were required, according to the categories defined below.  
 
Critical Thinking: Reflecting on a variety of positions on an issue and evaluating each in an 
unbiased way. This type of thinking requires seeking out evidence to support a variety of points 
of view, clarifying assumptions, and making logical inferences.  
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Creative Thinking: Generating new insights into an issue. This type of thinking requires 
establishing new connections between previously unassociated concepts or applying them in 
new ways or in new contexts. 
 
Systems Thinking: Perceiving how a set of elements interact to form a whole. This type of 
thinking requires considering how contextual variables influence the cause-and-effect 
relationships within an environment.  
 
Thinking in Time: Considering the influence of the past and the desired future on the current 
status of an issue. This type of thinking requires examining how a current issue developed, how 
the pattern is likely to unfold in the future, and how actions could shape a desired future state. 
 
Ethical Thinking: Considering the value, moral, and ethical factors in a situation which 
determine what one must do, what one must not do, and what is acceptable to do. This type of 
thinking requires knowledge of the values, morals, and ethics of yourself and those you 
represent. 
 
Tips for writing good incidents 
 
Describe an event, don’t give advice. We need examples from the work of Army officers of 
complex, novel problems. Try to avoid speaking in general terms about how to solve such 
problems. 
 
Write events in the third person (e.g., using “he” or “she” instead of “I” and “we”). Even if you 
are writing about things you did or things that happened to you, please write about them as 
things you observed. 
 
Do not include specific identifying information, such as a person’s name, a unit name, or a 
specific time and place (e.g. FOB Bravo, August 2010). Instead, use terms such as “the 
interpreter” or “MAJ X.” To the extent that a detail is important (e.g. took place during a local 
election) include only enough to explain the context. 
 
Take your time. It may take up to an hour to recall and report a relevant incident with sufficient 
detail. One effective incident is better than two that miss the point. 
 
Include what you considered doing as well as what you did do. 
 
DO NOT report incidents in which you participated in illegal activity. These may be subject to 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and we may be required to report these events to the 
appropriate authorities. 
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 Examples 
On the following pages, there are two example incidents, to help you understand what we’re 
looking for. The first is an example of an ideal style, length, and detail. The second is a real 
critical incident collected from a similar project we’ve conducted, but that is somewhat lacking 
in detail. We hope you can aim for something between these examples. 
Example Incident 1 
The following incident is a fictional depiction of an incident similar to what we are seeking. This 
is an adaptation of a scenario described in “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three 
Block War” by Marine Gen. Charles Krulak, in Marines Magazine, January 1999. 
 
Check the box for each type of thinking that was required: 
□ Critical Thinking   X Creative Thinking   □ Systems Thinking   X Thinking in Time   X Ethical 
Thinking 
Situation 
(Refer to the 
instructions 
packet for 
clarification on 
what to include 
here) 
CPL H was a squad leader in a Regional Multi-National Force (RMNF) 
providing security for a food distribution point (FDP).  Food and medical 
supplies from the FDP had a positive impact on the community, with daily 
death tolls decreasing.  
 
A supply convoy brought news that members of a local faction, led by 
Warlord N, were gathering near the boundary of a rival faction’s territory. 
Warlord N criticized the presence of the RMNF, but so far hadn’t targeted 
Americans. However, as starvation became less of a concern, there was 
fear that political tensions would erupt in violence.  
 
LT F ordered CPL H’s squad to man a roadblock at Checkpoint (CP) 
Charlie. Barricades were moved into place to secure the street. CPL S 
established an observation post on a nearby rooftop. A large crowd 
gathered waiting to pass through the checkpoint. CPL S reported that the 
crowd included many visibly upset young adult males. Meanwhile, he 
could see the vehicles of Warlord N’s gang gathered at the boundary.  
 
CPL H learned that Warlord N’s rival, Warlord M, was moving directly 
toward the CP and a likely collision with Warlord N, with the squad 
squarely in the middle. LT F directed CPL H to extend the road block and 
started moving another squad to help reinforce the checkpoint.  
 
The tension grew as the crowd became upset by the delay. The young men 
chanted anti-U.S. slogans and began to throw rocks. CPL H felt the 
situation slipping out of control and decided to close the road completely. 
The crowd erupted in protest and pressed forward.  
 
A helicopter nearby was hit by ground fire and crashed several blocks 
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away. CPL S observed the crash and saw survivors. In the distance, he 
could see Warlord N’s men rushing across the boundary. CPL S urgently 
requested permission to move to assist the crash survivors.  
 
Warlord M’s armed men arrived at the checkpoint followed closely by 
local media. They forced their way up to the barricade and the crowd 
began pelting the squad with rocks. CPL H, who knew the fate of his men 
and perhaps the humanitarian mission, hung in the balance. 
Problem-
solving 
approach 
(Refer to the 
Instructions 
Packet for 
clarification on 
what to include 
here) 
 
CPL H reviewed what he knew. He was certain that LT F and 2nd Squad 
would arrive within minutes. He knew that the crash site was in the 
adjacent unit’s sector and that checkpoints existed along Warlord N’s route 
to the site. He knew that exchange of gunfire with Warlord M’s men would 
likely lead to civilian casualties and jeopardize the success of the 
humanitarian mission. Then, he considered what he didn’t know. He 
wasn’t certain of either warlord’s intentions, nor of the likelihood of a 
successful rescue attempt. CPL S was directed to maintain his position and 
monitor Warlord N’s progress and the status of the crash survivors. CPL H 
contacted the adjacent RMNF unit and learned that they had already 
dispatched medical personnel to the crash site. He informed them of 
Warlord N’s movement, prompting them to reinforce the appropriate 
checkpoints.   
 
Outcome 
(Refer to the 
Instructions 
Packet for 
clarification on 
what to include 
here) 
LT F arrived with the additional squad, along with a neighborhood leader 
who had previously acted as an interpreter and mediator, recognized and 
respected in the community. Warlord M’s men withdrew. The mediator 
addressed the crowd. The situation was diffused: Warlord M’s men 
departed, the crowd calmed, and personnel reached the crash site. 
 
Circle the number that best reflects how effectively the problem was dealt with  
 
1                            2                            3                            4                            5 
 
      Very Ineffective/                                                                                              Highly Effective/ 
    Detrimental                                                                                                       Successful                                                              
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Example Incident 2 
The following is a real critical incident collected during a project investigating the work of 
combat advisors.  
 
Check the box for each type of thinking that was required: 
X Critical Thinking   □ Creative Thinking   □ Systems Thinking   □ Thinking in Time   □ Ethical 
Thinking 
Situation 
(Refer to the 
instructions 
packet for 
clarification on 
what to include 
here) 
There was an incident where CF fired on 4 IA who were on leave in civilian 
attire. US claimed these individuals were planting an IED however there 
was no evidence. 2 of the 4 were killed and the other two detained. 
Although our BN was not directly involved, our inability to satisfactory 
answer questions and relay decisions hurt our relationship with the IA BN 
officers. The CPT detained had been with the IA for four years. They 
passed through 11 checkpoints and had access to DIV HQs yet were 
accused of placing an IED in the middle of nowhere. 
 
Problem-
solving 
approach 
(Refer to the 
instructions 
packet for 
clarification on 
what to include 
here) 
 
Advisor coordinated through CF Intel channels to ascertain detainee and 
incident information. CF held information in 15-6 format and would not 
release through intel channels. IA is certain this incident is a cover up by 
the US Army and these detainees will be held indefinitely. 
 
Outcome 
(Refer to the 
instructions 
packet for 
clarification on 
what to include 
here) 
 
CF refuses any wrong doing. 2 dead IA and 2 detained IA. Information 
provided from advisor to IA built a better relationship but lack of 
resolution damaged Iraqi/US relations. Advisor frustrated with no sense 
of accomplishment yet situation was resolved as far as the advisor could 
take it. This incident is like the entire deployment. Many tasks would not 
be considered complete by US standards. This mission is frustrating on 
the best day yet completed to the best ability of all advisors involved. 
 
Circle the number that best reflects how effectively the problem was dealt with  
 
1                            2                            3                            4                            5 
 
  Very Ineffective/                                                                                              Highly Effective/ 
    Detrimental                                                                                                       Successful                                                              
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 Incident 1 
Using the space provided below, describe a problem-solving incident that you witnessed, either 
as an active participant or close observer. As described in the instructions packet, the incident 
should reflect a problem of heightened complexity and novelty. Pay special attention to 
detailing the nature of the situation and the various aspects contributing to the complexity. 
 
Check the box for each type of thinking that was required: 
□ Critical Thinking   □ Creative Thinking   □ Systems Thinking   □ Thinking in Time   □ 
Ethical Thinking 
Situation 
(Refer to the 
instructions 
packet for 
clarification on 
what to include 
here) 
 
Problem-solving 
approach 
(Refer to the 
instructions 
packet for 
clarification on 
what to include 
here) 
 
Outcome 
(Refer to the 
instructions 
packet for 
clarification on 
what to include 
here) 
 
Circle the number that best reflects how effectively the problem was dealt with  
 
1                            2                            3                            4                            5 
 
  Very Ineffective/                                                                                         Highly Effective/ 
    Detrimental                                                                                             Successful                                                              
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 Incident 2 
Using the space provided below, describe a problem-solving incident that you witnessed, either 
as an active participant or close observer. As described in the instructions packet, the incident 
should reflect a problem of heightened complexity and novelty. Pay special attention to 
detailing the nature of the situation and the various aspects contributing to the complexity. 
 
Check the box for each type of thinking that was required: 
□ Critical Thinking   □ Creative Thinking   □ Systems Thinking   □ Thinking in Time   □ Ethical 
Thinking 
Situation 
(Refer to the 
instructions 
packet for 
clarification on 
what to include 
here) 
 
Problem-solving 
approach 
(Refer to the 
instructions 
packet for 
clarification on 
what to include 
here) 
 
Outcome 
(Refer to the 
instructions 
packet for 
clarification on 
what to include 
here) 
 
Circle the number that best reflects how effectively the problem was dealt with  
 
1                            2                            3                            4                            5 
 
  Very Ineffective/                                                                                         Highly Effective/ 
    Detrimental                                                                                             Successful                                                              
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Demographics and Background 
 
The information requested below will allow us to summarize the basic demographics and 
experiences of our sample.  
 
1. Gender: ________ 
2. Rank (e.g., O-3): ________ 
3. Current functional branch (e.g. Civil Affairs, Infantry): ____________________________ 
4. Current MOS (e.g., 12B): _________  
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Appendix B - Stage 2 Materials 
 Scenario Review and Feedback Packet 
 Demographics and Background 
 
The information requested below will allow us to summarize the basic demographics and 
experiences of our sample.  
 
5. Gender: ________ 
6. Rank (e.g., O-3): ________ 
7. Current functional branch (e.g. Civil Affairs, Infantry): ____________________________ 
Current MOS (e.g., 12B): _________ 
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Instructions 
In this section, you will read a sequence of brief problem scenarios and provide feedback on their 
usability for the strategic thinking mindset assessment. You will also be asked to provide brief 
behavioral response options a Soldier might engage in to deal with that scenario. Additionally, 
we would like you to vary the level of flexibility, inclusiveness, or humility shown in the 
response options you provide. 
 
Below is an example of a scenario with responses that vary on the element of inclusiveness. The 
A response is designed to reflect a low level of inclusiveness, while the B response reflects a 
high level of inclusiveness. Use these as a guide to the length and type of behavioral responses 
we are looking for. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Travel to the second location to replace the Sergeant and give the instructions, as you've 
seen a tendency for the host nationals to have more respect for officers. 
B. Consult with the interpreter to find out what may be causing the host nation forces to 
resist complying with the Sergeant's advice and what they think should be done instead. 
C. Work on improving the defensibility of both positions while instructing the Sergeant to 
try other influence tactics and to control his emotions better when he speaks to the host 
nationals. 
D. Instruct the Sergeant to have his squad execute the necessary actions for the host 
nationals until the other platoon arrives. Then report the incident to the host national 
police chief. 
  
EXAMPLE - You are a platoon leader and combat advisor assigned to mentor host nation 
police in an area of operations. You have two squads of coalition forces attached with you to 
a host nation police platoon. Another platoon nearby is delayed in arriving to their location, 
so your platoon  is split in half and forced to cover two locations, reducing your combat 
effectiveness and placing your sergeant in charge at the second location. Both locations soon 
come under attack from positions deep in the surrounding mountains and valleys. The host 
national police at the other location are not responding to your Sergeant's instructions for 
dealing with the attack. He is quickly becoming frustrated and angry. 
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Scenarios 
Instructions: Read the problem scenario provided in the box, then consider each question below. 
When appropriate, place an X in the box next to your desired response. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which of the three mindset characteristics is this scenario most appropriate for? In other words, 
is it easier to think of Soldier responses that vary on flexibility, inclusiveness, or humility? 
□ Flexibility                    □ Inclusiveness                    □ Humility 
 
In the space below, provide any general feedback you have on the scenario, how it might be fit to 
a mindset characteristic, made more relevant to a variety of Soldiers with different specialties, 
and any other additions or changes could be made to improve it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continues on other side) 
  
[Each scenario appeared in a text box like this, but for the sake of simplifying these appendices, 
the general form of the packet is presented only.] 
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Now, please consider what behaviors the Soldier in the above scenario might engage in to try to 
understand and resolve the problem.  
In 1-2 sentences each, please describe up to ten different behavioral responses by varying the 
level of flexibility, inclusiveness, or humility shown, depending on which characteristic you 
believe can best be measured with this problem scenario. The responses don’t have to be 
behaviors you think would definitely solve the problem, just actions that a typical Soldier might 
take. 
1.   
 
 
2.   
 
 
3.   
 
 
4.   
 
 
5.   
 
 
6.  
 
 
7.  
 
 
8.  
 
 
9.  
 
 
10.  
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Appendix C - Stage 3 Materials 
 Scenario and Response Rating Packet 
 Demographics and Background 
 
The information requested below will allow us to summarize the basic demographics and 
experiences of our sample.  
 
1. Gender: ________ 
2. Rank (e.g., O-3): ________ 
3. Current functional branch (e.g. Civil Affairs, Infantry): ____________________________ 
4. Current MOS (e.g., 12B): _________ 
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Instructions 
In this survey, you will be presented with real Company-grade problem scenarios. Associated 
with each is a set of response options that Army leaders have provided to us as realistic, viable 
ways to respond to the problem. Your task is to give us a rating of how effective each option 
would likely be.  The second aspect of your task is to indicate how much each option indicates a 
mindset reflecting either flexibility, inclusiveness, or humility. Your ability to judge these 
scenarios and response options in the context of your experience and military training are crucial 
to developing a quality assessment. 
 
For each scenario, you will be asked to rate how strongly you disagree or agree 1) that a response 
option would be effective, and 2) that the response option would reflect a mindset of 
flexibility/inclusiveness/humility. Please circle one number that best represents your level of 
agreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please circle your desired response as indicated below. 
 
1. Travel to the second location to replace the Sergeant and give the instructions, as you've 
seen a tendency for the host nationals to have more respect for officers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
 
Please do not use the space between numbers to indicate a more refined level of agreement, as 
shown below. 
 
1. Consult with the interpreter to find out what may be causing the host nation forces to 
resist complying with the Sergeant's advice and what they think should be done instead. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
  
EXAMPLE - You are a platoon leader and combat advisor assigned to mentor host nation 
police in an area of operations. You have two squads of coalition forces attached with you to 
a host nation police platoon. Another platoon nearby is delayed in arriving to their location, 
so your platoon  is split in half and forced to cover two locations, reducing your combat 
effectiveness and placing your sergeant in charge at the second location. Both locations soon 
come under attack from positions deep in the surrounding mountains and valleys. The host 
national police at the other location are not responding to your Sergeant's instructions for 
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Scenarios 
Please read the scenario and all of the response options before providing any ratings. Please rate 
each of these possible response options in terms of how strongly you disagree or agree that the 
response would be an effective way to address the problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Gather evidence about the consequences of the glitch and bring it up during after-action 
review. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
2. Report the problem with the scenario coordinator to his/her superior. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
3. Talk to someone with more expertise in the systems being used and find out what it will take 
to fix the glitch. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
4. Accept that it is the scenario coordinator’s job to oversee the running of the scenario and 
focus on how the participants overcome the lack of situational awareness. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
5. Focus on what the participants in the exercise are learning and don’t hold problems 
associated with the glitch against them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
6. Encourage the participants to complain that they don’t feel they’re getting a realistic exercise 
due to the glitch with the scenario systems. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
LT Nunez was an observer/controller (OC) tasked to oversee and provide feedback on a multinational, 
virtual exercise. Many tiers of systems participated, each with various sensors and weapon systems being 
used in the scenarios. During the scenarios, LT Nunez witnessed a glitch in the scenario, in which digital 
clutter appeared on the display screens whenever an incoming target was destroyed. The operators' 
responded by temporarily switching off their radar and turning it back on to remove the visual clutter.  
LT Nunez saw this as a huge problem. The clutter and the switching off of the radar caused a lack of 
situational awareness on part of the operators, especially during intense parts of the scenario. LT Nunez 
brought his concerns to the attention of the scenario coordinator, but was met with resistance and an 
insistence that the lack of situational awareness was not a problem. 
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Review the scenario and response options as necessary and now please rate each of these 
possible options in terms of how strongly you agree or disagree that the response would reflect a 
mindset of humility. Please refer back to the Definitions sheet you were provided to refresh 
yourself on what is meant by humility. 
 
1. Gather evidence about the consequences of the glitch and bring it up during after-action 
review. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
 
2. Report the problem with the scenario coordinator to his/her superior. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
 
3. Talk to someone with more expertise in the systems being used and find out what it will take 
to fix the glitch. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
 
4. Accept that it is the scenario coordinator’s job to oversee the running of the scenario and 
focus on how the participants overcome the lack of situational awareness. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
 
5. Focus on what the participants in the exercise are learning and don’t hold problems 
associated with the glitch against them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
 
6. Encourage the participants to complain that they don’t feel they’re getting a realistic exercise 
due to the glitch with the scenario systems. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 
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Appendix D - STMT Pilot Test Items 
FLEXIBILITY ITEM P5 
 
1. Refuse to open the container unless the local nationals can justify their suspicions.  
2. Open the shipping container and allow them view its contents, but not to search the 
container.  
3. Talk to the local nationals and try to get to the bottom of what caused them to be 
suspicious. 
4. Explain to the local nationals that for the nation to be allies with coalition forces, there 
needs to be a level of trust that would be violated by opening the container.  
KEY: 1 – NEG, 2 – POS, 3 – NEUT, 4 - NEUT 
 
FLEXIBILITY ITEM P8 
 
 
1. Be candid with the Battalion XO that, in order to successfully complete the redeployment 
mission, they will need more time. 
2. Contact other Company XOs in the Brigade to brainstorm ways to meet the one week 
suspense. 
3. Create a new redeployment plan first and work to get the equipment that was already 
turned in returned or replaced later. 
4. Conduct a VTC with the other Company XOs and the Battalion XO to convince him/her 
of the need for a longer suspense. 
KEY: 1 – NEUT, 2 – POS, 3 – NEUT, 4 - NEG  
While deployed, CPT Matthews lead a platoon on a mission to recover a shipping container 
that had been detained by local national police. The contracted shipping company had been 
stopped at the border carrying Army equipment containers that were marked as being U.S. 
property containing HMMWV repair parts, but were not escorted by U.S. forces. The local 
nationals suspected the container was carrying ammunition that was not properly marked. 
CPT Matthews could not see any reason for the local nationals to be suspicious. The local 
nationals believed they had the right to view the contents of any container crossing their 
border. CPT Matthews wanted to be very sensitive not to disrupt the relationship with the 
locals and wanted to help save face for the local base CDR, while still recovering the 
equipment and assuring them it was properly marked. 
 
Bravo Company was set to redeploy soon and LT Graves, the Company XO, had spent weeks 
planning the process of turning in the remaining rolling stock (HMMWV/MRAPs) to clear 
the equipment hand receipt and had begun to execute the plan. However, with a week left 
before redeployment, the Company received an order that the rest of the Brigade would 
redeploy and the Company would act as a ready reserve for units all over the country. 
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FLEXIBILITY ITEM P16 
 
1. Give the pilot the fuel that he is requesting. 
2. Attempt to communicate with another informed party, e.g., at the fuel point or an 
engineer, to get another perspective on how much risk is associated with using lower-
grade fuel. 
3. Wait to get approval from higher up on the helicopter pilot’s chain of command. 
4. Argue that the fuel is needed at their original destination and that the pilots should use 
their designated re-fueling point where they can obtain appropriate fuel. 
KEY: 1 – NEUT, 2 – POS, 3 – NEUT, 4 - NEG 
 
FLEXIBILITY ITEM P21 
 
1. Approach the commander and argue that, for the sake of your platoon’s chance of success 
in deployment and in their careers, they need to be given the opportunity to receive 
training for their mission. 
2. Ask other units nearby if there are people that have graduated from those courses that are 
available to give your Soldiers some of the training. 
3. Submit a second request for only one or two of your better Soldiers to go to the courses 
and plan to have them teach the rest of your platoon when they return. 
4. Ask for guidance from the commander on what to do when budgets are constrained, but 
Soldiers need training. 
KEY: 1 – NEG, 2 – POS, 3 – NEUT, 4 - NEUT 
 
  
LT Gonzalez was in command of a convoy that included multiple fuel tankers. Nearby, another 
convoy came under heavy enemy fire. Helicopters nearby were called in to provide close air 
support, but were getting low on fuel. The only place to receive fuel was far enough to delay 
the support to the convoy by 30-45 minutes. While on route to the fuel point, the pilots spotted 
LT Gonzalez’s convoy. They landed immediately and briefed LT Gonzalez on the situation 
and their need for immediate resupply. LT Gonzalez resisted, noting that his fuel had not been 
tested to determine if it was aviation-grade or not. The pilot wanted to accept the risk, because 
the need was so pressing.  However, LT Gonzalez was concerned about completing his own 
mission as well as the risk to the aircraft. 
LT Allen was stationed in Europe preparing for a deployment as a platoon leader attached with 
a military intelligence company in an infantry brigade. LT Allen’s platoon needed extensive 
training in preparation for the upcoming deployment. However, a request to send his Soldiers 
to MOS-specific training courses back in the U.S. was denied due to lack of funding and 
frequent course cancellations. 
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FLEXIBILITY ITEM P20 
 
1. Request an NCO stay on to help with the additional staff roles. 
2. Focus on performing well in the FSO duties and make the best of it with the other areas. 
3. Pore over doctrine and other reference material on the new staff functions. 
4. Try to replicate the products produced by the previous S7 and S9 to make them work for 
the remainder of the deployment. 
 
KEY: 1 – NEG, 2 – NEUT, 3 – POS, 4 - NEUT 
 
FLEXIBILITY ITEM P13 
 
 
1. Have a private conversation with SGT Hayes’ to see if his anger about the incident might 
result in him actually doing something to SFC Crouch. 
2. Treat the comment as a legitimate threat and take the appropriate disciplinary actions. 
3. Counsel SFC Crouch and explain to him that his leadership style is ineffective and the 
way he handles discipline needs to change. 
4. Treat it as an isolated incident of blowing off steam, but tell SGT Hayes’ peers to report 
if he continues to make any kind of threat to SFC Crouch. 
KEY: 1 – POS, 2 – NEG, 3 – NEUT, 4 - NEUT 
 
  
While at home station, CPT Adams received word of a dispute between SGT Hayes and his 
platoon sergeant, SFC Crouch. SFC Crouch has a very "in your face" style which produced a 
strained relationship with many Soldiers in the platoon. One day, after his graduation 
ceremony from the Advanced Leader Course (ALC), SGT Hayes went home for the rest of 
the day rather than returning to the unit. SFC Crouch called SGT Hayes back to work and 
chewed him out severely in front of many peers. SGT Hayes reportedly stormed away and 
threatened to get even with SFC Crouch. At this point, the incident was reported to the 
company commander CPT Adams. 
LT Mason was a company fire support officer (FSO) providing advice to the commander and 
de-conflicting different assets. LT Mason was preparing to return home with his unit for an 
early redeployment, but instead he was assigned to stay and work on the Battalion staff.  LT 
Mason would have to serve as the civil-military relations officer (S9), information operations 
officer (S7), and assistant Battalion FSO. LT Mason knew he hadn’t received any training for 
the S7 and S9 positions and was concerned that he would not perform well in those functions. 
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FLEXIBILITY ITEM P2 
 
 
1. Maintain the inner cordon, but wait to enter the house until you can disperse the crowd by 
having the interpreter explain the situation. 
2. Focus on the local police leader and challenge him to set an example of courage for his 
men and lead the entrance into the target house. 
3. Contact your Company commander and ask him/her to communicate with the local police 
commander to order his men to enter the house. 
4. Call off the search if the police refuse to participate to avoid breaking rules of 
engagement. 
KEY: 1 – POS, 2 – NEUT, 3 – NEUT, 4 - NEG 
 
HUMILITY ITEM P7 
 
 
Given the following options for responding to this scenario, select the one that you would be 
most likely to choose? 
 
1. Accept the mission without comment and do your best to figure it out through trial and 
error. 
2. Spend a couple of days reading reference materials on aviation movement requirements 
and other logistics principles. 
3. Gather a team of others in the Battalion who together have the necessary knowledge and 
experience and operate as the coordinator of their efforts. 
4. Use a whiteboard to visualize all the elements of the problem and create a plan from 
there. 
KEY: 1 – NEG, 2 – NEUT, 3 – POS, 4 - NEUT 
  
Two platoons responded to intelligence that a high value target had bedded down in a nearby 
village. LT Smith led the effort to search the target house and surrounding area. LT Jones led 
the outer cordon enclosing the village. A local national opened fire on the outer cordon and 
was killed. At the target house with the local police, the villagers became upset and gathered 
aggressively. The local police wanted to leave without searching the houses. However, LT 
Smith needed the local police to enter the target house first and assist due to the rules of 
engagement. 
CPT Smith was a Field Artillery (FA) officer assigned to an Apache helicopter task force, 
working in the S3 shop. The Battalion XO assigned CPT Smith to plan and run the 
redeployment of the task force back to home station. This included hundreds of Soldiers, 27 
helicopters, and 90+ containers. As an FA officer, CPT Smith lacked experience and in-depth 
knowledge of how to transport aviation equipment. Coordination for personnel movement, 
container movement, and helicopter flight/movement all needed to be coordinated separately 
through different Brigade/theater organizations. Furthermore, the Battalion XO emphasized 
the need to prevent any loss of flight hours or ground support in the process. 
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HUMILITY ITEM P9 
 
 
1. Try to use his extensive time in the local national army to your benefit by consulting him 
about what has gone on in the local national army in the past. 
2. Ask your superiors to contact the LTC before you begin and vouch for you and describe 
how capable you are. 
3. Focus on the LTC’s subordinates and work with them more directly and demonstrate 
your competence to them. 
4. Defer to the LTC whenever there is a disagreement in order to maintain a positive 
relationship. 
KEY: 1 – POS, 2 – NEG, 3 – NEUT, 4 - NEUT 
 
HUMILITY ITEM 3 P3 
 
 
1. Gather evidence about the consequences of the glitch and bring it up during after-action 
review. 
2. Report the problem with the scenario coordinator to his/her superior. 
3. Accept that it is the scenario coordinator’s job to oversee the running of the scenario and 
focus on how the participants overcome the lack of situational awareness. 
4. Encourage the participants to complain that they don’t feel they’re getting a realistic 
exercise due to the glitch with the scenario systems. 
KEY: 1 – NEUT, 2 – NEUT, 3 – POS, 4 - NEG 
  
LT Hansen was assigned to serve as the senior advisor to a local national army battalion. The 
history of the area of operations and the local Army battalion required a consistent, strong 
presence with the local nationals. LT Hansen was an experienced 1LT close to promotion and 
highly thought of by his superiors. However, it was clear the local national army commander, 
who was a LTC and accustomed to being advised by American CPTs, was hesitant to work 
with an American advisor of an even lower rank than he was used to. 
LT Nunez was an observer/coach (OC) tasked to oversee and provide feedback on a 
multinational, virtual exercise. Many tiers of systems participated, each with various sensors 
and weapon systems being used in the scenarios. During the scenarios, LT Nunez witnessed a 
glitch in the scenario, in which digital clutter appeared on the display screens whenever an 
incoming target was destroyed. The operators' responded by temporarily switching off their 
radar and turning it back on to remove the visual clutter.  
LT Nunez saw this as a huge problem. The clutter and the switching off of the radar caused a 
lack of situational awareness on part of the operators, especially during intense parts of the 
scenario. LT Nunez brought his concerns to the attention of the scenario coordinator, but was 
met with resistance and an insistence that the lack of situational awareness was not a problem. 
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HUMILITY P12 
 
 
1. Conduct the inquiry and include a summary of your personal relationship as part of your 
report. 
2. Ask a peer to volunteer to do the inquiry in your place and recommend the peer while 
informing LTC Young of the relationship. 
3. Conduct the inquiry, but ask a trusted peer to go over things with you as a check to 
prevent any bias from coming in. 
4. Tell LTC Young that you have a personal relationship with SSG Adams that some might 
see as influencing your objectivity, but that you would still like to conduct the 
investigation, with his approval. 
KEY: 1 – NEG, 2 – NEUT, 3 – NEUT, 4 - POS 
 
HUMILITY ITEM P4 
 
 
1. Reframe your thinking about how involved you need to be in the local judicial system, 
knowing that it will have to work on its own eventually. 
2. Advise the police chief to conduct another operation to re-take the target and allow your 
advisor team to obtain any information the target can provide. 
3. Talk to other parties in the local judicial system to see if you can find out what the 
justification for his release was. 
4. Work on gathering better intelligence and evidence on the target and present this to the 
police chief and advise him to conduct another mission to re-detain the target. 
KEY: 1 – POS, 2 – NEG, 3 – NEUT, 4 - NEUT 
  
CPT Bolino was tasked by LTC Young to conduct a commander’s inquiry into an allegation 
that SSG Adams, the command group secretary, had falsified documents in order to get 
promoted. Despite being in the same company, CPT Bolino and SSG Adams did not work 
directly together. However, SSG Adams would occasionally come to CPT Bolino to talk 
about difficult personal situations outside of work. LTC Young needed the inquiry done 
quickly. CPT Bolino felt that he could be objective in the inquiry and wanted to accomplish 
the tasks assigned to him. 
CPT Donaldson lead a group of military advisors assigned to a local national police force. 
The advisors and police conducted a combined operation to locate a high value target hiding 
in a small house in a nearby village. The police detained the target and processed him in the 
local judicial system. The next day, CPT Donaldson went to the prison to visit the target and 
was told that the target had been released to the community. CPT Donaldson asked the police 
leadership why he had been released and did not receive a clear reason. Mistrust grew 
between the two units, disrupting the advising relationship. 
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HUMILITY ITEM P10 
 
 
1. Focus on improving the morale of the platoon. Come up with creative solutions to get 
everyone’s buy-in before cracking down on the standards. 
2. Communicate to the Soldiers that the platoon is not up to standard and that while you 
adjust to the logistics world, they will have to adjust to a higher standard of unit 
performance. 
3. Ask NCOs to provide candid feedback on your own performance while also giving 
feedback to them on the ways they can take more responsibility for the performance of 
their Soldiers. 
4. Challenge the Soldiers to take more pride in their branch and show that they can meet the 
same standard of discipline as a combat arms unit. 
KEY: 1 – NEUT, 2 – NEUT, 3 – POS, 4 - NEG 
 
HUMILITY ITEM P19 
 
 
1. Use your own leadership skills to maintain performance and morale among the Soldiers 
in the company while CPT Jacobs remains in command. 
2. Request a meeting with the Battalion XO to explain to him the problems you see with 
CPT Jacobs. 
3. Accept that CPT Jacobs is in command and focus on what you can learn about what you 
won’t do if you become a company commander. 
4. Be up front with CPT Jacobs that the Soldiers and NCOs in the unit feel disrespected and 
that if nothing changes you are worried about the performance of the unit. 
KEY: 1 – NEUT, 2 – NEG, 3 – POS, 4 - NEUT 
  
LT Smith was a highly motivated officer right out of ranger school when he arrived at his 
unit. The commander placed LT Smith in charge of a platoon managing the unit’s logistics, a 
position usually reserved for a senior LT before moving on to CPT. When he arrived at the 
platoon, LT Smith was overwhelmed by the enormous amount of disorder and the lack of 
morale in the platoon. The platoon was performing poorly: missing ammunition draw times, 
vehicles not ready to refuel before leaving for training exercises, bickering amongst NCOs, 
Soldiers getting into trouble, and bad PT scores. To complicate matters, LT Smith had trained 
for combat arms, but was instead was tasked with managing logistics which he struggled to 
wrap his head around. 
CPT Norris was a company executive officer serving under what he felt was an incompetent 
commander, CPT Jacobs. CPT Jacobs struggled to make decisions, and often showed little 
personal respect for his Soldiers, a lack of trust in his NCOs, and was not confident tactically. 
Many in the company felt the performance of the company was degraded since the previous 
CDR had left. 
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INCLUSIVENESS ITEM P15 
 
 
1. Fire the cultural advisor to avoid the risk of any more classified or sensitive information 
being released. 
2. Speak to a trusted leader in the local community about the situation as a hypothetical and 
see what he recommends. 
3. Wait to take action until a source more trustworthy than the known criminal actors makes 
an accusation. 
4. Speak with the cultural advisor and see if he gets unusually defensive or seems guilty. 
KEY: 1 – NEG, 2 – POS, 3 – NEUT, 4 - NEUT 
 
INCLUSIVENESS ITEM P17 
 
 
1. Do the necessary long-range planning yourself and have CPT Hadad build short-term 
plans within that, while extending the length of CPT Hadad’s plans over time. 
2. Conduct long-range planning yourself, but keep CPT Hadad closely involved in all 
meetings so that he learns through observation. 
3. Invite local leaders with the trust of the population to long-range planning meetings with 
CPT Hadad so that he gets to know the area and can get their input on how his plans will 
affect the population. 
4. Research the history of the area and find examples of previous police chiefs who have 
ignored long-range issues and explain what happened as a result. 
KEY: 1 – NEG, 2 – NEUT, 3 – POS, 4 - NEUT 
  
While deployed on a security force assistance mission, CPT Jones was tasked with oversight of police 
mentors. A local cultural advisor had been assigned to the lead U.S. police mentor. This individual had 
served well as an advisor for three years. CPT Jones received word that the cultural advisor’s name had 
been mentioned by known criminal actors as being a bad guy who extorted other locals with his 
position, using it to extort money and improve his position in the local community. He was also accused 
of passing classified or sensitive information to others. The cultural advisor was married to the local 
governor’s daughter. 
CPT Kennedy was deployed as an advisor to CPT Hadad, a local district chief of police. CPT 
Kennedy's mission was to help CPT Hadad and his police gain the trust of locals and establish 
security within his district so that the host nation could regain all control and responsibility of 
his district.  
CPT Hadad was a competent police officer, but struggled with long-range planning, and was 
unfamiliar with the district he just assumed responsibility over. CPT Kennedy had knowledge 
and experience planning and needed to devise a method of simultaneously gaining and 
maintaining security while mentoring CPT Hadad on assuming all control of his district. 
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INCLUSIVENESS ITEM P6 
 
 
1. Arrange a meeting with the local government officials and try to understand more about 
why they are resistant. 
2. Request that someone above you in the U.S. chain of command reach out to someone 
higher in the local government to bypass the resistance. 
3. Try to informally publicize your services through word of mouth, but nothing official. 
4. Comply with their bureaucratic processes for publicizing the efforts, accepting the delays 
in order to maintain a good relationship with the government. 
KEY: 1 – POS, 2 – NEUT, 3 – NEG, 4 - NEUT 
 
 
INCLUSIVENESS ITEM P18 
 
 
1. Confront the truck drivers with the missing fuel numbers and request an explanation. 
2. Get rid of the existing truck drivers and contract with a different local trucking company. 
3. Consult with U.S. engineers to see if they have any explanation for why fuel levels might 
decrease from departure to arrival. 
4. Recommend to the paying agent to only pay for the amount of fuel that arrives. 
KEY: 1 – NEUT, 2 – NEG, 3 – POS, 4 - NEUT 
  
CPT Clark was attached as civil-military support to a humanitarian dental effort.  CPT Clark 
was there to facilitate interaction with the local population and spread the word about the 
services available. However, the local government insisted that information about the services 
could only be distributed with approval and through the national government. However, the 
representatives CPT Clark had to work with were antagonistic and slow in responding and 
generally publicizing the effort. 
While deployed, CPT McCoy, Battalion S4, noticed shortages in fuel as fuel trucks arrived to 
her forward operating base (FOB). Records show that the local national fuel trucks had the 
appropriate fuel when leaving from the previous FOB and surveillance images did not 
indicate the vehicles were not leaving the route to offload fuel while moving between FOBs. 
No obvious leaks in the tanks could be found. As the amount of fuel missing increased over 
the months, CPT McCoy became concerned as it was approaching several hundred gallons a 
week. 
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INCLUSIVENESS ITEM P1 
 
 
1. Withhold all new food requests to those FOBs until a clear response has been given. 
2. Make plans using an estimate of the food stocks at each FOB based on what is on hand at 
the other FOBs. 
3. Provide the Brigade XO with a list of the FOBs that are hoarding their food stocks. 
4. Continue to request revised reports from each until you get a clear picture of what is on 
hand at each. 
KEY: 1 – NEG, 2 – NEUT, 3 – NEUT, 4 - POS 
 
 
INCLUSIVENESS ITEM P14 
 
 
1. Remove the computer from the network and instruct the pilots to ground their flights as 
soon as possible. 
2. Wait to remove the computer until the pilots can find a suitable landing spot. 
3. Leave the computer on the network until the mission is complete. 
4. Discuss the nature of the virus with other signal officers you can get in touch with and 
see if they have any knowledge on the severity. 
KEY: 1 – NEG, 2 – NEUT, 3 – NEUT, 4 - POS 
  
Newly promoted CPT Stevens has just begun a new assignment as a General Support Officer 
(GSO), tasked with sustaining the Brigade with supplies, such as food, ammunition, and fuel. 
The Brigade was initiating closure of a battle space, including 15 forward operating bases 
(FOB). CPT Stevens needed to create a plan for future sustainment operations. A problem 
arose when reports from several of the FOBs did not provide clear responses about their 
current stock of food, while still regularly sending new requests for food.  CPT Stevens 
became confused and frustrated at how this prevented his ability to plan ahead for future 
sustainment. 
CPT Martin was a Battalion signal staff officer in an aviation unit, primarily assigned to 
maintain a computer network to prevent sensitive information being compromised. One day, 
CPT Martin was notified that the network had a potential compromise on a mission-critical 
weather station computer. That computer largely determined if it was safe for the pilots to fly 
or not. Scans indicated the computer had a virus, but it was unclear how threatening it was. 
Standard protocol in this case would be to remove the computer from the network. However, 
at that time, the weather was becoming severe and pilots already in the air needed guidance 
on which paths they could safely travel. Inaccurate guidance or a lack of guidance posed a 
grave threat to the pilots. The Battalion XO and commander deferred to CPT Martin’s 
judgment about the level of threat posed by the virus. 
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INCLUSIVENESS ITEM 7 – P11 
 
 
1. Place your squad between the males and females to buy time for the females to get to 
safety. 
2. Tell the females that your presence there does not change their society and that they 
should go home as quickly as possible. 
3. Tell the females to find some garments in the market as soon as possible and follow them 
until they are adequately dressed. 
4. Encourage local bystanders to help resolve the situation peacefully by separating the men 
from females and finding them adequate clothing. 
KEY: 1 – NEG, 2 – NEUT, 3 – NEUT, 4 - POS 
 
LT Aldridge’s platoon leader was responsible for providing security in a sector of town. 
Many welcomed the platoon’s presence because it helped decrease crime in the area. While 
on patrol, LT Aldridge encountered an incident involving two young local females in the 
market area dressed in an American style, rather than traditional religious garments. The 
young women were being followed and verbally accosted by a group of men who felt the 
women were being disrespectful in their dress and mannerisms. The women were afraid and 
claimed that they had believed the presence of American Soldiers in their town meant they 
were free to dress and act more liberally. Although LT Aldridge knew the rules of 
engagement instructed not to interfere with local tribal traditions, his interpreter warned that if 
the women were left on their own, they would likely be killed or stoned. 
